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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Politically Rational Foreign Policy Decision-Making. (August 2005) 
 
Charles Todd Kent, B.S., Utah State University; 
 
M.A., Regent University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. George C. Edwards III 
 
 
 
This dissertation is an analysis of how presidents make foreign policy decisions.  
Rather than explaining foreign policy decisions by focusing on individuals or 
institutions, I stress the role of political pressures and context faced by presidents.  It 
shows that foreign policy decisions are not merely a reaction to stimulus from the 
international or domestic arenas but involve political considerations that affect policy 
choice. 
The dynamic elements in the argument are political resources and risk.  The 
relationship between the risk propensity of the president and presidential political 
resources provides an important link to understanding foreign policy decisions.  Within 
the realm of good public policy, a politically rational president can choose to act or 
respond to foreign policy disputes in various ways, including diplomacy, political 
coercion, economic coercion, covert action, or military intervention, based on his 
assessment of the political context and his willingness to accept the associated risks.  
The level of presidential political resources determines the risk propensity of the 
president.  Presidential foreign policy decisions will vary depending on the quantity of 
 iv
available political resources.  Thus, understanding the risk propensity of the president 
increases our ability to explain foreign policy decisions.   
The contribution of this research is the identification of a mechanism for 
understanding how the interaction between the domestic and international political 
environments, and individual decision-makers influence foreign policy decisions.  My 
research bridges the gap between structural theories, “theories that make predictions 
about foreign policy outcomes without reference to the cognition and actions of the 
actors themselves,” and decision-making theories that stress the role of the actors 
(Ikenberry 2002, 5).  Although the component parts of the foreign policy decision-
making system are widely known, we lack theories that tie the pieces together.     
 
 
 
 
 
 v
DEDICATION 
 
 
 I dedicate this dissertation to my wife Brenda.  Although she is not receiving a 
doctoral degree, she deserves one as much as I do.  For the past 5 years, Brenda has 
edited every page I have written.  She home schooled our three children Elisabeth, 
Emily, and Abby and made sure they practiced their musical instruments.  She managed 
the household on a graduate assistant’s salary without difficulty and put the children to 
bed while I worked nights in the office.  Brenda sacrificed so that I could pursue my 
doctoral dreams.  “Who can find a virtuous wife?  For her worth is far above rubies” 
(Proverbs 31:10). 
 
 
 
 
 vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I would like to thank my dissertation chair, Dr. George Edwards, for his tireless 
effort, guidance, and support.  Demanding excellence throughout the process, Dr. 
Edwards’ encouragement to do better when I thought it was good enough vastly 
improved this dissertation.  I am also indebted to the other members of my committee.  
Dr. Nehemia Geva took the time to think through my ideas and arrive at workable 
solutions.  Dr. David Peterson’s labors improving my methodology rescued my 
dissertation from embarrassing and juvenile mistakes.  Dr. Charles Hermann always 
asked the hard questions that required refinement and precision in my thinking and 
writing.   
Thanks also to my friends and colleagues in the Political Science department at 
Texas A&M University who made graduate school bearable and even enjoyable at times.  
The willingness of the faculty and other graduate students to suggest thoughtful 
solutions and honest critiques makes the department a great place to grow as a scholar.   
I would like to acknowledge the sacrifice of my children, Elisabeth, Emily, and 
Abby.  The many evenings and weekends dad spent in the office will pay off someday. 
Finally, I would like to thank my parents David and Eileen Kent.  Without their 
support, finishing this Ph.D. program would have been impossible.   
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Page 
 
ABSTRACT ..............................................................................................................  iii 
 
DEDICATION ..........................................................................................................  iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................  v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................  vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................  viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES...................................................................................................  x 
 
CHAPTER 
 
 I INTRODUCTION................................................................................  1 
 
   Previous Approaches to Explaining Foreign Policy ...................  2 
   A Politically Rational Theory of Foreign Policy ........................  6 
 
 II LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT ...........  14 
 
   Explaining Foreign Policy...........................................................  16 
   A Politically Rational Theory of Foreign Policy ........................  32 
 
 III POLITICAL CAPITAL .......................................................................  42 
 
   Potential Sources of Political Capital..........................................  44 
   Presidential Political Capital .......................................................  65 
 
 IV THE NATURE OF RISK IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY......................  71 
 
   What Is Foreign Policy Risk?......................................................  71 
   Measuring Risk Exposure ...........................................................  83 
   A Model of Foreign Policy Risk .................................................  96 
 
 V POLITICAL CONTEXT AND FOREIGN POLICY RISK-TAKING 102 
 
   Is the Glass Half-full or Half-empty?..........................................  104 
   Prospect Theory...........................................................................  106 
 viii
CHAPTER    Page 
 
   Testing the Politically Rational Theory of Foreign Policy .........  111 
   Data and Methods........................................................................  116 
 
 VI TESTING THE POLITICALLY RATIONAL THEORY...................  118 
 
   Job Approval As a Reference Point ............................................  119 
   Risky Foreign Policy Relationships ............................................  124 
   Modeling the Foreign Policy System ..........................................  135 
 
 VII CONCLUSION ....................................................................................  153 
 
   Approach to the Study ................................................................  153 
   The Politically Rational Decision-Maker....................................  155 
   Future Study ................................................................................  157 
 
REFERENCES..........................................................................................................  158 
 
APPENDIX A ...........................................................................................................  176 
 
APPENDIX B ...........................................................................................................  177 
 
APPENDIX C ...........................................................................................................  178 
 
APPENDIX D ...........................................................................................................  179 
 
VITA .........................................................................................................................  180 
 
 
 
 
 ix
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
TABLE Page 
 
 3.1 Job Approval and Percentage of House and Senate Seats..........................  49 
 
 3.2 Control of House and Senate Before Election............................................  50 
 
 3.3 Margin of Victory and Gain/Loss in House and Senate.............................  52 
 
 3.4 Margin of Victory and Congressional Support ..........................................  53 
 
 3.5 Margin of Electoral Victory and First Year Job Approval.........................  55 
 
 3.6 GDP, Job Approval and Presidential Support in Congress ........................  56 
 
 3.7 Presidential Support in the House ..............................................................  58 
 
 3.8 Presidential Support in the Senate..............................................................  59 
 
 3.9 Gross Domestic Product and Election Results for Incumbent Party..........  60 
 
 3.10 Presidential Reelection Results 1956-2004................................................  62 
 
 3.11 Election Results 1954-2004:  Presidential and Midterm Elections............  63 
 
 3.12 Election Results Summary 1954-2004.......................................................  64 
 
 4.1 Nations Included in CCFR Feeling Thermometer Questions ....................  86 
 
 4.2 Interactions with Other Nations by President (% of Total Interactions)...          88 
 
 4.3 Salient Nations by President ......................................................................  90 
 
 4.4 Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) ......................................  92 
 
 4.5 Percentage of Conflictual Interactions between U.S. and Target Nations .  95 
 
 5.1 Presidential Job Approval from Gallup Polls (1969 to 2000) ....................  113 
 
 6.1 Job Approval Summary by President, 1969 to 2000..................................  121 
 
 6.2 Job Approval Distribution in 10-point and 5-point Groups .......................  123 
 x
TABLE Page 
 
 6.3 High and Medium Risk Relationships from Nixon to Bush I ....................  125 
 
 6.4 Difference of Means Test (Reference Point 50-59) ...................................  133 
 
 6.5 Loss Aversion and Gain Endowment.........................................................  134 
 
 6.6 Granger Test for Influence on US Foreign Policy Actions ........................  141 
 
 6.7 Analysis of Job Approval Reference Point ................................................  142 
 
 6.8 Influence on the Reference Point (High and Medium Risk) ......................  143 
 
 6.9 Influence on US Foreign Policy Actions Toward USSR ...........................  146 
 
 6.10 Influence on the Reference Point (USA/USSR) ........................................  146 
 
 6.11 Influence on US Foreign Policy Actions (No USSR) ................................  148 
 
 6.12 High Profile Conflicts Involving the United States from Nixon to Bush I  151 
 
 
 xi
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
FIGURE Page 
 
 1.1 Model of U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Making .......................................  8 
 
 4.1 Decision-Maker Loss Exposure .................................................................  75 
 
 4.2 Risk Assessment from Power Differential .................................................  78 
 
 4.3 Risk Assessment from the Nature of the Action ........................................  79 
 
 4.4 Risk Assessment and Utility in State of Failure.........................................  80 
 
 4.5 Conditional Risk in Foreign Policy (Salient Nations Only).......................  82 
 
 4.6 Risk Exposure Johnson Administration .....................................................  98 
 
 4.7 Risk Exposure Nixon Administration ........................................................  98 
 
 4.8 Risk Exposure Ford Administration...........................................................  99 
 
 4.9 Risk Exposure Carter Administration ........................................................  99 
 
 4.10 Risk Exposure Reagan Administration ......................................................  100 
 
 4.11 Risk Exposure Bush Administration ..........................................................  100 
 
 5.1 Comparison of Expected-Utility and Prospect Theory Functions .............  107 
 
 6.1 Presidential Job Approval 1969-2000 ........................................................  121 
 
 6.2 Job Approval Distribution from 1969 to 2000 ...........................................  123 
 
 6.3 Mean Interaction by Job Approval-Low Risk Relationships .....................  128 
 
 6.4 Mean Interaction by Job Approval-High/Medium Risk (No Force)..........  129 
 
 6.5 Mean Interaction by Job Approval- High/Medium Risk (Force)...............  130 
 
 6.6 Mean Interaction by 10-Point Job Approval-No Use of Force ..................  131 
 
 6.7 Mean Interaction by 10-Point Job Approval-Use of Force ........................  132 
 xii
FIGURE Page 
 
 6.8 Foreign Policy Decision-Making Model-High/Medium Risk ...................  144 
 
 6.9 Foreign Policy Decision-Making Model-U.S./Soviet Union .....................  147 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
How a president makes foreign policy decisions remains an unanswered 
question.  The problem is that presidents often act in a manner that is counterintuitive to 
what public opinion would predict.  President Clinton committed American troops to a 
peacekeeping role in Bosnia when polls indicated that nearly 70% of the public opposed 
the action.  Facing strong opposition in Congress and the public, President Reagan 
continued to pursue policies in Central America aimed at stopping the spread of 
communism and ousting the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.  President George W. Bush 
initiated conflict with Iraq in spite of strong international pressures against the action.  
Presidents simply do not always adhere to the democratic leadership principles of 
responsiveness to strongly expressed popular opinion when making foreign policy 
decisions.   
To determine what influences presidential foreign policy decisions, the most 
obvious place to start is the international system.  Responding to threats from the 
international arena requires a centralized reaction from the U.S. government, namely the 
president.  Furthermore, actions from the international system constrain the choices 
available to the president.  Although the international system is an important piece of the 
foreign policy puzzle, relying solely on the international system for explanations is  
____________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of American Political Science Review. 
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insufficient since this view of foreign policy decision-making fails to consider the 
realities of the domestic political environment.  The president faces numerous domestic 
influences and constraints from the public, Congress, interests groups, and the media, 
which we would expect to play some role in influencing foreign policy decisions.  Yet, 
by relying solely on domestic and international factors to explain foreign policy, one 
neglects the actors themselves.  If the domestic and international environments are the 
only relevant explanatory variables, one could simply substitute one president for 
another and the foreign policy choices will remain the same.  Research has shown that 
all decision-makers are not alike and have individual beliefs and perceptions that lead to 
diverse policy choices (George 1979; Hermann 1978, 1984, Foyle 1999; Walker 1983). 
 
Previous Approaches to Explaining Foreign Policy 
Traditional international relations theories are useful in explaining outcomes in 
the international system, yet discount important domestic processes that aid our 
understanding of foreign policy behavior.  Neorealists treat nations as rational, unitary 
actors and ignore domestic political considerations (Waltz 1979).  The most often used 
model to explain foreign policy decisions is the rational actor model.  Three major 
assumptions characterize this model (see Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Allison and Zelikow 
1999).  First, unitary actors or states make foreign policy decisions.  Second, these 
unitary actors calculate the cost and benefits of different courses of action and choose 
the alternative that maximizes their utilities.  Third, the international environment is the 
determining factor in foreign policy decisions.  In most international relations theories, 
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domestic political influences can be ignored because all leaders have the same goal of 
advancing their country’s interests in competition with other states.  “Policy takes 
precedence over politics because the international system both severely limits the 
sensible choices a country can make and shapes the processes by which these decisions 
are reached” (Peterson 1994, 232).  According to this view, current foreign policy 
actions by a state are a function of factors in the international system (see equation 1). 
 
Foreign Policy Actions (FPA) (t) = International system (t-1)                          (1) 
 
The neorealist view of foreign policy decision-making fails to consider the 
broader context and political realities of the domestic political environment.  Peterson 
has noted the inconsistency.  “If the international system constrains the [domestic] 
policies of nations, so also it must influence the way in which nation-states deliberate 
upon and decide these [foreign] policies” (Peterson 1994, 230; see also Fearon 1998).   
A second approach to foreign policy decision-making considers the influence of 
both domestic and international factors on foreign policy decision-making.  This line of 
research considers the potential effects of the media, Congress, public opinion, and 
interest groups on decision-making, acknowledging that foreign policy decisions are not 
based solely on international system events but also are affected by domestic pressures 
and domestic implications of policy decisions. Much of the attention by scholars focuses 
on the degree of congruence between prevailing opinion in the media, the public, and 
others on U.S. policy or on the degree to which domestic political factors provide a 
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constraint on the policy options of the president.  According to this approach to 
understanding foreign policy decisions, current foreign policy actions are a function of 
the domestic political context and factors within the international system (see equation 
2). 
FPA (t) = Domestic political context (t-1) + International System (t-1)           (2) 
 
Although the inclusion of the domestic political context takes into account 
additional important decision-making influences,  this view of U.S. foreign policy is 
under-specified because there is little consideration of the goals and incentives of the 
president when making foreign policy decisions.  Personal goals and incentives are an 
important factor because presidents have domestic policy goals, and sometimes re-
election goals, that extend beyond a particular foreign policy crisis.  Political gains and 
losses in the foreign policy arena concern presidents because of their influence on public 
approval.  Better understanding how the political goals of the president influence foreign 
policy choices can strengthen current scholarship.    
As Putnam (1988, 430) observed, “much of the existing literature on relations 
between domestic and international affairs consists either of ad hoc lists of countless 
‘domestic influences’ on foreign policy or of generic observations that national and 
international affairs are somehow ‘linked.’”  He recognized two shortcomings in the 
research.  First, policy and organizational explanations are preferred to the neglect of 
political explanations.  “A more adequate account of the domestic determinants of 
foreign policy and international relations must stress politics:  parties, social classes, 
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interest groups (both economic and noneconomic), legislators, and even public opinion 
and elections, not simply executive officials and institutional arrangements” (1988, 432).  
Second, Putnam contends that there are few theories that connect domestic and 
international politics.  “We need to move beyond the mere observation that domestic 
factors influence international affairs and vice versa, and beyond simple catalogs of 
instances of such influence, to seek theories that integrate both spheres, accounting for 
the areas of entanglement between them” (1988, 433). 
Accepting Putnam’s challenge, more recent research has focused on the influence 
of interests groups (Keohane and Milner 1996), business interests (Milner 1997), 
knowledge-based experts (Haas 1992), and public opinion (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994; 
Page and Shapiro 1983) on foreign policy decision-making.  Although these studies have 
expanded the analysis of foreign policy into new areas, more work is needed to 
understand the relative influence of these factors and how they integrate into the 
domestic and international arenas.    
In sum, scholars’ efforts to link theory with the actual practice of foreign policy 
have not generated a consensus about what best explains foreign policy decisions.  The 
most prominent theories of foreign policy decision-making—cognitive, governmental 
politics, bureaucratic politics, and rational choice—are helpful, but no one model is 
wholly adequate for explaining U.S. foreign policy (Brewer 1997, 46; Hastedt and 
Teitelbaum 1997, 246).  A single model is insufficient for understanding U.S. foreign 
policy because decision-makers often employ multiple decision rules and strategies 
when making decisions (see Abelson and Levi 1985; Suedfeld and Tetlock 1992; Mintz 
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and Geva 1997a).  Foreign policy decisions result from linked actions and reactions 
occurring on both the domestic and international levels, but also include political factors 
affecting individual decision-makers.  Consequently, new theories of foreign policy must 
account for both structural and individual factors influencing foreign policy decisions. 
 
A Politically Rational Theory of Foreign Policy 
I propose a theory of presidential foreign policy decision-making that provides a 
linkage between the domestic and international decision-making contexts based on the 
goal-maximizing behavior of presidents.  Rather than simply choosing among possible 
alternatives based only on policy issues, I assume that the president factors in potential 
political benefits and losses, and his current political standing.  As a result of these 
additional considerations, presidents may violate key rational choice assumptions such 
as transitivity and invariance.  George (1993, 20) distinguishes between “objective 
analytic rationality,” which he views as an over-intellectualized view of foreign policy, 
with “political rationality,” which takes into account the broader political concerns and 
interests of the policy-maker.   
Presidents desire to maintain the status necessary to be reelected, or in the case of 
second-term incumbents, preserve their place in history, and to successfully promote 
their policy agenda (Ostrom and Job 1986; Moore and Lanoue 2003; Erickson, 
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002).  This common assumption provides an important link to 
understanding foreign policy decisions.  I argue that the president’s standing among the 
public serves as a resource of political capital, useful for accomplishing a desired policy 
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agenda, but also serving a mediating role in foreign policy decisions.  “Popular 
presidents can afford to spend some popularity to achieve their policy goals.  Unpopular 
presidents cannot.” (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002, 66). 
My theory suggests that presidents with larger quantities of political resources 
make decisions differently than presidents with few available political resources.  The 
success or failure of a policy represents a deposit or a withdrawal from presidential 
capital resources, affecting future decision-making and political opportunities. 
The concept of presidential political resources is nothing new.1  Political 
resources are the assets, advantages, or anything useful to increase the power or 
influence available to a president to accomplish that which he desires.  A more precise 
model of foreign policy decision-making recognizes the moderating effect of a 
president’s level of political resources (Figure 1.1).    
                                                          
1 Light (1991, 25) argues that the most important presidential resource is political capital and without 
capital the president is severely limited.  Light defines capital as the number of party seats in Congress, 
public approval of the president, and electoral margin of victory.  He suggests that capital is what gives 
momentum to the domestic agenda (Light 1991, 34).  A Lexis-Nexis search of major U.S. newspapers 
found over 200 references to the president and political capital in the first two years of the George W. 
Bush presidency. 
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FPA (t) = DP (t-1) + PR (t-1) + IS (t-1) + ((DP (t-1)*PR (t-1)) + ((IS (t-1)*PR (t-1))   (3) 
 
As equation 3 illustrates, foreign policy actions are a function of the direct effects of the 
domestic political context and the international system and the indirect effect of each 
mediated by presidential resources.  
When faced with a foreign policy decision, presidents encounter both domestic 
and international pressures.  One could argue that a president assesses the domestic and 
international political environment and then makes his decision based on what he deems 
to be good public policy.  This account of the decision process is too simplistic.  It is my 
assertion that the level of political resources available to the president mediates 
decisions.   Since presidents realize that foreign policy successes or failures have future 
consequences for their tenure in office, they will choose options that are politically 
rational.  
International 
System (IS) 
Domestic 
Politics 
(DP)
Foreign Policy 
Action (FPA) 
Presidential 
Resources (PR) 
FIGURE 1.1     Model of U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Making 
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Although achievement in the foreign policy arena does not directly translate into 
legislative or electoral success, foreign policy actions are intertwined with domestic 
politics in that they can affect the level of political resources available to the president.  
It is the appreciation that foreign policy actions can have positive or negative 
consequences, which transcend the international arena and affect the president 
domestically, which provides the basis for understanding the importance of political 
resources on foreign policy decisions. 
 
Overview of the Study 
This dissertation is an analysis how presidents make foreign policy decisions.  
Rather than explaining foreign policy decisions by focusing on individuals or 
institutions, I stress the role of political pressures and context faced by presidents.  It 
shows that foreign policy decisions are not merely a reaction to stimulus from the 
international or domestic arenas, but involve political considerations that affect policy 
choice. 
The contribution of this research is the identification of a mechanism for 
understanding how the interaction between the domestic and international political 
environments, and individual decision-makers influence foreign policy decisions.  My 
research bridges the gap between structural theories, “theories that make predictions 
about foreign policy outcomes without reference to the cognition and actions of the 
actors themselves,” and decision-making theories that stress the role of the actors 
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(Ikenberry 2002, 5, George 1993).  Although the component parts of the foreign policy 
decision-making system are widely known, we lack theories that tie the pieces together.     
The dynamic elements in the argument are political resources and risk.  The 
relationship between the risk propensity of the president and presidential political 
resources provides an important link to understanding foreign policy decisions.  Within 
the realm of good public policy, a politically rational president can choose to act or 
respond to foreign policy disputes in various ways, including diplomacy, political 
coercion, economic coercion, covert action, or military intervention, based on his 
assessment of the political context and his willingness to accept the associated risks.  
The level of presidential political resources determines the risk propensity of the 
president.  Presidential foreign policy decisions will vary depending on the quantity of 
available political resources.  Thus, understanding the risk propensity of the president 
increases our ability to explain foreign policy decisions.   
The explanatory power of risk in foreign policy decisions has been the subject of 
numerous past studies.  Lamborn (1985) suggests that the ability and willingness of the 
president to sustain risk, given the political environment, influence foreign policy 
decisions.  Huth, Bennett & Gelpi (1992) found that effects of the international system 
mediate the risk propensity of decision-makers.  Kowert & Hermann (1997) determine 
that risk-propensity relates to differences among individuals.  These studies recognize 
the importance of risk, but do not specify what determines a president’s propensity for 
risk-taking.  
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In contrast to previous research, this study focuses on the importance of 
presidential resources in determining the risk-propensity of the president.  Rather than 
viewing a president’s willingness to accept risk as linear, risk propensity remains 
constant, I suggest that risk propensity varies depending on the current level of political 
resources available to the president.  The willingness to accept risk in foreign policy is 
conditional on the political context of the president.   
A prospect theory value function (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) suggests that 
decision-makers will be risk-acceptant in a domain of loss and risk-averse in a domain of 
gain, with the two domains divided by a reference point.  In this study, the reference 
point is the minimum preferred level of political resources.  Consequently, by 
determining the reference point and the current level of political resources, one can make 
assumptions concerning the risk propensity of the president and create hypotheses 
concerning the president’s likely foreign policy behavior.  Hence, presidential resources 
play a mediating role in presidential foreign policy decisions. 
 
Organization of the Study 
In Chapter II, I review the literature concerning foreign policy decision-making, 
including the different approaches used and explanations offered to explain foreign 
policy decisions of presidents.  These include international politics, domestic politics, 
and actor specific explanations.  I develop a theory of foreign policy decision-making 
that links structural and individual theories of decision-making.  My theory recognizes 
 12
the importance of the political environment created by the interaction between the 
international system and domestic politics on individual decision-makers.   
In Chapters III and IV, I more fully develop the important theoretical concepts of 
the model, specifically the notion of political resources and risk.  Chapter III 
demonstrates why political resources are important to the president.  Because the 
president has so few political tools available to carry out his duties, political resources 
become vital to his success.  The analysis examines the possible measures of presidential 
political resources, determines the most appropriate measure, and discusses presidential 
job approval as a resource.     
Chapter IV completes the theory development by examining risk in foreign 
policy decisions.  In this chapter, I examine the nature of risk in foreign policy decision-
making, create a measure for risk, and determine what foreign policy relationships 
increase risk for the president.  Using the expected utility equation, I develop a typology 
of risk that includes important factors such as public awareness, relative national 
strength, and the level of conflict in bilateral relations.   
Chapter V makes a unique application of prospect theory.  Although widely 
utilized in the psychological, economic, and management literature, only recently has 
prospect theory been applied in analyses of U.S. foreign policy events (see McDermott 
and Kugler 2001).  Prospect theory violates some of the assumptions of rational choice 
theory.  The most important difference between rational choice theory and prospect 
theory is the S-curve utility function.  An S-curve utility function helps to explain why 
presidents make decisions differently depending on their current public standing.  From 
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prospect theory, I introduce the concept of a reference point.  The reference point 
provides insight into why relative gains in political resources are more important than 
absolute gains.  The chapter includes an analysis of the risk propensity of the president 
and under what conditions I expect risky behavior to occur.  Finally, the chapter 
discusses how issues are framed and the resulting influence on decision-making. 
Chapter VI is the primary analytical section of the dissertation.  Using Time 
Series techniques, I create models that imitate the sequential process of foreign policy 
decisions.  The model includes both domestic and international influences on foreign 
policy decisions and their interaction with presidential political resources.  My theory 
suggests that political capital will mediate the foreign policy actions of the president by 
influencing the risk propensity of the president.   
Finally, in Chapter VII, I discuss my approach to studying foreign policy 
decision-making, comment on contributions this dissertation makes to the study of the 
presidency and foreign policy, and propose directions for future study.  What do the 
findings suggest for the study of the presidency generally, and presidential foreign policy 
decision-making specifically?  Does the president lead, follow, or react when making 
foreign policy decisions?  Can we make probabilistic assertions about presidential 
foreign policy decisions?   
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of models used in the study 
of American foreign policy and develop a new theoretical approach to understanding 
foreign policy decisions.  The critical role of foreign policy in our political system 
underscores scholarly attempts to understand how foreign policy decisions are actually 
made.  G. John Ikenberry, in his collection of theoretical essays on American foreign 
policy, describes the current state of scholarship.  “The problem in the study of 
American foreign policy is that we have too many ways of explaining policy—we have 
an overabundance of theory . . . . Scholars are drawn to the study of foreign policy in 
efforts to develop powerful and satisfying accounts of the forces that shape policy.  Yet 
very little agreement can be found over what those forces are and how they operate” 
(Ikenberry 2002).  The obstacle is not a lack of competing theories, but an inability to 
combine diverse explanations into theories that take into account the complexities of the 
decision-making environment.   
This dissertation seeks to develop a theoretical approach that provides a 
mechanism to link structural and individual level theories of foreign policy decision-
making, improving our ability to explain how presidents make foreign policy decisions.  
A minimal requirement for a comprehensive theory of foreign policy decision-making is 
that results comport with two fundamental realities.  First, the foreign policy arena is a 
system, a regularly interacting group of influences forming a unified whole.  Foreign 
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policies result from the interaction of the international system, domestic politics, and 
individual actors.  Theories that explain only a part of the decision-making system do not 
account for the complexities of foreign policy decisions; therefore, combining insights 
from competing theories can lead to more satisfactory explanations of foreign policy 
decisions.  The nature of the system is dynamic rather than static.  Each action results in 
a reaction.  Consequently, moves by one member of the system changes the decision-
making environment. 
Second, foreign policy is inherently political.  Presidents recognize that there are 
domestic and international consequences that result from foreign policy decisions.  
Depending on the perceived success or failure of his foreign policy-decisions, reaction 
from the public, media, and Congress can increase or decrease the president’s ability to 
accomplish desired policy objectives, win reelection, or maintain his public status.  In a 
similar manner, foreign policy decisions affect political support from other states and the 
president’s standing in the international system.     
An improved theory of foreign policy should help to account for irregularities 
and puzzles in foreign policy.  For example, why are presidential foreign policy actions 
sometimes congruent with public opinion and other times contradicting public opinion?  
Why are presidential foreign policy actions sometimes cooperative and sometimes 
conflictual, even under similar circumstances?  Why do some presidents take more 
foreign policy risk than others do? 
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 The dependent variable in this analysis is presidential foreign policy actions.  The 
important explanatory concepts are political capital and risk.2  Political capital is 
important to the president because he has policy, legacy, and possibly reelection goals, 
and believes that political strength improves his opportunities for success.  Although the 
president has a range of possible foreign policy responses to a situation, the risks vary 
depending on the nature of the action pursued.  I intend to demonstrate that presidents 
with larger quantities of political capital take less foreign policy risks than presidents 
with few available resources.  An understanding of the relationship between political 
capital and risk propensity increase our ability to explain foreign policy decisions.  
Below, I will examine some previous explanations of foreign policy and develop a new 
theoretical approach to studying foreign policy actions.  
 
Explaining Foreign Policy 
 Efforts to explain U.S. foreign policy actions have centered on a scholar’s choice 
of explanatory variables and typically have been summarized into three categories:  
international politics, domestic politics, and actor specific.  Explanations from 
international politics focus on the role of national governments and how they respond to 
national security threats and status.  Domestic political explanations concentrate on 
factors such as public opinion, media, parties, interests groups, Congress, and culture to 
determine how foreign policies develop to confront threats from the international 
system.  Actor specific explanations seek answers from examining the individual beliefs 
                                                          
2 Chapters III and IV provide an in-depth analysis of political capital and foreign policy risk. 
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of decision-makers and the structure of the decision-making environment.  Below, I 
discuss each of these categories in more detail.   
 
International Politics 
 International politics models find explanatory power from understanding the 
relationship between states in the international system.  The nature of the international 
system requires that countries pursue policies that promote their national interests and 
security.  Instead of being influential in policymaking, internal factors play a secondary 
role and may even hinder states’ efforts to respond to changes in the international 
system. 
The dominant paradigm in international politics is neorealism, although 
neoliberal scholarship continues to grow in acceptance.3  The theoretical underpinnings 
of neorealism can be traced to Kenneth Waltz (1979), although works by Glaser (1992a 
and 1992b), Mearsheimer (1990), Schweller (1994), and Grieco (1988) helped to refine 
the basic theory.  Waltz modified the theories of Hans Morganthau (1948), which 
asserted that nations were primarily interested in gaining power.  In his departure from 
the classical realism of Morgenthau, Waltz differentiates the system level from the unit 
                                                          
3 A thorough discussion of the debate between neorealism and neoliberalism is found in Baldwin (1993).  
Neoliberal theories trace their beginnings back to Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech to the U.S. 
Senate on January 22, 1917 (Kegley 1995).  Keohane and Nye (1977) provide the most systematic 
articulation of the theory (see also Morse 1976; Roseneau 1980; Mansbach and Vasquez 1981).  
Neoliberals believe that neorealists are too concerned with war/peace and the notion of the state as the key 
actor in the international system.  Instead of viewing the state as the primary actor, neoliberals see a role 
for international organizations (IO) and nongovernmental (NGO) organizations to mediate in the 
international system.  Neoliberal theory argues that institutions can play a role in altering state behavior by 
encouraging cooperation and enforcing agreements.  For the neoliberal, shared interests among nations are 
more important than distributions of power.  Finally, neoliberals typically concentrate on economic and 
environmental issues over security interests. 
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level, which focuses the analysis on the international system as opposed to the internal 
power politics of individual nation-states and leaders.  
Waltz (1979, 121) claims that it is an error “to mistake a theory of international 
politics for a theory of foreign policy.”   Waltz argues that international relations theory 
is “not a theory of the process by which foreign policy is made” (Waltz 1979, 122).  In 
spite of Waltz’s admonitions, an increasing number of international relations scholars 
have written on the importance of domestic considerations including interstate war 
(Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992), territorial disputes (Huth 1996), crisis 
bargaining (Milner 1997), two-level games (Putnam 1988), and military expansion 
(Legro 1994).  Recently, Fearon (1998, 293) has argued that instead of a sharp 
distinction between systematic international relations and a theory of foreign policy, they 
are the same in many respects.  He asserts that many of the things structural realist 
theories seek to explain either are the result of foreign policies or are foreign policies.  
“When we say a ‘theory of X,’ we normally mean a theory that explains the existence, 
occurrence, or variation in X.”  If “X” represents a nation’s foreign policy, the question 
becomes what explains the existence, occurrence, or variation in foreign policy?  
International relations theory suggests that the international system constrains the policy 
options of nations.  If the international system is a constraint on policy-makers, the 
international system must be influencing the deliberations on foreign policy choice. 
Neorealism has five core assumptions: the international system is anarchic, states 
are unitary actors, states are rational, states desire to maximize their security, and states 
seek to gain power when it does not threaten their security (Baldwin 1993; Waltz 1979).  
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An anarchic international system refers to the fact that there is no entity governing the 
relations between states.  States are unitary actors forced to protect themselves and look 
after their own interests.  States are rational in that they will make decisions that 
maximize their expected benefits.  In order to protect themselves, states will seek to 
maximize their security.    
These core neorealist assumptions led Waltz (1979) to derive several hypotheses 
that aid our understanding of how international politics influences the foreign policies of 
states.  First, states will balance against a predominant power.  When states recognize 
that they are in a weak position relative to a strong nation, they will seek methods of 
balancing out the power differential through internal growth or external alliances.  
Second, balances of power form and recur.  The balance of power in the international 
system changes over time, resulting in efforts to adapt to those changes.  Foreign 
policies of states result from efforts to react to changes occurring in the international 
system.   
The contribution of international politics to our understanding of foreign policy 
comes from the recognition that foreign policy problems originate from the nature and 
political context of the international system.  Although the international system 
constrains political leaders by forcing them to protect their autonomy and security, 
domestic decision-makers are not limited to a small set of policy options.  Political 
leaders can consider a wide range of policy alternatives for addressing changes in the 
international system and accomplish their objectives.  Factors in the domestic political 
environment influence the choice of these policy alternatives.   
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Domestic Politics 
 The list of possible domestic influences on foreign policy is very large.  The 
three domestic groups most often considered an influence on presidential policy 
decisions are Congress, media, and the public.  Theodore Sorenson, former advisor to 
President Jimmy Carter, argues that presidential power in foreign affairs is not absolute.  
“Every modern president must contend with three rival sources of power:  the power of 
the Congress; the power of public opinion; and the power of the press, particularly 
television.  How each president handles each of those rivals for influence will largely 
determine the success or failure of his foreign policy” (Sorenson 1994, 516).  Below, I 
discuss the research related to Congress, the media, and the public and foreign policy. 
Congress.  Few doubt the ability of Congress to set its own legislative agenda 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993), but it is unlikely that Congress significantly influences 
the foreign policy of the president.  Although the president has the responsibility of 
commander in chief, the only powers given exclusively to the president are the duty to 
receive foreign ambassadors, grant pardons, and execute the laws of Congress.  This is in 
contrast to the Congress, which has the authority to declare war, raise an army, and 
prepare for the common defense.  Even with the Constitutional constraints on the 
president in foreign policy, Peterson asserts that the constraints on the president from the 
international system require a dominant executive in matters of foreign policy (Peterson 
1994, 233).  Regarding presidential/congressional relations in foreign policy, Fisher 
(1997, 258) sees “two values operating in tandem:  executive discretion and legislative 
limits.”  Although these competing values can lead to conflictual relations between the 
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president and Congress, the president’s unique position in foreign affairs gives him a 
decided advantage.  Additionally, the president’s role as chief executive gives him 
information, expertise, and operational advantages over the Congress in matters of 
foreign policy.  These advantages of the president in foreign policy led to Wildavsky’s 
(1966) “two presidencies” thesis.  Wildavsky argued that presidents can exercise more 
power in foreign policy than domestic policy.   
The relative influence of the Congress on foreign policy actions is marginal.  
Lindsay (1992, 609) found that although foreign policy debates in the Congress are more 
touchy than in the past, the “House and Senate remain reluctant to deny a president’s 
foreign policy requests or to pass alternatives of their own” and will attempt to influence 
policy indirectly by using “anticipated reactions and political grandstanding.”  Focusing 
on the ability of the Congress, the media, and the president to set the policy agenda, 
Edwards and Wood (1999, 336) found that the president was “seemingly inattentive 
toward congressional activities as they pertain to U.S.-Soviet relations or the Arab-
Israeli conflict.”  Although these only represent two areas of foreign policy, they 
occupied a significant amount of the nation’s attention.  Rather than setting new agendas 
in U.S./Soviet relations or the Arab-Israeli conflict, congressional “attention to issues at 
one point is strongly related to attention to those issues in the past” (Edwards and Wood 
1999). 
Even though the Congress plays a subordinate role in foreign policy, 
congressional support for the president in foreign policy has become more contentious.  
McCormick and Wittkopf found that the timing of the Vietnam War was consistent with 
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a decline in bipartisanship, but the war itself was not the defining factor in the decline 
(McCormick and Wittkopf 1990, 1097).  McCormick and Wittkopf (1990, 1097) found 
the breakdown between Congress and the president on foreign policy issues occurring 
after Watergate and the 1979 takeover of the Embassy in Tehran.  “By all accounts 
Congress’ behavior changed dramatically following the Vietnam War.  The deference 
Congress once accorded the president gave way to active questioning of presidential 
initiatives” (Lindsay 1992).  In contrast, Meernik (1993) found that the Vietnam War 
was an important benchmark in the decline of bipartisanship in foreign policy.  “There is 
strong evidence that Congress was willing to grant presidents an extra margin of support 
during the Cold War and that this assistance evaporated after Vietnam” (Meernik 1993, 
583).  Meernik (1993, 571) concluded after examining foreign policy and defense roll-
call votes from 1947 to 1988 that “there appears to be at least a prima facie case for the 
existence of some sort of Vietnam syndrome affecting congressional-executive 
relations.”   
In matters of foreign policy, the dominant pattern is that the president initiates 
and the Congress responds.  One should expect the president to lead because the tools 
available to the Congress to influence policy, legislative, budgetary, and oversight 
powers are arduous to implement.  The partisan and decentralized nature of the Congress 
makes it difficult to respond quickly to a crisis, fine-tune current policy, or initiate new 
policy.  Rather than setting the direction of foreign policy or making foreign policy 
decisions, the most influential role played by Congress in foreign policy is to constrain 
policy, setting the parameters of policy decisions. 
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Media.  Given the pervasiveness of the media in our society, one would expect 
the media to play an influential role in politics, especially in the domain of foreign 
policy.  Because foreign policy is largely out of the public’s view, the public relies on 
the media to filter the information they receive.  Consequently, what the media conveys 
concerning foreign policy and the public’s capacity to understand the information largely 
determine what the public knows about foreign events.   
Although early research suggested that the media produces “minimal effects” 
(Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948), 
recent studies have produced more promising results.  Using experimental techniques, 
Iyengar (1991) and Iyengar and Kinder (1987) find convincing evidence of influence 
from media exposure.  Bartels (1993) finds a strong relationship between opinion change 
and media exposure during the 1980 presidential campaign.   
The influence of the media on foreign policy relates to its agenda setting and 
priming capabilities.  Agenda setting refers to the media’s ability to determine what is 
important in the mind of the respondent.  Iyengar and Kinder (1987) find that people will 
assign more importance to an issue once exposed to it through network broadcasts.  
Once issues become salient in people’s minds, priming draws attention to particular 
aspects of an issue.  Individuals make issue evaluations on the terms set by priming.     
The influence of agenda setting and priming on foreign policy is both direct and 
indirect.  The media directly influences foreign policy by increasing the focus on certain 
policy issues.  Although presidential attention to an issue relates to past attention given 
an issue, Edwards and Wood (1999) found that media attention to U.S.-Soviet relations 
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or the Arab-Israeli conflict caused an increase in presidential attention to these issues.  
Similarly, Wood and Peake (1998 182) found that presidential “attention also shifts due 
to changing media interpretations of events and the perceived relative importance of an 
issue.”  These findings do not conclude that the media influences presidential foreign 
policy decisions, only that the media makes the issues relevant to the president.   
The indirect influence of the media relates to the public.  Iyengar and Kinder 
(1987) posit that network television is the primary educator of the masses.  By raising 
awareness and highlighting particular aspects of a foreign policy issue, the media 
influences public opinion.  Edwards and Wood (1999, 329) conclude, “If television 
coverage can affect mass attitudes about the importance of issues and how they are 
handled, then policymakers, especially visible ones such as the president and members 
of Congress, have strong incentive to put those issues on their agenda.”  
Research suggests that the media, especially television, influence public opinion.  
Jordan and Page (1992) theorize that television news may exert an even greater influence 
on foreign policy opinions because the public has less experience and will look to those 
with more expertise for information.  The most influential source of information is 
television news commentary, suggesting that the news media play a substantial role in 
shaping foreign policy opinion.  The president and his administration do not influence 
opinion in a statistically significant manner.  The authors explain this result by 
considering the repetition available to the news commentator, while the president is 
usually limited to one or two speeches on an issue.  Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey (1987, 
38), using identical questions measured in two different time points, find that “TV news 
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variables, together with opinion at the time of an initial survey, account for well over 
90% of the variance in public opinion at the time of a second survey.”  
A second indirect influence of the media concerns how the public evaluates the 
president.  By raising the importance of some issues, the media sets a standard for the 
public to use in its evaluation of presidential performance.  Using experimental 
techniques, Miller and Krosnick (2000) found that the media was a factor in agenda 
setting and eventually affected presidential evaluations.  Iyengar and Kinder (1987, 4) 
argue that media coverage “sets the terms by which political judgements are rendered 
and political choices are made.”  Edwards et al. (1995, 199) found that “measures of 
both television coverage and total front-page space on foreign policy strongly relate to 
the impact of foreign policy on presidential approval.”  Their reasoning is that the media 
raises awareness of what issues are salient to the nation and citizens evaluate the 
president’s performance based on these issues (Edwards et al. 1995, 109-113).  
Similarly, Soroka (2001) found that the media raises the salience of foreign affairs 
issues, and influences presidential approval when those who are more concerned with 
foreign affairs consider the president’s performance.  Meernik and Ault (2001) found 
that media foreign policy cues influence public evaluations of a president’s foreign 
policy.   
Some have credited media attention to the plight of Somalians for providing the 
impetus for President Bush to intervene in the nation’s civil war.4  As late as September 
                                                          
4 On December 10, 1992, the following essay appeared in the Christian Science Monitor and depicts the 
influence of the media on U.S. policy-makers.  Good Motives Aside, The Mission Is Likely to Fail, by 
Margaret Calhoun.  “As Simon Barber of Johannesburg's Business Day suggests, Americans appear 
desperate for some action designed to remove from their television screens visions of emaciated African 
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10, 1992, only 11% said they were following the situation in Somalia “very closely,” but 
by December 3, 1992, 66% favored the U.S. sending troops and aid to help the 
Somalians.5  During the months of November and December 1992, the major networks 
ran over 133 stories on Somalia during the evening news.6   
Public Opinion.  Holsti argues that “the least developed of the areas of public 
opinion research has been the opinion-policy link” (Holsti 1996, 196).  According to 
Holsti, much of the work on the opinion-policy link has been descriptive.  Research 
based on interviews and case studies has shown a link between public opinion and 
foreign policy (Powlick 1991, 1995).  Jacobs and Shapiro (1995, 10) use archival 
records and interviews and find evidence of public opinion influencing policy decisions 
in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (see also Jacobs and Shapiro 1994a, and 
1994b).  Although case studies and personal interviews are helpful in identifying 
possible opinion-policy links, there are obvious validity problems.  Consistent with 
Holsti’s assessment, Sobel (2001, 9) acknowledges that “there has been little progress 
either in developing the theory of the opinion-foreign policy connection or in explaining 
the dynamics of the actual impact of public opinion on policy.” 
Scholarly research on public opinion and foreign policy is not conclusive.  Some 
have found that public opinion restricts the policy options of the president; others find 
little influence on the president from public opinion.  Sobel (2001, 238-39) finds that the 
primary role of public opinion is to act as a constraint on foreign policy makers.  “In 
                                                                                                                                                                           
babies and mothers that threaten to spoil their Christmases. In a characteristic style-over-substance, media-
driven gesture, President Bush has launched an ill-conceived plan with no stated strategic objective that 
may recklessly risk American casualties.” 
5 December 3, 1992 Gallup Poll, September 10, 1992 Times Mirror Poll. 
6 Source: Vanderbilt Television News Digest. 
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short, decision makers were constantly aware of public opinion and were by necessity 
constrained in the timing, extent, and direction of their actions.  Presidents follow the 
polls for both governing and electoral purposes.”  In contrast, Cohen (1997, 26) found 
that “presidents will display greater responsiveness to the public in ways and at times 
that do not cost them substantive control over policy.  When substantive policy decisions 
are being made, presidential responsiveness will decline.” 
Although older studies have found evidence of congruence between public 
opinion and policy change (Page and Shapiro 1983), recent work has shown that 
responsiveness to public opinion has been declining over the past 20 years.  Monroe 
(1998) found that policy was more in line with majority opinion during the period 1960-
79 than 1980-83.  Jacobs and Shapiro (1997a) suggest that social policy was less 
responsive to public preferences in the 1980s and 1990s than in the 1970s.  In their 
analysis of the early Clinton years, Jacobs and Shapiro (1995) found that President 
Clinton was responsive to the public on domestic issues, but not on matters of foreign 
policy. 
 
Actor Specific Models and Individual/Group Theories 
 
International and domestic politics provide the context for foreign policy 
decisions.  These domains both influence and constrain foreign policy decisions, but do 
not fully explain foreign policy.  The actors themselves provide an additional influence 
on foreign policy decision-making.  Although actor specific theories concern individuals 
and groups of individuals, actual choices result from the interaction of the actors and the 
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decision process.  If the external setting of policy-makers does not give satisfactory 
explanations, one must look to theories that explain policy choice by examining factors 
related to the actor such as personal beliefs and decision-making processes.   
Cognitive Decision Making.   Instead of focusing on the outcomes an actor 
chooses or organization processes, cognitive theories assume that political behavior 
originates with individuals.  Cognitive theories attempt to answer the question, what is 
the process that produced a decision?  The primary assumptions that form cognitive 
theories are that references to the individual best explain behavior.  The units of analysis 
are individual foreign policy actors or elites.  Research approaches in cognitive models 
include operational codes (Leites 1951; George 1969; Holsti 1977), cognitive mapping 
(Axelrod 1972), image theory (Cottam 1977), conceptual complexity (Hermann and 
Milburn 1977), operational codes (Walker 1983), and poliheuristic theory (Mintz and 
Geva 1997).  In contrast to rational choice theories which focus on outcomes and assume 
that decision-makers have a single set of preferences over outcomes, cognitive theories 
consider decision outcomes to be based on the processing of beliefs and reasoning of 
individuals.    
 Cognitive models of decision-making differ from other models in that they do 
not posit a single decision rule (Stein and Welch 1997).  Cognitive theories posit that 
individuals use various filters to process information and make sense of the world.  
Other studies have found that general schemata interpret more specific and complex 
foreign policy events (Conover and Feldman 1984; Jervis 1976).  Cognitive constructs 
such as schema and image provide information shortcuts that allow the decision-makers 
 29
to make sense of the world around them.  Leaders use relevant schemas to draw 
inferences and fill in information gaps that exist.7  As opposed to rational choice models, 
cognitive models assume that decision-makers exhibit “bounded rationality” rather than 
complete rationality due to time constraints, cognitive limitations, and imperfect 
information (Simon 1982, 1985).   
 Poliheuristic Theory.  Poliheuristic models represent a theory of the foreign 
policy decision-making process that bridges the gap between rational choice and 
cognitive models (Mintz and Geva 1997).  Poliheuristic theory suggests that foreign 
policy decision-making often involves a two-stage process.  The first phase is a 
nonexhaustive search for a “subset of alternatives using simplifying heuristics” and the 
second phase consists of “choosing an alternative that minimizes risk and guarantees 
rewards” (Mintz and Geva 1997, 82-83).  Rather than a decision process that initially 
chooses among various alternatives, the decision-maker considers alternatives from a 
dimension-based process.  The decision-maker takes into account the relative importance 
of a dimension and sets a minimum threshold for that dimension before examining 
potential options.  A rejection of alternatives that do not meet a minimal threshold in the 
most important dimension is key aspect of poliheuristic theory.  This helps to explain 
why the political dimension is important in foreign policy decision-making.  The 
potential loss of public support concerns decision-makers and cause the decision-maker 
to reject viable foreign policy options that are unpopular.   
                                                          
7 Research has shown that individuals also use a schema-related concepts and images to form opinions 
(Fiske and Taylor 1991). 
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Bureaucratic Decision-Making.  In contrast to rational actors making deliberate 
choices, the bureaucratic or organizational model views decisions as outputs of large 
organizations based on standard operating procedures.  The complex nature of central 
governments with divided responsibilities requires the coordination of activities through 
standard patterns of decision-making.  “The behavior of these organizations—and 
consequently of the government—relevant to an issue in any particular instance is, 
therefore, determined primarily by routines established prior to that instance” (Allison 
and Zelikow 1999).  Individuals located in different areas of government share power 
over decision-making.  Two decision-making propositions typify organizations 
characterized by standard operating procedures.  First, the government will likely choose 
options proposed by an organization with particular expertise or capability in a relevant 
area.  Second, fixed organizational routines do not allow all players to influence foreign 
policy decisions.     
 Governmental Politics.  Instead of unitary actors making foreign policy decisions 
or decisions resulting from organizational outputs, the governmental politics model 
argues that choices made by the government are a result of bargaining between players 
hierarchically placed in government (Allison and Zelikow 1999).  Each player has 
competing values, goals, and perceptions of the environment, and decisions result from 
the interaction of these players.  Rather than choosing the most rational decision, the 
agreed upon option is the result of compromise and conflict among the players.  Several 
propositions result from the governmental politics model.  First, individual preferences 
of the decision-makers affect foreign policy choices.  Second, individuals differ in their 
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power, ability to influence decisions, depending on their bargaining advantages, skill, 
and perceptions of the other players.  Third, with many individuals with different 
preferences involved in the decision process, foreign policy choices are usually not 
representative of any one individual, group, or organization.  
International politics, domestic politics, and actor-specific explanations for U.S. 
foreign policy provide useful insights into the making of foreign policy decisions but fail 
to produce far-reaching theories that account for competing influences in the foreign 
policy arena.  Structural explanations from international and domestic politics are too 
mechanistic and leave little room for differences in individual actors.  Actor-specific 
explanations are more difficult to operationalize outside of the experimental laboratory 
environment and often neglect the influences and constraints in the international and 
domestic political environments.   
As the preceding review of international, domestic, and actor-specific 
explanations for foreign policy shows, the problem facing the scholar is not a lack of 
explanations, but an inability to develop theories that connect individual presidential 
behavior with influences from the domestic and international arenas.  The dilemma for 
the scholar is that both structural and actor-specific influences provide important 
information needed to explain foreign policy.  Ikenberry (2002) suggests an analytical 
approach to the problem.  “Rather than simply picking and choosing elements of the 
various approaches, this approach can involve the development of more overarching 
propositions that bring the various theories together in comprehensive ways” (2002, 9).  
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The objective is to develop theories that “incorporate several types of variables into 
larger scale frameworks” (2002, 9).  
 
A Politically Rational Theory of Foreign Policy 
 A politically rational theory of foreign policy decision-making emphasizes the 
important role of political pressures and context faced by presidents.  Although an 
important duty of the president, foreign policy represents only a portion of the 
president’s overall concerns.  Presidents realize that the consequences of foreign policy 
decisions transcend the foreign policy arena and affect the president politically.  These 
political considerations affect policy choice.  Therefore, in order to understand foreign 
policy decision-making, one must consider the political environment of the president.   
Presidents enter office with policy and reelection goals, and in the case of 
second-term incumbents, the creation of a legacy.  Presidents have domestic and foreign 
policy agendas they hope to accomplish and need support from others, primarily the 
public and the Congress, to realize their goals.  Presidents desire to maintain the status 
necessary for reelection, although to do so means gaining the approval of the public.  
Finally, public approval can benefit presidents who hope to preserve their place in 
history.  Yet, the president’s ability to govern effectively is limited.  Constitutionally, the 
president is the commander in chief of the armed forces and has the authority to grant 
pardons.  With the advice and consent of the Senate, the president appoints judges, 
ambassadors, cabinet members, and negotiates treaties with other nations.  Congress has 
its own set of enumerated powers, which require the president to share governing duties.  
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The constitutional duties of the executive branch alone do not provide the might the 
president needs to be effective.  In order to realize his goals, the president requires 
something more than the authority of the office.  The president needs the political capital 
necessary to get others to do what he wants done.   
 
Political Capital 
Political capital is more than the status or authority of the office of president; 
presidents earn political capital and these political resources reside with the president 
and are not usually transferable.  One may argue that President Johnson enjoyed a 
measure of residual political capital after the death of President Kennedy, which gave 
Johnson additional legislative success in Congress.   
The implication of the theory is that presidents with greater levels of political 
capital will have greater influence, the ability to change others’ behavior.  Neustadt 
(1990, xxi) suggests “the search for personal influence is at the center of the job of being 
President.”  Presidents with influence have power and those without influence do not.  
Political capital is the assets, advantages, or anything else useful to increase the power or 
influence of a president to accomplish what he desires.  Practically, political capital is 
the accumulated goodwill, support, and toleration gained from the public and others that 
the president can draw upon to pursue his agenda. 
Does political capital really matter?  Even though the president has certain 
advantages in governing—articulating a clear policy agenda to the public, access to 
resources, and responding quickly in times of crises—less than one-half of his legislative 
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initiatives become law (Edwards & Barrett 2000) and any legislative success is likely 
related to the size of his political party in Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1990, Edwards 
1989).  Scholars conclude that presidents only marginally influence key groups such as 
Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1990), the public (Edwards 2003), and the media (Edwards 
and Wood 1999).  Political capital is not significant because there is overwhelming 
evidence that it makes a president more successful.  Political capital is important because 
presidents act as if political capital matters.  Presidents view political capital as a source 
of influence and this belief ultimately affects their decisions.  Few would argue that 
influence for the president does not matter.  Neustadt (1990, 49) “[The president] can 
draw power from continuing relationships in the degree that he can capitalize upon the 
needs of others for the Presidency's status and authority.”  I suggest that seeking, 
gaining, and maintaining personal influence gives the president the greatest opportunity 
for achievement in office. 
 
What Is Political Capital? 
Light (1991) argues that political capital for a president is the number of party 
seats in Congress, public approval of the president, and the electoral margin of victory.8  
Neustadt (1990) proposes three sources of presidential power:  ability to persuade, 
professional reputation, and public prestige.  Persuasive powers for the president is not 
charm or reasoning capacity, but the ability “to induce [others] to believe that what he 
wants of them is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to 
                                                          
8 Chapter III provides a detailed examination of party seats in Congress, public approval of the president, 
economy, and electoral margin of victory as sources of presidential political capital. 
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do in their interest, not his” (1990, 40).  A president’s professional reputation is 
determined by how convinced people are “in their own minds that he has skill and will 
enough to use his advantages” (1990, 50).  Finally, public prestige relates to anticipated 
reactions from the public.  Because members of Congress and others in Washington 
depend on outsiders for their support, the public’s impression of the president and his 
desires is an important factor in their willingness to support him.  “Public standing is a 
source of influence for him . . . bearing on their willingness to give him what he wants” 
(1990, 73).  The most obvious measure of political capital is the president’s job 
approval.  A president’s job approval is the one measure that captures the public’s 
overall evaluation of the president’s policy success or failure, personality, competence, 
and future agenda.   
Presidents believe that in order to carry out their agenda, they need the strength 
that comes from a high job approval that will give them the standing that is necessary to 
be successful.  Presidents with popular support have bargaining power among other 
elected officials and will work diligently to obtain the public’s approval (Edwards 1989, 
pg. 142).  Public approval is the most visible measure of the president’s relationship with 
the public.  Although public approval is not a steady resource for the president, “public 
approval is the resource with the greatest potential to turn a typical situation into one 
favorable for change” (Edwards 1989, 125; see also Ostrom and Simon 1985).  
Presidents perceive that public opinion affects their ability to govern.  A good example is 
a passage from Richard Nixon’s personal diary.  “I don’t give one damn what the polls 
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say insofar as affecting my decisions.  I only care about them because they may affect 
my ability to lead, since politicians do pay attention to them” (Nixon 1978, 753). 
There is also an electoral motivation for presidents to consider their public 
approval.  First term presidents realize they will have to face the voters again in the 
future.  Comparing the five presidencies from 1969 to 1992, the only two presidents to 
win re-election had presidential job approval numbers that averaged 50%+ during the six 
months leading up to the election, Nixon (58.6%) and Reagan (54.3%).  The other three 
had job approval numbers below 50% during the six months prior to the election (Ford 
47.4%, Carter 33.5%, and Bush 36.6%).  Although this result is not counter-intuitive, it 
simply means that those presidents desiring a second term in office must be concerned 
with their public job approval numbers. 
Presidents are aware that foreign policy events can change the level of public 
support (Brody 1991; Marra, Ostrom, Simon 1990; Ostrom and Simon 1985), and 
therefore, will be concerned about the effect on their ability to govern.  Studies have 
shown that Nixon benefited from the Vietnam War issue (Kelley 1983; Miller et al. 
1976; Pomper 1975) and the Iranian hostage crisis hurt Carter (Abramson, Aldrich, and 
Rhode 1982).  Kernell (1978) found that the Korean War reduced support for Truman, 
and the Vietnam War negatively influenced public support for Johnson.  Hurwitz and 
Peffley (1987, p. 237) conclude that the “political impact of foreign affairs is greater 
than previous research has suggested.”  Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) found that 
retrospective judgment of Reagan’s performance of reducing the likelihood of war and 
improving relations with other nations to be a significant predictor of presidential 
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approval.  Ostrom and Simon (1985, p. 351) found that “presidential actions in the 
superpower arena do have an impact on approval, especially when foreign affairs 
dominate the public’s awareness.” 
 
Diversionary Theory and Political Capital 
A president’s job approval is an important resource and some have suggested that 
presidents will use foreign policy actions to influence their public standing.  Most of the 
work in this area has centered around the diversionary theory, which suggests that 
leaders faced with poor domestic political conditions will use aggressive foreign policy 
behavior to divert attention from domestic issues (Clark 2000; DeRouen 1995; Fordham 
1998a; 1998b; Gelpi 1997, Hess and Orphanides 1995; James and Hristoulas 1994; 
James and Oneal 1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Ostrom and Job 1986; Wang 1996).  
The increased media attention from the use of force directs the public’s focus away from 
domestic problems, thus providing a political incentive for presidents to use force 
(DeRouen and Peake 2002). 
The diversionary theory is not without its detractors.  Some have found that 
foreign policy is independent of domestic influences or that international factors are 
more important in presidential decision-making (Meernik 1994; Oneal and Lian 1993).  
Others have found that states will anticipate diversionary tactics and seek to find ways to 
avoid conflict (Smith 1996; Clark 2000; Enterline and Gleditsch 2000; Leeds and Davis 
1997; Meernik 2000; Miller 1999).  In a recent study, Moore and Lanoue (2003) argue 
that presidents use domestic policy to solve domestic problems and foreign policy to 
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solve foreign problems, casting doubt on the influence of domestic politics on foreign 
policy actions. 
Diversionary theory is too narrow in its scope and cannot explain a wide variety 
of foreign policy actions.  It is possible that proponents of the diversionary theory have 
found evidence of domestic influences on foreign policy actions, but erred in their causal 
explanations of these influences.  Since the dependent variable in most diversionary 
theory studies is war/no war or the use of force/no use of force, the explanatory value is 
limited to the most conflictual engagements.  Diversionary theory has obvious 
limitations explaining under what conditions one would expect cooperative foreign 
policy actions.  I posit that models accounting for risk better explain presidential foreign 
policy decision-making.   
 
Political Capital and Foreign Policy Risk 
My theory of foreign policy decision-making varies from the diversionary theory 
in significant ways.  In contrast to the diversionary theory, my theory does not depend on 
a presidential strategy of diverting the public’s attention from domestic problems, but on 
the president’s propensity for risk, given the level of political resources available to the 
president.  In reality, foreign policy decisions are much more nuanced and complex than 
diversionary theory would suggest.  The president is constantly required to assess public 
awareness and expectations concerning foreign policy and the potential risk and payoff 
from a particular course of action.  My theory suggests that the president will adjust the 
focus and intensity of his actions depending on his willingness to accept risk.  The 
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current state of the president’s political capital determines the level of risk that is 
acceptable to the president.   
Risk is an inherent feature of decision-making when the result of an action is 
unknown, thereby, creating a potential hazard or an opportunity for the president, 
depending on the outcome.  Two related sources of risk influence foreign policy 
decision-making.  The first source of risk involves the external expectations of the public 
and other governments.  This type of risk results from the decision-maker pursuing 
foreign policy actions that are contrary to what would normally be expected.  Consistent 
foreign policy behavior sends a signal to the public and other governments about what to 
expect in future foreign policy actions (Anderson 1981).  A second source of risk 
involves the choice of foreign policy actions.  Choosing an action where the spread 
between the potential gain or loss is greater than other possible policy actions represents 
risk-seeking behavior, compared to a choice where the probable outcomes are more 
constrained.   
The level of presidential political capital determines the risk propensity of the 
president.  Understanding the risk propensity of the president increases our ability to 
explain foreign policy decisions by specifying the conditions in which one would expect 
the president to take more or less risks in foreign policy actions.    
Prospect theory is concerned with decision-making under conditions of 
uncertainty and contributes to our understanding of the relationship between risk and 
decisions (see Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1982, 1984 and Tversky and Kahneman 
1981, 1986, 1992).  The theory hypothesizes that one would expect risk-seeking 
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behavior to occur in the domain of losses and risk-averse behavior in the domain of 
gains.  According to prospect theory, at the decision-making point an actor perceives 
himself to be acting from a position of gains or losses based on a reference point.  The 
“reference point is usually the current steady state, or status quo, to which a person has 
become accustomed” (McDermott 1998, 40), but can also be a desired state based on the 
goals of the decision-maker.  If the decision-maker’s current state is perceived to be less 
than the reference point, he would be in the domain of loss, and vice versa.  The 
reference point for the president is his job approval.  For the president there are two 
important considerations.  First, what is an acceptable level of job approval based on his 
expectations or goals?  Second, what is the change that is occurring in relation to that 
reference point?  What is important are gains and losses from the reference point and not 
absolute gains or losses.  Prospect theory suggests that actors are risk-averse above the 
reference point and risk-acceptant below the reference point.  It is the decision-maker’s 
reaction to the gains and losses from the reference point that aids in our understanding of 
why presidents make certain foreign policy decisions.  Chapter V provides a full 
discussion of these concepts. 
Foreign policy decisions result from the interaction between the international and 
domestic arenas and individual actors.  Although the context provides the stimulus, the 
political capital of the president mediates the reaction.  The political environment of 
presidents requires that they seek to preserve their political capital.  Presidents need 
resources to maintain their influence in the governing process.  Although the success or 
failure of foreign policy decisions can affect the level of capital available to the 
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president, the motivation of presidents is to protect their capital and not use foreign 
policy as a means of increasing capital.  Presidents with acceptable levels of political 
capital become more risk-averse in an attempt to safeguard current levels, while weak 
president’s display more risky behavior because they have little to lose.   
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CHAPTER III 
POLITICAL CAPITAL 
 
Political capital is one of the most talked about resources for the president, 
although few attempt to define the concept.  It reminds me of Justice Potter Stewart’s 
concurring opinion on a case that overturned a ban on pornographic films.  “I shall not 
today attempt further to define the kinds of material . . . but I know it when I see it” 
(Simpson 1988).  Perhaps we know political capital when we see it.  We believe that 
some have it and others do not.  We assume it is better to have it, than not have it.  Like 
a commodity, we suppose political capital is something that you can gain, lose, risk and 
spend.  According to one former Carter Administration official, “Every President has a 
certain amount of capital—you know, power, push, juice. . . . But it’s always the same 
thing; it’s the President’s ability to get what he wants” (Light 1982, 15). 
Apparently, the popular media knows political capital when it sees it.  During the 
11-year period from 1990 to 2000, the phrase “political capital” appears 484 times in 
The New York Times and 500 times in the Washington Post.9  Consider the following 
quotes from The New York Times commenting on the political capital of President 
George W. Bush:  
The White House had frequently flexed their political muscles in legislative 
battles, bruising egos, endangering long-nurtured bipartisan relationships among 
legislators and using up the president’s political capital at a rapid pace 
(Stevenson 2003). 
 
                                                          
9 Source: Lexis Nexis search using the phrase “political capital”. 
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Still, for presidents, especially for wartime leaders, political capital can drain 
quickly from the White House account.  After the guns fall silent, voters’ eyes 
turn elsewhere, often to social and economic needs.  It happened to Winston 
Churchill late in World War II, and as this president remembers better than most, 
it happened to his father, too (Apple 2003). 
 
If it cannot yet be declared a cyclone, it was still powerful enough to give 
President Bush, who had risked much of his political capital, a highly satisfying 
night (Apple 2002). 
 
Mr. Bush’s advisers said that Mr. Bush believes that his father, the former 
president, squandered his political capital during the Persian Gulf War by 
focusing almost exclusively on the military operation and not on the declining 
economy.  They said Mr. Bush was determined not to repeat that mistake of his 
father, whose high approval ratings evaporated when the war ended (Berke 
2001). 
 
The use of the words “used up”, “drained”, “risked”, and “squandered” suggests 
that presidential political capital is something of value that can be lost.  Are these 
assertions the result of overzealous journalists or is political capital a tangible asset for 
the president?  If the media, the public, Congress, or other relevant actors believe that 
the president is operating from a position of strength or weakness, and act as if it is so, 
then political capital is no longer a vague concept but a political reality with the potential 
to influence behavior.  Furthermore, if presidents view political strength and influence as 
assets to preserve and apply judiciously, then these factors are an important piece of the 
decision-making calculus of presidents.  
Two assumptions underscore the relationship between political capital and 
foreign policy decision-making.  First, presidents have goals they seek to accomplish 
and simply being president does not provide the necessary political strength.  The 
Constitution says little about the power of the president and the president shares 
executive, judicial, and legislative powers with others in government.  Furthermore, 
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other policy-makers have their own interests and agendas.  The president needs every 
political advantage possible to get others to do what he desires.  Second, the success or 
failure of a president’s foreign policy influences the overall political perception of the 
president and his ability to influence others.  The outcome of foreign policy actions is 
not limited to the foreign policy arena.  As one of President Carter’s aides put it, “No 
president whose popularity is as low as this president’s has much clout on the Hill” 
(quoted in Edwards 2004, 389).  Third, presidents will strategically preserve and use 
available resources to accomplish their desires.  Since policy choices expend capital, the 
amount of capital placed at risk depends on the president’s subjective evaluation of his 
political environment10  
My theory of foreign policy decision-making suggests that political capital 
mediates foreign policy decisions.  Presidents with higher levels of political capital make 
foreign policy decisions differently than presidents with lower levels of political capital.  
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze possible sources of influence for the president 
and determine which resource the president values most.  What resource is so important 
that it has the potential to change presidential behavior? 
 
Potential Sources of Political Capital 
The concept of political capital implies that the president and others believe the 
president can exercise some level of influence not solely based on his Constitutional 
authority or the status of the presidency.  The challenge is to determine what presidential 
                                                          
10 It is true that successful foreign policies may generate capital, but there is a measure of capital placed at 
risk at the outset of any foreign policy action.  This forces a decision-maker to evaluate the possible risks 
and opportunities.  
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resources provide the desired influence.  Although scholars do agree that resources are 
important to a president, there is little agreement on what constitutes political capital.   
Neustadt (1990) finds the power of the president in his ability to persuade and 
bargain with others.  Placing more emphasis on the value of the public than Neustadt, 
Cornwell (1965, 248) suggests that presidential strength lies in his ability to lead and 
mold public opinion.  Similar to Cornwell’s work, Kernell detects a shift away from the 
bargaining president to a president that influences by “going public”.  The president 
“promotes himself and his policies in Washington by appealing to the American public 
for support” (Kernell 1995, 6, see also Johnson & Roberts 2004).  Numerous studies 
characterize public support as political capital (James & Hristoulas 1994; Russett 1990a; 
Hibbs, Rivers, & Vasilatos 1982; Thomas & Baas 1996; and Peffley, Langley, & Goidel 
1995).  Other scholars have defined political capital as votes (Tenpas & Dickinson 1997) 
and partisan congressional support (Wang 1996; Rohde and Simon 1985).  Basing his 
theory on interviews with 126 White House staff members, Light (1982) suggests that 
political capital for a president is the number of party seats in Congress, job approval, 
and his electoral margin of victory.  According to Light, party seats are the most 
important resource but the president needs the strength of public approval to improve the 
opportunities for party support in Congress. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I define political capital as the assets or 
advantages that increase the power of a president to accomplish what he desires.  In the 
course of governing, presidents will endeavor to hold on to and improve those resources 
that will aid the pursuit of their goals.  Presidents desire to successfully advance their 
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policy agenda, maintain high public standing, get reelected, and in the case of second 
term presidents, leave a legacy.  The most often mentioned and visible resources for the 
president are party seats in Congress, electoral margin of victory, and job approval 
(Light 1991).  Although, some research suggests that one additional resource, economic 
prosperity, is an important asset for the president (Sigelman and Knight 1985; Jacobson 
1990; Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995).  Below, I examine each of these potential 
resources to determine their usefulness to the president in accomplishing his desires. 
 
Party Seats in Congress  
 Presidents need support in Congress to accomplish their legislative agenda.  
Light (1982 27) refers to party support as the “chief ingredient in presidential capital:  it 
is the ‘gold standard’ of congressional support.”  If party seats in Congress are a 
significant resource for the president, there should be an indication that party seats 
correspond with success in advancing a policy agenda, maintaining popularity, and 
getting reelected to office. 
Although helpful to the president, party seats in Congress do not guarantee 
success in accomplishing the president’s legislative desires (Bond and Fleisher 1990; 
Edwards 1989; Collier and Sullivan 1995).  Members of Congress do tend to support the 
president in levels that are consistent with their partisan identities and increase the 
president’s chances for success (Bond and Fleisher 1990).  The difficulty for a president 
is keeping his own party unified so those seats work to his advantage.  According to 
Bond and Fleisher (1990), the president’s party base “provides unified support on about 
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60% of presidential roll calls.”  Edwards (1989, 30) finds that aggregate support for the 
president from his own party on votes that are not unanimous is 65% for Republicans 
and 69% for Democrats.  Maintaining unity in Congress is difficult and ideological 
diversity reduces party unity.  In the case of divided government, president’s chances for 
success decrease as factions unify.  Although an important resource for the president, 
party seats in Congress do not insure presidential success in furthering the president’s 
legislative agenda. 
A partisan advantage in Congress does help the president to get significant 
legislation on the congressional agenda (Edwards and Barrett 2000, 124).  Under divided 
government, presidential initiatives make up 24% of the House agenda and 24.1% of the 
Senate agenda.  In contrast, under unified government, presidential initiatives make up 
56.7% of the House agenda and 47% of the Senate agenda.  Once on the congressional 
agenda, 53% of presidential initiatives become law under unified government and 28% 
under divided government (Edwards and Barrett 2000).  With findings similar to other 
studies on the president and Congress, the authors note that “Congress displays no 
exceptional deference toward the president, and the president demonstrates no unusual 
persuasiveness with Congress” (Edwards and Barrett 2000, 133). 
 Although one would expect presidents with strong base party support in 
Congress to be more popular due to a weaker opposition and greater potential support, 
there is little evidence that party seats in Congress contribute to high job approval for 
presidents.  Table 3.1 shows incumbent presidential job approval six months prior to the 
next election and the percentage of party House and Senate seats controlled by the 
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president’s party.  Hypothetically, a larger percentage of party seats in the House and the 
Senate should be advantageous for the president, since a greater number of party seats 
should translate into additional support for presidential actions and positively influence 
job approval.  Instead of an average job approval number, I use job approval six-months 
before the election.11  Using May job approval numbers accounts for the president 
having worked with a particular House and Senate for 18-months and a possible 
influence on job approval to be reflected.  Regressing job approval against the 
percentage of House and the percentage of Senate seats, and controlling for unified 
government, reveals no significant relationship between the variables.  Presidents 
Johnson and Carter enjoyed clear majorities in both the House and Senate and by their 
third year in office, their job approval had dropped below 50%.  Neither President Nixon 
(1970 & 1972) nor Clinton (1996 & 1998) controlled the House or the Senate, yet 
possessed job approval numbers above 55%.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Lewis-Beck and Rice (1982, 1984) find that job approval numbers six months before an election are a 
good predictor of presidential support in upcoming elections.  They find that polls closer to the election do 
not add to the models usefulness.  Additionally, the sixth month period falls after primaries and before 
conventions, which provide short-term distortions in poll numbers.    
 49
TABLE 3.1     Job Approval and Percentage of House and Senate Seats 
 
 
President 
 
 
Year 
 
May Job 
Approval 
 
% of House 
Seats  
 
% of Senate 
Seats 
 
Unified 
Government 
Eisenhower 1954 61 50.80 50.5 Yes 
Eisenhower 1956 69 46.67 49.5 No 
Eisenhower 1958 53 46.21 49 No 
Kennedy 1962 74 60.00 65 Yes 
Johnson 1964 75 59.54 66 Yes 
Johnson 1966 46 67.82 68 Yes 
Nixon 1970 59 44.14 43 No 
Nixon 1972 62 41.38 45 No 
Ford 1976 47 33.10 37 No 
Carter 1978 41 67.13 61 Yes 
Carter 1980 43 65.98 59 Yes 
Reagan 1982 44 44.14 53 No 
Reagan 1984 52 38.16 54 No 
Reagan 1986 68 41.84 53 No 
Bush 1990 65 40.23 45 No 
Bush 1992 41 38.39 44 No 
Clinton 1994 51 59.31 57 Yes 
Clinton 1996 55 46.90 48 No 
Clinton 1998 64 47.59 45 No 
Bush II 2002 76 50.80 49 No 
Bush II 2004 49 52.64 51 Yes 
Source:  Job Approval is based on Gallup polls conducted in May of each election year. 
 
 
 Just as party seats in the House and Senate do not guarantee legislative success or 
improve job approval, party seats also do not help a president get reelected.  Table 3.2 
shows party control of the House and Senate before presidential elections involving an 
incumbent president.  The results indicate that incumbent presidents with a minority in 
both the House and the Senate before the election win as often as presidents with 
majorities in both the House and the Senate.  Reagan’s reelection occurred at a time 
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when the Republicans controlled the Senate, but subsequently lost control.  Carter lost in 
his bid for reelection when his party controlled over 60% of the House and Senate.  
 
TABLE 3.2     Control of House and Senate Before Election 
 Majority Minority 
Election Result House Senate House Senate 
Incumbent win     
1956   Eisenhower Eisenhower 
1964 Johnson Johnson   
1972   Nixon Nixon 
1986  Reagan Reagan  
1996   Clinton Clinton 
2004 Bush II Bush II   
Incumbent loss     
1976   Ford Ford 
1980 Carter Carter   
1992   Bush Bush 
 
 
 The number of party seats in Congress is an important resource, but not an 
influence the president can rely on.  It is certainly better to have a large number of party 
seats than not.  Factors other than the president influence members of Congress such as 
their own reelection concerns, policy desires, and constituent concerns.   
 
Electoral Margin of Victory 
 Electoral margin of victory is a primary source of political capital in Light’s 
(1982) interviews with White House staffs.  “If the president is elected by a slim margin, 
congressional support may be undermined” (Light 1982, 28).  In reality, the usefulness 
of margin of victory for a president is probably overstated.  The two presidents with the 
greatest margin of victory, Nixon II and Johnson, both ended their time in office with 
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little public support due to the Watergate scandal and the Vietnam war.  Presidential 
choices and events soon overshadow electoral returns.  Nixon I and Kennedy barely won 
elections and remained popular with the public throughout their terms.   
From 1956 to 2004, the average margin of victory was 8.91 points (SD 8.4) for 
the 13 presidential elections.  The margin of victory for four presidents exceeded 15 
points and the electoral margin for three was less than 1 point.12  Table 3.3 shows the 
margin of victory and gain/loss in party seats resulting from each election.  Nixon (1968) 
and Reagan (1980) gained significant numbers in the House and the Senate during the 
period when they were first elected president.  In both of their large margin reelection 
victories, Nixon and Reagan gained a few House seats and lost Senate seats.  
Presidents with margins of victory above 15 points gained an average of 4% of 
seats in the House and lost 1% of seats in the Senate.  Presidents with the lowest margins 
of victory, less than three points, fared slightly better gaining an average of 1.38% of 
seats in the House and 1.6% of seats in the Senate.  There is no correlation between 
margin of victory and the change in House or Senate seats.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 George W. Bush lost the popular vote by less than 1%, but won the Electoral College. 
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TABLE 3.3     Margin of Victory and Gain/Loss in House and Senate  
                        Presidential Election Years 
 
 
President 
 
 
Year 
 
% of Popular 
vote 
Margin of 
Victory or 
Loss 
Gain/Loss 
House Seats 
% 
Gain/Loss 
Senate Seats 
% 
Eisenhower 1956 57.4 15.4 -.46 -.5 
Kennedy 1960 49.7 .2 -4.83 0 
Johnson 1964 61.1 22.6 8.28 2 
Nixon 1968 43.4 .7 11.96 7 
Nixon 1972 60.7 23.2 2.76 -3 
Carter 1976 50.1 2.1 -.23 2 
Reagan 1980 50.7 9.7 10.12 8 
Reagan 1984 59.0 18.2 3.68 -1 
Bush 1988 53.4 7.8 -.46 0 
Clinton 1992 43.3 5.6 -2.3 1 
Clinton 1996 49.2 8.4 .69 -3 
Bush II 2000 47.87 -.51* -.01 -5 
Bush II 2004 50.73 2.46 .01 4 
Average   8.91   
Standard Deviation   8.40   
*George Bush lost the popular vote and won the electoral vote 
     
   House Senate 
  
Margin of Victory 
 
# of 
Elections 
Average 
Gain/Loss in 
% 
Average 
Gain/Loss in 
% 
 > 15 points 4 3.57% -0.63% 
 >3 and <15 points 4 2.01% 1.50% 
 <3 points 5 1.38% 1.60% 
     
   % Elections 
with Gains 
% Elections 
with Gains 
 > 15 points 4 75% 25% 
 >3 and <15 points 4 50% 75% 
 <3 points 5 40% 80% 
     
     
 
 
If electoral margin of victory represents political capital, there should be a 
noticeable difference between victors with large electoral margins and those will small 
margins of victory in gaining support in Congress.  Table 3.4 shows margin of victory 
 53
and presidential support on votes when the president took a clear position in the first 
year after a presidential election.  I would expect a president’s margin of victory to be 
most influential in the 12 months after an election.  Although overall presidential support 
can be problematic (see Edwards 1989), it gives a rough estimation of how well the 
president fares in Congress.  Regressing overall support by margin of victory and 
controlling for House and Senate party seats and unified government reveals no 
significant relationship between margin of victory and support for presidential positions 
on votes in Congress.   
  
TABLE 3.4      Margin of Victory and Congressional Support  
                         First Year after Election of President 
 
 
President 
 
 
Year 
 
Margin of 
Victory  
Overall 
Presidential 
Support* 
Presidential 
Support 
House 
 
Presidential 
Support Senate
Eisenhower 1956 15.4 68 58 79 
Kennedy 1960 .2 81 83 81 
Johnson 1964 22.6 93 94 93 
Nixon 1968 .7 74 72 76 
Nixon 1972 23.2 51 48 52 
Carter 1976 2.1 75 75 76 
Reagan 1980 9.7 82 73 87 
Reagan 1984 18.2 60 45 72 
Bush 1988 7.8 63 50 73 
Clinton 1992 5.6 86 87 85 
Clinton 1996 8.4 54 39 71 
Bush II 2000 -.51** 86 84 88 
*Presidential victories when the president took a clear-cut position on a bill. 
**George Bush lost the popular vote and won the Electoral vote. 
  
 
One could argue that presidents winning elections by large margins are more 
likely to have higher initial approval from the public and the approval would endure 
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longer.  Table 3.5 shows presidents from 1956 to 2004 sorted by their margin of victory.  
Presidents with the highest margins (>15 points) have an average approval at the end of 
the first quarter of 62%, compared to presidents with the lowest margin of victory (<3 
points) whose approval averages 65% in the first quarter.  Some have called the 
tendency of presidents, who win by narrow margins, yet receive support from a large 
majority of respondents the “honeymoon effect” (Lanoue 1987, Brody 1991).  Excluding 
Nixon, whose numbers decline rapidly in 1973 due to Watergate, and Bush II, whose 
number increase rapidly in 2001 due to the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the 
trend continues through the end of the year.  Presidents with the lowest margin of victory 
begin the year slightly higher, but have an average loss of 7 points (Bush II excluded) 
compared to those presidents with the highest margin of victory whose average loss is 
2.6 points (Nixon excluded).  Seven of the 12 presidents lost approval at the end of the 
first year.  The stability of the job approval numbers is evident by the low standard 
deviations for most presidents.  Nixon and Bush II are both outliers with job approval 
standard deviations of 12.55 and 19.45 respectively.  The standard deviation on 672 
Gallup polls from 1953 to 2000 is 10.35.  Margin of victory does not influence initial 
evaluations (1st quarter approval), but does slightly influence the stability of a president’s 
job approval.  Perhaps voters give more leeway to presidents with higher margins of 
victory and this deference reflects positively on job approval.  Regardless of margin of 
victory, president’s job approval remains relatively stable throughout the year. 
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TABLE 3.5     Margin of Electoral Victory and First Year Job Approval 
    
Job Approval 
 
President 
 
Year 
 
Margin 
End of 
1st qtr 
End of 
4th qtr 
4 Qtr 
Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
1st Qtr less 
4th Qtr 
Nixon 1972 23.20 57 29 40.75 12.55 -28 
Johnson 1964 22.60 71 63 65.50 3.79 -8 
Reagan 1984 18.20 54 59 55.25 2.50 +5 
Eisenhower 1956 15.40 65 60 61.75 2.75 -5 
Average   62 53 (61)*   -9 (-2.6)* 
        
Reagan 1980 9.70 60 49 55.75 4.79 -11 
Clinton 1996 8.40 56 56 56.25 1.26 0 
Bush 1988 7.80 56 71 66.75 7.18 +15 
Clinton 1992 5.60 52 54 52.00 4.32 2 
Average   56 58   1.5 
        
Carter 1976 2.10 70 57 62.25 5.74 -13 
Nixon 1968 0.70 63 59 60.75 2.63 -4 
Kennedy 1960 0.20 73 77 75.25 3.30 -4 
Bush II 2000 -.51 53 86 71.25 19.45 +33 
Average   65 70 (64)**   3 (-7)** 
*Nixon excluded in the number in parenthesis. 
**Bush excluded in the number in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
The State of the Economy as Political Capital 
“It’s the economy, stupid” was the campaign mantra for the Clinton election 
campaign in 1992.  Clinton effectively changed the focus of the campaign from Bush’s 
strength, foreign policy, to the nation’s economy.  After receiving job approval numbers 
above 75% during and after the Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush’s approval fell 
to 32% in July before the November election.  Voter’s negative perceptions of economic 
indicators spelled doom for the Bush reelection campaign (Hetherington 1996).  
Examining public evaluations of his economic and foreign policy performance can help 
explain President Bush’s drop in job approval.  In July 1992, the impact of economic 
evaluations exceeded the impact of foreign policy evaluations on overall job approval by 
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2 to 1, resulting in Bush’s decline in approval (Edwards, Mitchell, & Welch 1995).  
Given the president’s goals of accomplishing his policy agenda, maintaining his public 
standing, and reelection, is the economy a source of political capital for the president? 
Previous research shows that party identification and ideology are the most 
important factors in congressional voting (Bond and Fleisher 1990), and one should not 
expect the economy to have a discernable influence on presidential success in Congress.  
Table 3.6 shows GDP growth, job approval, and presidential support in the House and 
Senate for each year from 1953 to 2003.  The economy under Eisenhower in 1958 
experienced negative GDP growth (-1.0) and his job approval was average (57%), yet 
Eisenhower won 76% of votes when he took a clear position.  In contrast, the GDP 
under Reagan in 1984 grew at a rate of 7.2% and his job approval was 59%, yet overall 
congressional support for Reagan was only 66%.   
 
TABLE 3.6     GDP, Job Approval and Presidential Support in Congress 
 
Year 
 
GDP 
 
Job Approval 
Presidential 
Support in House 
Presidential 
Support in Senate
1953 4.6 69 63 57 
1954 -0.7 69 61 58 
1955 7.1 75 58 66 
1956 1.9 79 63 57 
1957 2.0 58 53 62 
1958 -1.0 57 59 58 
1959 7.1 77 52 52 
1960 2.5 59 51 53 
1961 2.3 77 59 58 
1962 6.1 76 62 58 
1963 4.4 74 58 60 
1964 5.8 69 61 63 
1965 6.4 63 50 61 
1966 6.5 44 59 55 
1967 2.5 46 60 60 
1968 4.8 44 60 50 
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TABLE 3.6     Continued 
 
Year 
 
GDP 
 
Job Approval 
Presidential 
Support in House 
Presidential 
Support in Senate
1969 3.1 59 53 56 
1970 0.2 52 61 56 
1971 3.4 50 58 53 
1972 5.3 59 56 56 
1973 5.8 29 48 49 
1974 -0.5 42 51 48 
1975 -0.2 39 43 56 
1976 5.3 53 44 50 
1977 4.6 57 57 63 
1978 5.6 51 57 57 
1979 3.2 54 54 60 
1980 -0.2 34 55 56 
1981 2.5 49 54 66 
1982 -1.9 41 51 60 
1983 4.5 54 44 60 
1984 7.2 59 45 61 
1985 4.1 63 46 57 
1986 3.5 48 42 58 
1987 3.4 49 40 50 
1988 4.1 63 40 57 
1989 3.5 71 49 66 
1990 1.9 63 40 58 
1991 -0.2 50 48 59 
1992 3.3 49 42 49 
1993 2.7 54 61 61 
1994 4.0 40 63 66 
1995 2.5 51 47 54 
1996 3.7 58 54 58 
1997 4.5 56 50 71 
1998 4.2 73 47 60 
1999 4.5 58 48 56 
2000 3.7 66 48 65 
2001 .8 63 59 79 
2002 1.9 71 57 79 
2003 3.0 61 59 73 
Source: GDP, U.S. Department of Commerce, Seasonal Adjusted Rates in 2000 dollars 
             Job Approval, Gallup Polls, yearly average 
             Presidential Support, Adjusted CQ Almanac scores using Edwards (1989, 21, 26-27). 
 
 
Table 3.7 shows the result of regressing overall success in the House against 
GDP growth, job approval, and controlling for party control of the House.  Although 
 58
GDP growth and job approval do not influence House support, presidential party control 
of the house is significant.  The model predicts that presidents receive a constant level of 
support of 45% from the House, and when the president’s party controls the House, 
support increases by 10 points.   
 
TABLE 3.7     Presidential Support in the House 
                        Economy, Job Approval, and Partisanship 
Source SS Df MS  Number of Obs = 51 
   F(3,44) = 17.39 
Model 1205.24002 3 401.746673  Prob>F = 0.0000 
Residual 1086.09841 47 23.1084769  R-squared = 0.5260 
     Adj R-squared = 0.4957 
Total 2291.33843 50 45.8267687  Root MSE = 4.8071 
  
  
House Support Coef. Std. Error t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval) 
       
GDP -.3584167 0.3202754 -1.12 0.269 -1.002728 0.2858943
Job Approval .0876958 0.0608172 1.44 0.156 -0.0346526 0.2100443
Control House 9.569016 1.395935 6.85 0.00 6.760757 12.37727 
Constant 45.28578 3.396733 13.33 0.00 38.45243 52.11913 
 
 
 The results for the Senate are slightly different.  As before, GDP growth does not 
influence success in the Senate.  Presidential party control of the senate is significant at 
the .10 level.  Job approval does influence presidential support in the Senate, albeit the 
support is very small.  For every five point increase in a president’s job approval, the 
president can expect a 1 point increase in Senate support.   
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TABLE 3.8     Presidential Support in the Senate  
                         Economy, Job Approval, and Partisanship 
Source SS Df MS  Number of Obs = 51 
   F(3,44) = 3.74 
Model 323.472454 3 107.824151  Prob>F = 0.0171 
Residual 1353.20196 47 28.7915311  R-squared = 0.1929 
     Adj R-squared = 0.1414 
Total 1676.67441 50 33.5334883  Root MSE = 5.3658 
  
  
Senate Support Coef. Std. Error t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval) 
       
GDP -.4606803 0.3653996 -1.26 0.214 -1.195769 0.2744088
Job Approval .2067966 0.0685585 3.02 0.004 .0688746 0.3447185
Control Senate 2.638156 1.534163 1.72 0.092 -.4481818 5.724494 
Constant 46.99192 3.875381 12.13 0.000 39.19566 54.78818 
 
 
 Although economic prosperity does not influence the president’s success in 
Congress, and therefore, is not a source of political capital in legislative affairs, there is 
little doubt that the state of the economy affects presidential job approval.  There are 
many other influential components of job approval, with the economy being one of those 
components (see Marra, Ostrom, and Simon 1990; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 
2002).  Controversies have arisen concerning whether the influence of the economy is 
retrospective (Norpoth 1996), prospective (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992), or 
both retrospective and prospective (Clarke and Stewart 1994).   
Presidents desire a strong economy leading into a presidential election, but a 
strong economy does not mean victory.  Table 3.9 shows the growth in the GDP for each 
presidential election from 1952 to 2000 and the election result for the incumbent party.  
One would expect that strong economic growth would favor the party in office.  
However, the results are mixed.  Eisenhower won reelection with flat growth and the 
Democrats lost the presidency in 1968 when the economy was booming.  Both Ford and 
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Bush lost in years when GDP growth exceeded 4%.  In matters of elections, the 
economy matters, but how much depends on other factors.  According to Erikson, 
MacKuen, and Stimson (2002, 282), “Good economic times (and other signs of good 
management) make all political attitudes more favorable to the in-party and push them in 
the opposite direction under bad times.  In this way, both economic and political 
explanations of the vote may be of equal validity.”  The state of the economy is 
important for the president, but not a source of capital that the president can rely on for 
reelection.   
 
TABLE 3.9     Gross Domestic Product and Election Results for Incumbent Party 
Year GDP Growth in 1st three 
Qtrs of Election Year 
Election Result for the 
Incumbent Party 
Election Result for the 
Incumbent President 
1952 2.37 Won Won 
1956 0.27 Won Won 
1960 2.60 Lost N/A 
1964 6.53 Won Won 
1968 6.07 Lost N/A 
1972 7.00 Won Won 
1976 4.73 Lost Lost 
1980 -2.40 Lost Lost 
1984 6.37 Won Won 
1988 3.10 Won Won 
1992 4.03 Lost Lost 
1996 4.33 Won Won 
2000 2.30 Lost N/A 
2004 3.93 Won Won 
Average 3.66   
    
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Adjusted to 2000 dollars 
              Seasonally Adjusted Rates in 2000 dollars 
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Job Approval as Political Capital 
 The importance of job approval to the success of a president is a matter of 
dispute.  Can job approval help a president accomplish his policy and reelection goals?  
Regressing job approval against election results, Lewis-Beck and Rice (1984) show that 
the president’s job approval 6 months prior to the election explains 72% of the variance 
in the popular vote of the incumbent’s party in elections from 1948 to 1980.  Kernell 
(1995, 228) updates Lewis-Beck and Rice’s numbers to include elections through 1996 
and gets a similar result.  The regression line crosses right at 50%.  The implication is 
that strategic presidents seeking reelection need to be close to 50% approval by June of 
an election year.  Eisenhower’s political adviser Bryce Harlow summed up the situation 
facing presidents.  “The trick is to get the president into the fourth year with an approval 
rating still over 50%” (Kernell 1995, 227).  Table 3.10 shows presidential election 
results from 1956 to 2004 when an incumbent president was running for reelection.  In 
all eight elections, the president’s job approval six-months before the election (May) 
correctly predicts the results.  In fact, May job approval is highly correlated with margin 
of victory (.85).  Although models predicting elections with a president’s job approval 
are not the final word, unpopular presidents tend to lose elections. 
Scholars have spent considerable time understanding the influence of presidents 
on congressional elections (see Tufte 1975; Ferejohn & Calvert 1984; Campbell 1985; 
Abramowitz & Segal 1986).  Conventional wisdom says that a popular president should 
help his party in winning seats in Congress by transferring his popularity to candidates 
of the same party.  “When the President’s numbers go up so do the numbers of those 
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who are seeking election or reelection on the Republican ticket” (Reagan Press Secretary 
Larry Speakes quoted in Weinraub 1985).   
 
TABLE 3.10     Presidential Reelection Results 1956-2004 
 
 
President 
 
 
Year 
 
 
May Approval 
% of 
Popular 
vote 
Margin of 
Victory or 
Loss 
Percentage 
Gain/Loss 
House Seats 
Percentage 
Gain/Loss 
Senate Seats 
Eisenhower 1956 69 57.4 15.4 -0.46 -0.5 
Johnson 1964 75 61.1 22.6 8.28 2 
Nixon 1972 62 60.7 23.2 2.76 -3 
Ford 1976 47 48.0 -2.1 -0.23 2 
Carter 1980 43 41.7 -9.7 -10.1 -8 
Reagan 1984 52 59.0 18.2 3.68 -1 
Bush 1992 41 37.7 -5.6 2.30 -1 
Clinton 1996 55 49.2 8.4 0.69 -3 
Bush II 2004 49 50.73 2.46 .01 4 
   
Job Approval in 
May of election 
year 
 
 
Won 
 
 
Lost 
 
Above 50% 5 0  
Below 50% 1 3    
      
 
 
 Table 3.11 shows election results for each presidential and midterm election from 
1954 to 2004.  Table 3.12 breaks down the results.  In over 57% of the House elections 
and 62% of the Senate elections, the president’s party loses seats.  Furthermore, the 
popularity of the president only slightly improves chances for success in gaining party 
seats, and primarily in the House.  When the president’s job approval is above 50%, the 
president’s party gains House seats 44% of the time and Senate seats 31% of the time.  
Presidents whose job approval is below 50% gain House seats in 33% of the elections 
and Senate seats in 43% of elections.  A simple t-test shows that there is no significant 
difference between the mean gain/loss in seats when the president is above or below 
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50% job approval.   This result is in contrast to some previous research that has found 
evidence that the president’s job approval can influence mid-term congressional 
elections and change the partisan composition of Congress (Tufte 1975; Kernell 1978; 
Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Fiorina 1981; Abramson, Aldrich, Rohde 1982). 
 
TABLE 3.11     Election Results 1954-2004:  Presidential and Midterm Elections 
 
 
President 
 
Election Year 
 
6 Month 
Approval(1) 
% of 
Party House 
Seats(2) 
% of 
Party Senate 
Seats(3) 
Gain/Loss  
House Party 
Seats as % (4) 
Gain/Loss 
Senate 
Seats(5) 
Eisenhower 1954 61 46.67 49.5 -4.13 -1 
Eisenhower 1956 69 46.21 49 -0.46 -0.5 
Eisenhower 1958 53 35.17 35 -11.04 -14 
Kennedy 1962 74 59.54 66 -0.46 1 
Johnson 1964 75 67.82 68 8.28 2 
Johnson 1966 46 67.82 64 0.00 -4 
Nixon 1970 59 44.14 45 -2.76 2 
Nixon 1972 62 41.38 42 2.76 -3 
Ford 1976 47 32.87 39 -0.23 2 
Carter 1978 41 65.98 59 -1.15 -2 
Carter 1980 43 55.86 51 -10.12 -8 
Reagan 1982 44 38.16 54 -5.98 1 
Reagan 1984 52 41.84 53 3.68 -1 
Reagan 1986 68 40.69 45 -1.15 -8 
Bush 1990 65 38.39 44 -1.84 -1 
Bush 1992 41 40.69 43 2.30 -1 
Clinton 1994 51 46.9 48 -12.41 -9 
Clinton 1996 55 47.59 45 0.69 -3 
Clinton 1998 64 48.51 45 0.92 0 
Bush II 2002 76 52.41 51 1.61 1 
Bush II 2004 49 53.10 55 .69 4 
 # Elections 21      
Note: Based on two-year election cycle and after a President has served for a minimum of one year 
(1) Job Approval in May of each election year (See Lewis-Beck & Rice 1982) 
(2) Percentage of House seats in the party of the incumbent president after the election 
(3) Percentage of Senate seats in the party of the incumbent president after the election 
(4) Gain or Loss in House party seats from the previous election  
(5) Gain or Loss in Senate party seats from the previous election 
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TABLE 3.12     Election Results Summary 1954-2004  
   
House % Senate % 
Number of elections with Gains 8 38% 7 33% 
Number of elections with Losses 12 57% 13 62% 
No Change 1 5% 1 5% 
21 100% 21 100% 
    
Gains when approval above 50% 6 29% 4 19% 
Losses when approval above 50% 8 38% 9 43% 
Gains when approval below 50% 2 10% 3 14% 
Losses when approval below 50% 4 19% 4 19% 
No Change 1 5% 1 5% 
  Total 21 100% 21 100% 
    
President above 50% approval     
  Elections with gain 6 44% 4 31% 
  Elections with loss 8 56% 9 69% 
14 100% 13 100.00% 
    
President below 50% approval     
  Elections with gain 2 33% 3 43% 
  Elections with loss 4 67% 4 57% 
6 100% 7 100.00% 
 
 
 A final important aspect of job approval as political capital is the influence on 
congressional voting.  This subject has been thoroughly researched.  Edwards (1989, 
125) finds that though job approval is useful, it is not likely to “dominate executive-
legislative relations” (Edwards 1989, 125).  Bond and Fleisher (1990) conclude that the 
effects of job approval on success in Congress are limited and that presidential 
popularity does not unify party factions.  Presidential job approval may have benefits in 
other areas.  Scholars have found job approval to be a significant resource in winning 
Supreme Court confirmations (Johnson and Roberts 2004), Senate confirmations (Krutz, 
Fleisher, and Bond 1998), the veto process (Rohde and Simon 1985; Woolley 1991), and 
roll-call votes (Brace and Hinckley 1992; Rivers and Rose 1985).   
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In contrast, Ostrom and Simon (1985) find that public approval is a vital resource 
to presidents in their dealings with Congress.  Their results imply that the “cumulative 
rate of roll-call victories will decline by three points for every ten-point drop in 
approval” (1985, 349).  According to Ostrom and Simon, “more ambitious legislative 
agendas demand higher levels of approval to sustain a given level of success” (1985, 
351).   
 
Presidential Political Capital 
 Presidents need resources to be successful.  Party seats in Congress, large 
electoral margin of victory, a strong economy, and job approval are all prized 
possessions for presidents, but none of these resources are a panacea.  Party seats in 
Congress can help a president with his legislative agenda as long as the president can 
keep his party unified.  An increase in party seats does not make presidents more popular 
or reelection more likely.  Most presidents lose seats in subsequent elections regardless 
of their popularity.  Presidents with large margins of victory do not enjoy higher job 
approval numbers or more success in Congress.  A strong economy is a significant 
component of overall job approval, but does not guarantee election or legislative 
success.  High presidential job approval can help first-term presidents in their reelection 
efforts, but job approval does not make presidents more successful in Congress.  Even 
with their obvious limitations, each of these possible sources of influence is desirable for 
a president.  The important question is, which of these resources has the potential to 
change the decision-making behavior of the president?  
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 I contend that the one resource the president will trade for all of the others is job 
approval.  None of the other possible sources of influence, party seats, strong economy, 
or margin of victory can overcome a low job approval evaluation from the public, or 
change with each foreign policy action.  When compared with party seats, margin of 
victory, and the economy, a president’s job approval is distinctive.  First, job approval is 
personal.  It is an aggregate measure of the public’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
the president’s performance in office.  Second, job approval is a continuous measure.  
Public appraisals occur at regular intervals and reflect the president’s ongoing 
performance in dealing with the many facets of government.  Third, job approval is a 
measure of the public’s appraisal of the choices made by the president.  Although a 
president has little control over the economy or Congress, presidents do have control 
over their own policy choices.  Strategic presidents recognize that there is a potential 
trade-off between policy choices and public support.  Johnson knew the perils of policy 
choice.  “I think (my grandchildren) will be proud of two things.  What I did for the 
Negro and seeing it through in Vietnam for all of Asia.  The Negro cost me 15 points in 
the polls and Vietnam cost me 20” (Wise 1968, 131).  Finally, a high job approval 
enhances other resources available to the president.  In appealing to the public and 
Congress, popular presidents are more apt to be heard.  
 Gallup has been asking about presidential approval for over 70 years and since 
1945 has asked the question in the same manner: “Do you approve or disapprove of the 
way the [president’s name] is handling his job as president”?  The president’s job 
approval has become one of the most recognizable measures in our political system.  
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“The standing of the president with the American people has come to have a political life 
of its own.  A president’s ‘popularity’ is said to be a political resource that can help him 
achieve his program, keep challengers at bay and guide his and other political leaders’ 
expectations about the president’s party prospects in presidential and congressional 
elections” (Brody 1991). 
 Research has shown that presidential job approval is not a one-dimensional 
measure of general popularity.  Job approval consists of both relatively stable 
predispositions and more volatile environmental factors.  Edwards (1990) suggests that 
party identification and a general positivity bias provide stability to job approval 
numbers.  Respondents tend to support presidents of their own party and will tend to 
disregard information that portrays the president poorly.  A positivity bias is a proclivity 
to evaluate public figures in a positive direction.  This explains why most presidents start 
their terms in office with high job approval numbers.  Similarly, Erikson, MacKuen, and 
Stimson (2002) find that residual components, factors other than environmental events, 
explain 40% of job approval.    
 Most variation in job approval comes from environmental factors.  The 
environment includes diverse factors such as rates of unemployment and inflation, battle 
deaths during times of war, the level of international tension, and presidential success 
(Marra, Ostrom, Simon 1990, 594; see also Kernell 1978; MacKuen 1983).  According 
to Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002), economic performance and political events 
explain over 50% of a president’s job approval.  As the president satisfies public 
expectations, approval increases, and when expectations are not met, approval declines.  
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Additionally, the public responds to symbolic events from the president.  Activities such 
as foreign travel (Lammers 1981), presidential speeches (Kernell 1978), and press 
relations (Grossman and Kumar 1981) can help mitigate negative environmental factors.   
 Presidents do not choose job approval as a measure of their political strength.  
The media forces it upon them.  A president’s job approval provides the media with an 
objective measure of how the public is responding to a president’s leadership.  In the 
first 100 days of the Clinton presidency, polling firms asked the job approval question 37 
times, or once every 2.7 days (Bowman 2000).  From 1969 to 2000, Gallup reported 
presidential approval numbers 672 times, an average of 21 per year and 1.75 times per 
month.  Combining the numerous media outlets and private polling organizations 
conducting surveys, a current job approval number is available for the president every 
week of his term.   
 Recognizing the importance of their standing in the public, presidents seek 
information on their own.  Since the Kennedy White House, presidents have used private 
polling firms to assess public opinion (Jacobs and Shapiro, 1995).  Funded primarily by 
the Republican National Committee and the Democratic National Committee, presidents 
spend large amounts of money to gauge their support.  In two years, President Ford spent 
over $960,000 on polling.  In four years, Carter spent $4 million, Reagan $16 million, 
Bush $2 million, and Clinton $15 million on private polls13 (Tenpas 2000, see also Heith 
2004).  According to Heith (2004, 44), 36.5% of the questions in these polls were to 
appraise the public’s approval of the president and/or Congress.  Kernell (1995) suggests 
                                                          
13 In 1997 constant dollars. 
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that “presidents who go public need pollsters.”  When the president’s standing in the 
public is a resource, information becomes essential.  As one Clinton aide offered, 
“Clinton has come to believe that if he keeps his approval rating up and sells his 
message as he did during the campaign, there will be greater acceptability for his 
program” (Mitchell 1997).   
 Presidential approval is important because presidents have few tools to govern 
effectively and others think it is important.   
Presidential approval may, in fact, be more important than support or opposition 
to specific policies in developing policy possibilities or constraints. . . . That 
occurs because presidential approval is political capital that the president can 
draw upon, and congressional representatives and other people recognize the 
power of that capital when they challenge or support the president Sobel (1993, 
275). 
 
Presidential poll ratings are important because they are thought to be important.  
They are thought to be important because political leaders look for indications of 
when it is safe or dangerous to oppose their policy interests or career ambitions 
to those of the president and because indications of political support—which in 
other political contexts might be preferred—are too limited in scope to be relied 
upon in this context (Brody 1991, 22). 
 
The perceived importance of a president’s approval rating makes it a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for influence.  Although high job approval does represent a 
significant measure of strength for the president, which is helpful in accomplishing the 
president’s policy, reelection, and legacy goals, low job approval reduces the potential 
leverage available to the president.  The preceding analysis finds that party seats, margin 
of victory, and the economy do not necessarily increase the chances for presidential 
success.  The personal and portable nature of job approval makes it a preferable to party 
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seats in Congress, electoral margin of victory, and economic prosperity as a source of 
political capital for the president.   
 The desire to preserve available political capital motivates presidents.  When job 
approval signals the strength or weakness of a president, job approval has the potential to 
change behavior.  Since policy choices place political capital at risk, popular presidents 
make foreign policy decisions differently than unpopular presidents.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE NATURE OF RISK IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
 
“These people [the Vietnamese] hate us.  They are going to throw our asses out 
of there at almost any point.  But I can’t give up territory like that to the Communists 
and then get the American people to reelect me!” (JFK to the journalist Charles Bartlett 
on April 24, 1963, quoted in Small 1996).  President Kennedy stated what is obvious to 
presidents; foreign policy choices have domestic implications for presidents.  Reelection 
is not the only presidential concern.  A president’s domestic policy agenda, public 
standing, and his ability to build political support for future foreign policy decisions 
depend in part on the president’s performance in foreign affairs.  Although the strategic 
foreign policy decision-maker seeks to accomplish his policy desires and at the same 
time minimize exposure to undesirable outcomes, inherent in foreign policy decisions is 
the acceptance of some level of risk.  The purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
nature of risk in foreign policy decision-making, create a measure for risk, and determine 
what foreign policy decisions represent risky behavior.    
 
What Is Foreign Policy Risk? 
Simply stated, risk is being subject to the possibility of a loss.  Decision-making 
risks occur because the results of foreign policy actions are unknown, thereby, exposing 
the president to a potential loss or a gain, depending on the outcome.  A decision-maker 
incurs risk when all possible outcomes of a decision are not favorable.   
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Most scholarly discussions of foreign policy risk concern undesired outcomes or 
unintended consequences, but are too vague and difficult to quantify.  For example, 
Snyder and Diesing (1977, 209-211) divide risk considerations into two groups.  One is 
the risk of miscalculation.  Due to misperceptions of the adversary’s interests or 
intentions, decision-makers make choices that place them in a situation that can become 
problematic.  A second type of risk is autonomous risk, or the danger that once a course 
of action is pursued events will spiral out of control.  Lamborn (1985) separates risk into 
two categories, policy risk and political risk.  Policy risk is the “probability that policy 
goals will not be achieved.”  Intrinsic policy risk means that the policy may fail even if 
implemented successfully.  Extrinsic policy risk refers to policies that cannot be 
sustained long enough to be successful.  Political risk concerns the environment of 
decision-makers.  Policy choices may lead to problems for key partners in a coalition. 
Although identifying types of risk associated with foreign policy is helpful, 
determining when decision-making risk occurs requires more precision.  The most 
common method of measuring risk is the product of the likelihood of occurring a loss 
times the value of the loss to the decision-maker (see Kahneman and Tversky 1984, 
341).  Determining appropriate values for these measures is often subjective and inexact, 
which leads to much speculation.  Since the objective is to understand the risk 
considerations of the decision-maker, one must find a workable method of valuing risk.  
Although it is not possible to know the exact probabilities considered by the decision-
maker, and therefore calculate a value for risk, it is possible to specify the conditions 
under which risk is expected and the extent of the risk.         
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I propose that instead of focusing on a calculation of risk, measured by 
consequences and likelihood, additional leverage is gained by concentrating on risk 
exposure.  Risk exposure is being subject to a source of risk.  Rather than subjectively 
creating values for consequences and likelihood, one can determine the magnitude of 
risk by examining the possible hazards, or sources of risk, from a foreign policy 
decision.  In this manner, risks are identified by discerning the potential vulnerabilities 
from pursuing a course of action against a target.  Since the primary sources of risks in 
foreign policy are the actions pursued and the targets of the actions, risk exposure is 
conditional on the context of the decision.   
  The assumption is that the degree of risk can be measured by an analysis of the 
risk exposure produced by a foreign policy decision.  The uncertainty that a foreign 
policy action will be successful and the consequences from the action are conditional on 
the target and the action itself.  This is illustrated by the standard utility equation.  The 
formula for expected utility is as follows: 
))1(()()( fUsPsUsPdUE ×−+×=  
Where 
E(Ud) = decision-maker’s expected utility for proposed policy 
Ps = probability of success 
Us = utility in a state of success 
Uf = utility in a state of failure 
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When contemplating an action, a decision-maker considers both the gain from a 
successful action and the possible loss from an unsuccessful action.  The expected utility 
from a decision is the expected value of success (Ps x Us) plus the expected value of 
failure ((1 - Ps) x Uf ).  Presidents are strategic actors.  They desire to maximize their 
benefits or value from foreign policy choices and expect the results of an action to 
provide positive benefits both to them personally and to the country.  When E(Ud) is >0, 
the nation and the leader are better off pursuing the action than foregoing the action.    If 
E(Ud) < 0, then the decision-maker will exercise restraint or seek another alternative.  
The utility in a state of failure (Uf ) is presumed to be a negative value.  If Uf is positive, 
there is no downside to pursuing the action.14   
 The expected value of failure ((1 - Ps) x Uf) is a measure of the utility value 
placed in jeopardy by a foreign policy action.  It is a quantitative estimate of the cost of 
the worst case scenario taking place.  In risk management terms, the expected value of 
failure is the level of exposure the decision-maker accepts when pursuing a course of 
action.  The expected value of failure equation suggests important constraints in the 
decision process; the probability the action will not succeed and the utility loss 
associated with failure.  Figure 4.1 depicts the relationship between the probability of 
failure and utility in the state of failure and the resulting decision-maker risk. 
                                                          
14 The expected utility question helps to explain the difference between a risk-acceptant actor 
and a risk-averse actor.  A risk-acceptant actor will choose the alternative with the greatest 
expected value of success (Ps x Us).  In contrast, the risk-averse actor considers the entire 
equation that includes the expected value of failure ((1 - Ps) x Uf ).  Huth and Russett (1993, 67) 
define risk orientation as “an individual’s way of choosing between options that have the same 
expected payoff but vary with respect to the probability of receiving that payoff.  Risk-averse 
actors tend to favor more certain outcomes and risk-acceptant actors are more willing to gamble 
on less certain outcomes.” 
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The risk from a foreign policy decision depends on the relationship between the 
probability of failure (1-Ps) and the utility in a state of failure (Uf).  A decision-maker 
can minimize his risk by choosing actions with a lower probability of failure and/or a 
lower utility for failure.  Actions with a greater probability of failure have a steeper slope 
indicating a greater potential for a loss.   
 The relationship between probability of failure (1-Ps) and the utility in a state of 
failure (Uf) create conditions under which decision-making risks can be assessed.  
Below, I examine the contextual factors that influence the probability of failure and 
utility in a state of failure and graphically show how these factors interact to create risk 
exposure for the decision-maker. 
  
FIGURE 4.1     Decision-Maker Loss Exposure   
Decision-
maker risk 
Utility in State of Failure (Uf) 
Pf  High 
Pf Low 
Low 
High 
High 
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Probability of Failure (1-Ps) 
Probability of failure (1-Ps) is a measure of a decision-maker’s assesment 
concerning the probability of failing when making a policy choice.  The probability of 
success when extending a trade agreement to another nation is almost 100%.  In contrast, 
the probability of success when implementing economic sanctions on another country is 
less clear.  Assigning a value for Ps is difficult due to uncertainty.  Bueno de Mesquita 
addresses this issue in his book The War Trap.  “Suppose that the decision maker either 
did not know enough about the likely costs and benefits of his choices to be certain 
about the chance of success with each to affix a probability value with confidence to 
each of these options.  The choices he must make under these circumstances are fraught 
with uncertainty” (BDM 1981, 35).  According to Bueno de Mesquita, when there is 
uncertainty, 1-Ps is actually 1-(Ps+ k) with k representing the amount of uncertainty in 
the calculation (BDM 1981, 35).15    
The theoretical underpinnings of decision-making under risk and uncertainty in 
political science have been borrowed from economics, yet economists do not agree on 
precise definitions or proper measurement.  As far back as Knight (1921), attempts were 
made to make a distinction between risk and uncertainty.  Knight argued that risk refers 
to situations where probabilities can be assigned and uncertainty refers to situations 
when probabilities cannot be expressed.  Prominent theorists such as von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944), Arrow (1964), and Savage (1954) take varied approaches 
                                                          
15 In The War Trap, Bueno de Mesquita measures Ps using CINC scores (relative power) and k 
(uncertainty) as a function of the change in tightness of alliances in international system.  Huth, Bennett, 
and Gelpi (1992, 481) suggest that uncertainty is represented by the confidence interval placed around 
estimates of possible outcomes from an action and the wider the confidence interval, the less certain the 
outcome of the decision.   
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concerning the appropriateness of assigning mathematical probabilities.  The risk versus 
certainty debate remains a “field in flux” (Machina 1987).   
Although recognizing the differences between risk and uncertainty, Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan combines the concepts for purpose of modeling 
monetary policy.   
The Federal Reserve's experiences over the past two decades make it clear that 
uncertainty is not just a pervasive feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is 
the defining characteristic of that landscape.  The term "uncertainty" is meant 
here to encompass both "Knightian uncertainty," in which the probability 
distribution of outcomes is unknown, and "risk," in which uncertainty of 
outcomes is delimited by a known probability distribution.  In practice, one is 
never quite sure what type of uncertainty one is dealing with in real time, and it 
may be best to think of a continuum ranging from well-defined risks to the truly 
unknown. . . .This conceptual framework emphasizes understanding as much as 
possible the many sources of risk and uncertainty that policymakers face, 
quantifying those risk when possible, and assessing the costs associated with 
each of the risks.16   
 
The process of choosing among alternative policy options involves calculating 
probabilities, and these probabilities include an assessment of both risk and uncertainty.  
Although it is impossible to ever know for sure the chances for success, factors related to 
the target of the action and the action itself can help to distinguish between more and 
less certain policy choices.   
Target Risk.  Uncertainty related to the target results from relative power 
differentials.  It is more difficult to achieve foreign policy success as the target of the 
policy increases in strength.  Stronger nations can resist longer and more effectively than 
weaker nations, and therefore, the risk of undesired outcomes increases.  When an action 
                                                          
16 Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan at the Meetings of the American Economic Association, San 
Diego, California, January 3, 2004. 
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is considered, decision-makers subjectively assess the target risk by comparing the 
relative strength of the target with their own current state.  As the target nation increases 
in strength, the probability of failure increases.  Figure 4.2 shows this relationship.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Action Risk.  Actions toward a target nation are either cooperative or conflictual, 
and within each category, there is a wide variation.  A cooperative action can range from 
a simple consultation to the extension of economic aid to another nation.  A conflictual 
action can range from issuing a complaint to the use of military force.  Although it is 
possible that both cooperation and conflict can increase the probability of failure, I 
suggest that conflictual actions provide the greatest opportunity for policy failure.  
Figure 4.3 shows the relationship between the nature of the action and the probability of 
failure.   
Target Strength  
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FIGURE 4.2     Risk Assessment from Power Differential 
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Conflict increases the complexity of the decision because the number of variables 
to be accounted for increases.  Leaders who are the target of a conflictual act must seek 
to insure their legitimacy by a strong reaction or even implementing defensive measures.  
A conflictual act can draw other nations into the situation due to a military alliance or 
other relationship.  Risk increases as the action pursued covaries with other factors 
giving the initiator less control over the outcome.   
 Both the target of the action and the type of action are sources of risk for the 
decision-maker.  Decision-maker risk increases as actions become more conflictual and 
the strength of the target nation grows.   
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Utility in a State of Failure (Uf)—How Bad Does It Hurt? 
 Utility in a state of failure is a measure of the loss associated with a failed foreign 
policy action.  It is a measure of how much of something useful in achieving the goals of 
the decision-maker is lost.  In contrast to probability of failure (1-Ps), which is largely a 
function of the international system, the value of Uf  is primarily related to domestic 
factors, namely public awareness.  The failure of a foreign policy action is more 
damaging when the target has a high profile due to its strategic importance or historical 
relationship with the U.S.  Nations with a higher public profile pose a greater potential 
loss from foreign policy failure than lesser known countries (i.e., Russia vs. New 
Zealand).  Figure 4.4 shows the relationship between the importance of the target and the 
utility at risk from failure. 
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It is important to clearly define what is meant by a loss (Uf).  A loss in the 
expected utility equation is not an outlay or expenditure made to achieve something; it is 
the penalty incurred when the objective is not achieved.  For example, the economic 
expense related to a military action occurs whether or not the action is successful.  In a 
military endeavor, the cost of the action is a sunk cost.  It is an expenditure that takes 
place and usually cannot be recovered.  In contrast, the losses of trade relationships or 
public support from a foreign policy action are losses associated with the failure of the 
policy.   
 Although economic and political costs can result from foreign policy failure, 
political costs are more likely and most hazardous for the president.  Economic costs, 
such as the loss of trade, are less problematic for the decision-maker because conflictual 
relations between trading partners is less likely to occur, especially in bilateral relations 
where trade relations already exist (Dorussen 1999; Polachek, Robst, & Chang 1999).   
Even in the case of Japan during the 1980’s, where most Americans believed that Japan 
was trading unfairly with the U.S., the cost to President Bush was political.17       
 
Actors and Actions 
Foreign policy is about conflict and cooperation among nations; foreign policy 
includes an action (policy choice) and a target (nation-state).  Although risk is measured 
by ((1 - Ps) x Uf ), risk exposure is defined by the sources of risk.  In the case of foreign 
                                                          
17 For example, see the Gallup/Newsweek Poll, 9/19/89.  “Do you think the (President George) 
Bush Administration is or is not doing enough to make Japan adopt more fair trade practices, or 
don't you think this is necessary?”  44%-Not doing enough, 18%--doing enough. 23%-Don’t 
know.   
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policy, the nature of the action, the target nation and the salience of the action and target 
combine to form the source of risk for the decision-maker.  To understand the risk 
involved in foreign policy, it is not sufficient to focus on the type of action chosen or the 
target nation; both are important.  Since decision-makers choose policy with a target in 
mind, it is the interaction between the action and the target that is of interest.   
The previous analysis shows that the probability of failure (1-Ps) includes both 
target risk and action risk, and the utility for failure (Uf) is a function of the domestic 
importance of the target.   Foreign policy actions that include strong targets and 
conflictual actions create more risk for the decision-maker.   In order to illustrate this 
concept, I have created a figure showing possible relationships (see figure 4.5 below).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stronger 
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Target 
Action High
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FIGURE 4.5     Conditional Risk in Foreign Policy (Salient Nations Only) 
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As the figure shows, the foreign policy risk depends on the nature of the action and the 
target nation.  When an action is cooperative and the target nation is weak, the risks are 
low compared to a conflictual action directed towards a stronger nation.  Foreign policy 
risks increase as an action becomes more conflictual and the target nation stronger.  
Although there is an element of risk in all foreign policy actions, the risks vary greatly 
depending on the type of action and the strength of the target nation.  Both the action and 
the target are relevant to the analysis.   
 
Measuring Risk Exposure 
 The previous chart shows that the interaction between the target and the action 
creates conditions where different levels of risk are likely.  Measuring risk exposure 
involves three factors:  nature of the action, strength of the target nation, and the public 
importance of the target.     
 
Measuring (Uf) 
 The utility for failure (Uf) increases when the target of U.S. foreign policy is 
considered important to the public.  Importance is defined by a number of factors.  First, 
a nation is considered important when there is an historical relationship with the U.S that 
has kept the nation in the public eye for a long period of time.  Nations such as France, 
Japan, and Russia have long been considered important to the U.S.  Second, a nation’s 
importance can change due to the nature of the current relationship.  When the attention 
of the president is focused on a particular nation, the salience of that nation increases 
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until the environment changes.  This is usually the case when relations become 
conflictual, such as with Haiti and Nicaragua.  After the conflict subsides, the salience of 
the nation returns to normal levels.  Third, nations grow in public importance when they 
are perceived to be a threat to the U.S.  Iraq and North Korea are examples of countries 
whose importance to the U.S. is related to their perceived threat.     
The public’s assessment of nations in the international system is largely based on 
historical attitudes updated with new information.  The typical citizen does not live in 
the world of foreign policy and is forced to rely on the mass media for knowledge of 
current world events.  The public develops a general opinion about which nations are 
important by updating past beliefs, which involves drawing upon and simplifying 
currently available information.  Using concepts found in cognitive-psychology and 
social cognition literature, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), argue that humans are cognitive 
misers, facing information-processing shortcomings and forced to rely on shortcuts when 
possible.  These cognitive heuristics are necessary because of the complexity of foreign 
policy issues.  One technique employed by the individual is to “use old, generic 
knowledge to interpret new, specific information” (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, 1104; see 
also Fiske and Taylor 1984).  General beliefs fill in the gaps when confronted with new 
information (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).   
I have chosen two methods of identifying target nations that are salient to the 
U.S. public.  First, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) surveys conducted 
every four years since 1978.  Second, press reports of interactions between the U.S. and 
other nations.  During the term of a president, if a nation appears on the CCFR survey or 
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represents over 1.5% of all U.S. foreign policy interactions, as reported by Reuters News 
Service, then the nation is considered salient to the public.18   
CCFR Surveys.  Since 1978, and every four years thereafter, the CCFR has 
included in the survey a series of questions asking respondents to rate their feeling 
towards individual countries.  Although a feeling toward a country is not equivalent to 
salience, the limited survey space requires that the CCFR only include countries deemed 
most relevant.  Therefore, inclusion in the survey is an indication of the current 
importance or highly visible nature of an individual country.  Table 4.1 shows the 
nations included on the Council on Foreign Relations surveys of the general public from 
1978 to 2002.  As world events change, the list of countries included in the survey vary.  
In 2002, Afghanistan was added to the survey and in 1998 Haiti was removed.  
Seventeen nations are included in each of the seven surveys and 5 nations are included in 
only one survey.  For most countries, the percentage of respondents able to give an 
opinion is over 85% indicating the high profile nature of the countries included in the 
survey.   
                                                          
18 Although 1.5% is an arbitrary breakpoint, it is a reasonable cutoff.  The measure is intended to create a 
list of nations, out the 172 total nations, likely to be salient to the public.  It is intended to be exclusive, but 
not too restrictive.  The 1.5% level limits the list to nations most likely to be in the news based on Reuters’ 
news reports.  In the Nixon administration only 13 countries exceeded 1.5% of all interactions, compared 
to 23 countries during the Reagan Administration.  It is highly unlikely that public awareness extends 
beyond 23 countries.  In order for a nation to meet the 1.5% threshold, the U.S. must have initiated at least 
25 interactions with the nation and the actual number of interactions must exceed the mean number of 
interactions. 
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TABLE 4.1     Nations Included in CCFR Feeling Thermometer Questions  
 Carter Reagan Bush Clinton Bush  
 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 
Number of 
surveys 
Brazil x x x x x x x 7 
Canada x x x x x x x 7 
China x x x x x x x 7 
France x x x x x x x 7 
Germany x x x x x x x 7 
India x x x x x x x 7 
Iran x x x x x x x 7 
Israel x x x x x x x 7 
Italy x x x x x x x 7 
Japan x x x x x x x 7 
Mexico x x x x x x x 7 
Poland x x x x x x x 7 
Saudia Arabia x x x x x x x 7 
South Africa x x x x x x x 7 
South Korea x x x x x x x 7 
Taiwan x x x x x x x 7 
UK x x x x x x x 7 
Nigeria   x x  x x 4 
Russia    x x x x 4 
Argentina     x x x 3 
Cuba     x x x 3 
Iraq    x  x x 3 
North Korea     x x x 3 
Soviet Union x x x     3 
Egypt    x   x 2 
Nicauragua   x x    2 
Pakistan      x x 2 
Philippines   x x    2 
Turkey      x x 2 
Afghanistan       x 1 
Columbia       x 1 
East Germany   x     1 
Haiti     x   1 
Syria   x     1 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Surveys, 1978-2002 
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 U.S. Interactions.  In the course of carrying out their foreign policy duties, the 
attention of presidents is not equally distributed among the countries of the world.  There 
are a number of possible reasons.  Some nations are more strategic and require close 
management by the U.S. due to their location or political importance such as Israel and 
Egypt.  Other nations are important because they are more conflictual in their relations 
with the U.S such as the Soviet Union and Syria.  Often, a president’s term in office is 
defined by how he dealt with a certain country.  Johnson and Nixon’s presidency was 
defined by relations with Vietnam, Carter with Iran, and Bush with Iraq.  Table 4.2 
shows the percentage of total interactions with different nations during six presidencies 
as reported by the Reuters News Service.  The percentages give a rough measure of the 
attention devoted to each nation.  When a president spends a disproportionate amount of 
foreign policy effort on one country, public expectations increase and policy options are 
more constrained, therefore the probability of failure increases.  Israel is a prime 
example.  During the six presidencies, interactions with Israel required the third largest 
amount of foreign policy effort.  The high profile nature of the relationship and the 
importance of Israel in the Middle East can limit U.S. options in the region.    
The interactions in the table are both cooperative and conflictual.  All presidents 
from Johnson to Bush spent a plurality of their time dealing with the Soviet Union.   
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TABLE 4.2     Interactions with Other Nations by President (% of Total Interactions) 
                        Nations representing more than 1.5% of total interactions 
TARGET Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Bush Average 
USSR 15.07% 13.50% 13.48% 19.06% 22.07% 14.65% 16.30% 
N Vietnam 8.46% 24.21% 2.36% 2.74%   9.44% 
Iraq      8.59% 8.59% 
Israel 4.01% 4.89% 9.50% 11.57% 7.52% 7.10% 7.43% 
S Vietnam 5.15% 5.94% 2.42%    4.50% 
Iran   1.79% 9.20% 3.11% 2.08% 4.04% 
Egypt 2.38% 2.97% 4.03% 7.14% 2.24%  3.75% 
Nicaragua     4.87% 2.22% 3.54% 
Russia      3.39% 3.39% 
N Korea 3.36%      3.36% 
Lebanon   2.59%  4.12%  3.35% 
China 2.49% 2.68% 2.48% 3.65% 2.39% 4.39% 3.01% 
El Salvador     2.99%  2.99% 
Panama      2.62% 2.62% 
S Africa   2.36% 1.93% 3.06%  2.45% 
Cuba   2.53% 3.08% 1.72%  2.44% 
Turkey   2.42%    2.42% 
Japan 1.84% 3.55% 2.42% 1.82% 1.87% 2.76% 2.38% 
France 3.52% 1.94% 2.25%   1.54% 2.31% 
W Germany 3.79% 1.99% 1.79%   1.58% 2.29% 
India 3.41% 1.67% 1.73%    2.27% 
Philippines     2.27%  2.27% 
UK 3.79% 1.70% 2.13% 1.64% 2.17% 1.85% 2.22% 
Cambodia 2.06% 2.66% 1.84%    2.19% 
S Korea 2.17%  1.56% 2.55%   2.09% 
Syria   1.73%  2.67% 1.72% 2.04% 
Greece   1.96%    1.96% 
Libya     1.93%  1.93% 
Angola   1.84%    1.84% 
Saudi Arabia    1.88% 1.61%  1.75% 
Portugal   1.73%    1.73% 
Poland     1.71%  1.71% 
Thailand   1.67%    1.67% 
Canada  1.67%     1.67% 
Zimbabwe    1.62%   1.62% 
Jordan     1.60%  1.60% 
Mexico     1.58%  1.58% 
% of Total Interactions 61.52% 69.38% 68.61% 67.88% 71.51% 54.48%  
Source:  KEDS data based on Reuters news reports and compiled by Rodney Tomlinson, 
U.S. Naval Academy 
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Other than a few key partners such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and 
France, most presidents’ foreign policy attention is spent on nations with whom the U.S. 
has conflictual relations or regions where conflict is present.  In addition, attention varies 
by president.  Carter spent a disproportionate amount of time on Egypt and Iran, Reagan 
on Nicaragua and Lebanon, and Bush on Iraq.   
 Salient Nations.  The CCFR surveys and U.S. interactions provide an objective 
indicator of nations likely to be salient to the American public.  By combining the two 
sources, it is possible to account for both historical and current relationships with other 
countries.  Table 4.3 shows the nations that met the criteria of being included on a CCFR 
survey or represent over 1.5% of all U.S. interactions during a presidential term in 
office. 
The list of salient nations shows evidence of historical relationships and short-
term crises.  Ten countries were relevant in each administration and 10 countries were 
relevant during only one administration.   
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TABLE 4.3     Salient Nations by President 
 Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Bush 
Canada x x x x x x 
China x x x x x x 
France x x x x x x 
India x x x x x x 
Israel x x x x x x 
Japan x x x x x x 
USSR/Russia x x x x x x 
United Kingdom x x x x x x 
West Germany x x x x x x 
Brazil  x x x x x 
Egypt x x x x x x 
Italy x  x x x x 
South Korea x  x x x x 
Iran   x x x x 
South Africa   x x x x 
Taiwan   x x x x 
Cuba   x x x  
Mexico    x x x 
Poland    x x x 
Saudi Arabia    x x x 
Nigeria     x x 
Vietnam x x x x   
Cambodia x x x    
Iraq      x 
North Korea   x    
S. Vietnam x x x    
Syria   x  x x 
Turkey   x    
Lebanon   x  x  
Nicaragua     x x 
Philippines     x x 
Zimbabwe   x x   
Angola   x    
East Germany     x  
El Salvador     x  
Greece   x    
Jordan     x  
Libya     x  
Panama      x 
Portugal   x    
Spain   x    
Thailand   x    
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Probability of Failure (1-Ps)  
The analysis suggests that both the target and the action interact to create 
uncertainty, and therefore, risk for the foreign policy decision-maker.  The strategic 
decision-maker seeks to minimize his risk exposure by considering the potential sources 
of risk or hazards from pursuing a foreign policy action.   
 Target Uncertainty.  The relative strength of one nation compared to another 
matters in foreign policy.  Powerful nations have the material and human resources to 
threaten the security of other nations and engage in prolonged conflicts.  Due to these 
resources, the more powerful the target nation the more uncertainty involved in actions 
toward that nation.  The more capable the target nation, the less likely the initiator of a 
policy will get what he wants.  In addition, the cost of unintended consequences when 
dealing with powerful nations is greater.  The probability of failure is greater as the 
strength of the target nation increases.           
 Table 4.4 shows the relative world power of previously identified salient nations 
using the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC)19 scores.  This composite 
measure, derived from the Correlates of War II National Material Capabilities data set, 
accounts for energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditure, 
military personnel, total population, and urban population.  Since 1970, only two 
countries compare favorably with the United States, China and Russia.  After the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia’s share of world power has declined below India  
                                                          
19 “The measure is computed by summing all observations on each of the six capability components for a 
given year, converting each state’s absolute component to a share of the international system, and then 
averaging across the six components.”  See Correlates of War II at http:cow2.la.psu.edu.   
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TABLE 4.4     Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) 
                         Value is the relative Percentage of world power (rounded) 
Country Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Bush 
Angola   0.00    
Brazil 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Cambodia 0.00 0.00 0.00    
Canada 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
China 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 
Cuba   0.00 0.00 0.00  
East Germany     0.01  
Egypt 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
El Salvador     0.00  
France 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Germany 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Greece   0.00    
India 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Iran   0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Iraq      0.01 
Israel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Italy 0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Japan 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Jordan     0.00  
Lebanon   0.00  0.00  
Libya     0.00  
Mexico    0.01 0.01 0.01 
Nicaragua     0.00 0.00 
Nigeria     0.01 0.01 
North Korea   0.01    
Panama      0.00 
Philippines     0.00 0.01 
Poland    0.02 0.02 0.01 
Portugal   0.00    
Saudi Arabia    0.01 0.01 0.01 
South Africa   0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
South Korea 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Spain   0.01    
Syria   0.00  0.00 0.00 
Tawain   0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Thailand   0.00    
Turkey   0.01    
United Kingdom 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
USSR 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 
South Vietnam 0.00 0.01 0.01    
North Vietnam 0.01 0.01 0.01    
Zimbabwe   0.00 0.00   
  % of World Power 0.55 0.52 0.64 0.62 0.64 0.62 
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and Japan, and China remains the only close competitor of the United States.  The CINC 
scores provide a measure of one nation’s capability of resisting the foreign policy actions 
of another nation.   
Action Uncertainty.  Foreign policy actions, whether cooperative or conflictual, 
involve risk due to uncertainty about final outcomes.  The threat from cooperation is 
violating the external expectations of the public and other governments.  This type of 
hazard results from the decision-maker pursuing foreign policy actions that are contrary 
to what would normally be expected.  Cooperative actions when conflict is expected, or 
vice versa, can increase the chances the policy is deemed a failure.  Consistent foreign 
policy behavior sends a signal to the public and other governments about what to expect 
in future foreign policy actions (Anderson 1981). 
Since foreign relations between democracies tend to be consistent and largely 
cooperative, uncertainty is minimized.  A large body of research has examined the 
question, why don’t democracies fight each other (Chan 1984; Doyle 1986; Morgan and 
Campbell 1991).  Mintz and Geva’s (1993, 500) findings suggest that “launching an 
attack on another democracy is perceived by the public as a failure of foreign policy” 
and “democratic leaders have very few political incentives to do so.”  In their 
experiments, force is appropriate when aimed at a nondemocratic state and less 
appropriate when a democratic state is involved.   
Actions resulting from different types of policy objectives can also be hazardous 
for a president.  There are certain foreign policy objectives that the public finds 
acceptable and are more willing to support.  Jentleson (1992) found that variation in 
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public support for the use of military force can be explained by examining the policy 
objectives.  The American public is more supportive of military intervention when the 
principal policy objective is to coerce foreign policy restraint from an aggressor state 
than force used to impose internal political change within another state.  The former is 
somewhat acceptable to the public, although the latter is not.  Pursuing foreign policy 
objectives that are contrary to what the public would expect creates opportunity for 
failure. 
Although there is an element of risk in cooperative actions, conflictual actions 
expose the president to more opportunities for failure.  There are a number of reasons.  
First, there is norm of reciprocity in international relations.  Past quantitative studies 
(Goldstein 1991; Goldstein and Freeman 1989) and case studies (Larson 1987; George, 
Farley, and Dallin 1988) have shown that nations tend to reciprocate the actions of other 
nations.  Conflictual actions are likely to produce conflictual actions in return.  Second, 
conflictual actions may draw other nations into a dispute when tensions increase.  Third, 
when the military is mobilized, deaths are more likely to occur, which may cause a 
decrease in support for a policy.  Finally, in contrast to cooperative actions, conflictual 
actions are not as easily reversed as cooperative actions.     
 Table 4.5 shows the percentage of conflictual interactions between the U.S. and 
salient nations for six presidents.  The numbers are determined by dividing the total 
number of conflictual U.S. actions by the total number of U.S. interactions towards each 
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TABLE 4.5     Percentage of Conflictual Interactions Between U.S. and Target Nations 
                         Salient Nations Only 
Target Nation Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Bush Average 
Lybia     84.4%  84.4% 
Iraq      73.2% 73.2% 
North Korea   73.1%    73.1% 
Panama      69.0% 69.0% 
Cuba   77.3% 66.9%  60.0% 68.1% 
North Vietnam 61.5% 86.8% 58.5% 41.0%   62.0% 
Nicaragua     69.7% 51.0% 60.3% 
East Germany     56.3%  56.3% 
Zimbabwe   42.3% 58.1%   50.2% 
Iran   25.8% 61.2% 67.4% 43.5% 49.5% 
USSR 51.8% 42.0% 47.4% 53.2% 58.9% 36.7% 48.3% 
Syria   33.3%  54.4% 44.7% 44.2% 
Angola   43.8%    43.8% 
S Africa   39.0% 56.8% 59.8% 16.7% 43.1% 
El Salvador     38.9%  38.9% 
China 58.7% 29.5% 23.3% 25.7% 30.9% 50.5% 36.4% 
India 15.9% 45.4% 53.3% 22.9% 26.9% 52.9% 36.2% 
Poland    36.4% 60.6% 11.1% 36.0% 
Cambodia 34.2% 21.3% 50.0%    35.2% 
Israel 39.2% 23.9% 19.4% 33.8% 38.7% 49.7% 34.1% 
Portugal   33.3%    33.3% 
Philippines     41.5% 24.1% 32.8% 
Taiwan   40.0% 23.5% 22.2% 33.3% 29.8% 
Turkey   28.6%    28.6% 
France 41.5% 31.0% 20.5% 23.1% 31.7% 23.5% 28.5% 
Brazil  14.3% 40.0% 43.8% 18.2% 25.0% 28.2% 
South Vietnam 13.7% 26.0% 42.9%    27.5% 
Japan 17.6% 36.2% 21.4% 27.1% 30.3% 18.0% 25.1% 
South Korea 12.5%  22.2% 34.7% 33.6% 20.7% 24.8% 
Mexico    26.5% 36.5% 9.4% 24.1% 
Egypt 50.0% 28.9% 8.6% 19.0% 14.8% 23.5% 24.1% 
Lebanon   20.0%  28.1%  24.0% 
Greece   23.5%    23.5% 
Jordan     23.3%  23.3% 
Saudi Arabia    29.2% 20.5% 18.2% 22.6% 
Nigeria     22.2%  22.2% 
Canada 18.2% 45.4% 28.6% 20.0% 15.8% 5.6% 22.2% 
United Kingdom 18.6% 24.2% 18.9% 15.9% 18.7% 9.8% 17.7% 
Germany 14.3% 15.5% 6.5% 14.3% 18.1% 20.0% 14.8% 
Italy 16.7%  18.2% 15.4% 19.4% 0.0% 13.9% 
Thailand   13.8%    13.8% 
Spain   11.5%    11.5% 
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nation.20  The resulting percentage provides a conflict measure between the U.S. and 
other countries.  For example, during the Carter administration, 61.2% of all interactions 
with Iran were conflictual, compared to only 25.7% of all interactions with China. 
 
A Model of Foreign Policy Risk 
  
The following graphs plot target uncertainty, determined by relative power, by 
action uncertainty, determined by percentage of conflictual actions for each president 
from Nixon to Bush (Figures 4.6 to 4.11).  The vertical lines are placed at the 50% 
conflictual level.  All salient nations with whom the U.S. initiated more than 50% 
conflictual actions are located to the right of the line.  The horizontal lines are the 
median power level for the salient nations in the analysis.  The stronger nations are 
above the horizontal line and the weaker nations are below the line.  The graphs for each 
presidency provide insight into the relative riskiness of foreign policy actions.  Risk 
increases from the lower left to the upper right quadrant.  The most risky relationships 
are higher and farther to the right on the graph.  Nations located in the bottom right 
                                                          
20 Interactions between the U.S. and other nations are based on KEDS data.  The Kansas Event Data 
Project is a ten-year project focused on the development and application of political event data; it is 
funded by the National Science Foundation and the University of Kansas.  For examples of research using 
KEDS data see Goldstein, Joshua S., Jon C. Pevehouse, Deborah J. Gerner, and Shibley Telhami. 2001. 
"Dynamics of middle East Conflict and U.S. Influence, 1979-97." Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, 5: 
594-620; Kovar, K., J. Fürnkranz, J. Petrak, B. Pfahringer, R. Trappl, and G. Widmer. 2000. "Searching 
for Patterns in Political Event Sequences: Experiments with the KEDS Database." Cybernetics and 
Systems 31, 6; Pevehouse, Jon C., and Joshua S. Goldstein. 1999. "Serbian Compliance or Defiance in 
Kosovo? Statistical Analysis and Real-Time Predictions," Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, 4: 538-546; 
Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. 1997. "Reciprocity, Bullying and International Cooperation: 
A Time-Series Analysis of the Bosnia Conflict." American Political Science Review 91,3: 515-530; 
Huxtable, Phillip A. 1997. Uncertainty and Foreign Policy-Making: Conflict and Cooperation in West 
Africa. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas; Huxtable, Phillip A. and Jon C. Pevehouse. 1996. 
"Potential Validity Problems in Events Data Collection." International Studies Notes 21,2: 8-19.  
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quadrant are less powerful yet represent medium risk due to the conflictual nature of the 
relationship.   
 High-risk relationships are not surprising.  China, USSR, and India are all very 
powerful nations that have a history of stormy relationships with the U.S.  Each 
president deals with a different set of risky foreign policy relationships.  High-risk 
relationships for President Johnson included both USSR and China, compared to Ford 
whose primary risky relationships were India, N. Vietnam, and N. Korea.  The U.S. has 
not been involved in a direct military confrontation with any countries in the high risk 
quadrant since 1966.   
Medium risk countries (bottom right quadrant) tend to vary more between 
presidents.  Relations with these countries are not risky because of their strength; the risk 
is in the conflictual nature of the relationship.  The overwhelming size and strength of 
the U.S. is more than adequate should the U.S. decide to intervene militarily.  Many 
conflicts with these nations are solved using non-military methods.  The exceptions are 
the Vietnam War, the air attack on Libya, the short invasion of Panama, and the war 
against Iraq in Kuwait.  In some conflicts the U.S. participated indirectly, such as aiding 
the efforts of the Contras in Nicaragua and the support of Iraq against Iran.    
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FIGURE 4.6     Risk Exposure Johnson Administration 
FIGURE 4.7     Risk Exposure Nixon Administration 
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FIGURE 4.8     Risk Exposure Ford Administration 
FIGURE 4.9     Risk Exposure Carter Administration 
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FIGURE 4.10     Risk Exposure Reagan Administration 
FIGURE 4.11     Risk Exposure Bush Administration 
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 The objective of this chapter is to more clearly define risk in foreign policy and 
create a method of determining when one action is riskier than another.  Risk is a 
function of both target and action uncertainty.  These two factors create risk exposure for 
the decision-maker.  Conflictual foreign policy interactions with stronger nations 
produce the greatest opportunity for failure. 
 A politically rational theory of foreign policy decision-making suggests that 
presidents with larger quantities of political capital make decisions differently than 
presidents with fewer political resources.  The difference is in their willingness to take 
risk.  Popular presidents desire to preserve their available resources to spend on 
governing priorities rather than risk their capital on foreign policy.  Unpopular presidents 
take more foreign policy risks.   
 Chapter III shows that a president’s job approval is his primary political resource.  
Although not entirely reliable, job approval is the one public measure of the president’s 
performance.  This chapter developed a model that divides relationships with other 
nations into high, medium, and low risk categories based on the amount of risk exposure 
from the strength of the target nation and the level of conflict in the actions pursued.  In 
Chapter V, I test the theory that presidents with low job approval take more foreign 
policy risks than presidents with high job approval ratings. 
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CHAPTER V 
POLITICAL CONTEXT AND FOREIGN POLICY RISK-TAKING 
 
In fulfilling this mission, we will have the chance to help stop the killing of innocent 
civilians, especially children, and at the same time, to bring stability to Central Europe, a 
region of the world that is vital to our national interests. It is the right thing to do. 
President Clinton’s address to the nation on implementation of the peace 
agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, November 27, 1995 
 
We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military 
offensive. We act to prevent a wider war, to defuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe 
that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results. 
President Clinton’s address to the nation on air strikes against Serbian targets in 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), March 24, 1999 
 
 
 The defining foreign policy events of the Clinton presidency arguably occurred 
in the Balkans.  In Bosnia and Kosovo, President Clinton in association with NATO 
allies intervened in ethnic civil wars to end the violence and stop the spread of conflict in 
the region.  Although the stated purposes of the actions were similar, the political risks 
incurred by President Clinton were very different.   
 In December 1995, as a result of the Dayton Peace Accords, President Clinton 
agreed to commit 20,000 U.S. troops to peacekeeping roles in Bosnia.  The action was 
surprising given the political context of the decision.  There was fear that events in 
Bosnia could turn out as they had in Somalia a few years earlier.  The decision to use 
American troops was antagonistic to the Republican dominated Congress who opposed 
the use of American troops even in a peacekeeping role.  Furthermore, the action was 
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opposed by a majority of the public.21  What is most interesting is that the unpopular 
action took place during a time when the Clinton administration was involved in a 
reelection campaign.  According to David Halberstam: 
The settlement demanded that the Americans station twenty thousand men on the 
ground as peacekeepers, and that put the president at risk as he was about to enter 
an election campaign. . . . Rarely had Clinton done something of such import 
with so little ostensible public support.  When he committed American troops to 
peacekeeping in Bosnia, the polls were running roughly 70 percent against the 
idea.  It was, whatever the upside, and the upside was considerable, still a roll of 
the dice, and it took extraordinary courage on his part to make that decision 
(Halberstam 2001, 358).   
 
Given the environment, President Clinton took a political risk by committing U.S. troops 
to Bosnia. 
 In the fall of 1999, President Clinton faced similar circumstances in Kosovo: 
ethnic conflict, the prospect of large civilian casualties, and the possibility of the conflict 
expanding into other areas.  Like Bosnia four years earlier, Congress opposed using U.S. 
troops in a combat or peacekeeping role.  In contrast to the situation in Bosnia, public 
opinion was mixed concerning the use of U.S. ground troops in Kosovo with 45% 
favoring and 45% opposed.22  Halberstam commenting on the Administration’s 
hesitancy in Kosovo: 
But even so, the White House was in effect tiptoeing into the war, acutely aware 
of congressional opposition at home and the fragility of the alliance overseas.  
                                                          
21 In polls conducted during October 1995, a large majority of Americans opposed sending U.S. troops as 
peacekeepers in Bosnia.  In a CBS/NYT poll dated October 24, 1995, the following question was asked.  
“If NATO sends a peace-keeping force to Bosnia to enforce a cease fire agreement, would you favor or 
oppose the U.S. sending ground troops as part of the peace-keeping force?”  Favor-37%/Oppose-57%.  A 
NBC/WSJ poll dated October 31, 1995 asked a similar question and 65% of respondents opposed U.S. 
troops as peacekeepers in Bosnia. 
22 CBS New Poll, April 22, 1999.  “In order to try to end the fighting in Kosovo, would you favor or 
oppose the United States sending in ground troops as part of NATO peacekeeping force?” 
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When the bombing began on March 24, the administration had not made a 
complete commitment.  That night Clinton inserted one critical sentence into his 
statement . . . ‘I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.’  
Months later, after it was all over, his top civilian people would privately admit 
that his statement might have been a considerable mistake (Halberstam 2001, 
423).   
 
Unlike the considerable political risk demonstrated by Clinton in Bosnia, the Clinton 
administration appeared less willing to take chances in Kosovo.  Even though the U.S. 
participated in the NATO-led bombing campaigns, significant efforts were made to 
avoid casualties.  Halberstam (2001, 457) called the effort “an antiseptic war waged by 
remote control, without casualties, if at all possible . . . The NATO planes flew so high 
that they were never seen . . .”   
Why did President Clinton appear risk-acceptant in Bosnia and risk-averse in 
Kosovo?  The objectives of the missions were not that different.  The public was more 
supportive of ground troops in Kosovo than Bosnia.  I believe that Halberstam answers 
the question.  “Bill Clinton, who had long minimized the importance of foreign affairs, 
was the beneficiary of the NATO victory in Kosovo, though there was little political 
capital to be gained from it” (Halberstam 2001, 482).  Politically, there was very little to 
be gained and a great deal to lose in Kosovo. 
 
Is the Glass Half-full or Half-empty? 
 The Bosnian conflict could not have come at a more difficult time for President 
Clinton.  The Republicans had swept the 1994 elections and taken control of the House 
for the first time in 40 years and attempts to overhaul the health care system had failed 
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miserably.  During the 12 months preceding the Bosnian Peace Accords, President 
Clinton’s job approval averaged 46%.23   The 1996 election cycle had begun and 
historical evidence weighed heavily against reelecting a president with a job approval 
below 50%.  The political environment for President Clinton during the Kosovo conflict 
was very different.  After struggling through the Lewinsky scandal and the impeachment 
proceedings, President Clinton regained his footing and was at the height of his 
popularity.  In the year preceding the Kosovo conflict, Clinton’s job approval averaged 
64%.24  The eighteen point difference in the president’s job approval from the Bosnia 
conflict to the Kosovo conflict created a completely different frame of reference for 
Clinton.   Is it possible that a decision-maker’s foreign policy preferences change 
depending on his analysis of the problem at hand and his political environment?   
Rational choice theory suggests that preferences are linear and that a similar set 
of circumstances should lead to similar decisions.  According to Levy:  
Preference reversals induced by changes in frames rather than changes in 
subjective utilities or probabilities are much more difficult to reconcile with 
expected-utility theory or with rational choice theories more generally.  Evidence 
that behavior varies depending on whether the glass is seen as half-empty or half-
full does not easily lend itself to a rational choice explanation (Levy 1997, 92). 
 
The notion that framing effects can lead to different decisions violates several important 
principles of expected utility models, namely transitivity and invariance.  Transitivity 
implies that if an actor prefers a to b and b to c, then he will also prefer a to c.  
Invariance posits that presentation does not influence preference ordering.  “This 
                                                          
23 Based on 33 Gallup polls during the period from November 95 to October 95. 
24 Based on 42 Gallup polls during the period from April 98 to March 99. 
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assumption, which is rarely stated explicitly, requires that the preference order among 
prospects should not depend on how their outcomes and probabilities are described and 
thus two alternative formulations of the same problem should yield the same choice”  
(Quatrone and Tversky 1988).   The invariant and transitive nature of actors’ choices 
give coherence and make rational choice analysis possible using a model or theory 
(Zagare 1990).  Although useful for modeling, a growing body of research has 
demonstrated that actual behavior violates these assumptions (Vertzberger 1990).   
 
Prospect Theory 
 Modeling decision behavior continues to be a source of controversy among 
scholars (Simon 1985, Moe 1979).  The orientation of expected utility models is toward 
the prescriptive, how decisions should be made, and not the descriptive, how decisions 
are actually made.  Expected utility models are a mathematical representation of 
preferences over a bundle of goods.  The rational decision-maker should demonstrate a 
linear response to a preference ordering of possible choices and choose the options with 
the greatest utility.  The problem for expected utility models is that experimental studies 
show that individual’s choices are often nonlinear.   
Research over the last 25 years in behavioral economics has challenged the 
dominance of expected utility modeling as the best description of decision behavior.   
Prospect theory is concerned with decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and 
contributes to our understanding of the relationship between risk and decisions (see 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1982, 1984 and Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 1986, 
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1992)25.  Whereas expected utility focuses on preferences, prospect theory integrates 
individual cognitive biases and the decision context to explain decision behavior.  Two 
aspects of prospect theory differentiate the theory from traditional expected utility 
models:  reference point dependence and an s-shaped value function.  Figure 5.1 below 
shows the relationship. 
 
FIGURE 5.1     Comparison of Expected-Utility and Prospect Theory Functions 
    
    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 In October 2002, Princeton University psychologist Daniel Kahneman, PhD, was awarded the Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for applying psychological insights to economic theory.  Together 
with Amos Tversky, Kahneman challenged traditional economic theory in the areas of judgment and 
decision-making under uncertainty. 
Utility 
Losses Gains
GainsLosses
Value 
Reference Point
Expected Utility Prospect Theory 
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Reference Point Dependence 
By subjectively evaluating one’s own political environment, political actors often 
make different decisions when faced with similar circumstances.  One’s risk orientation 
changes depending on “whether the outcomes are perceived as gains or losses, relative to 
the reference point” (Quatrone and Tversky 1988, 722).  The “reference point is usually 
the current steady state, or status quo, to which a person has become accustomed” 
(McDermott 1998, 40), but can also be a desired state based on the goals of the decision-
maker (Tversky and Kahneman 1991, 1046).  If the decision-maker’s current state is 
perceived to be less than the reference point, he would be in the domain of loss, and vice 
versa.  What is important are gains and losses from the reference point and not absolute 
gains or losses.  It is the decision-maker’s reaction to the gains and losses from the 
reference point that aids in our understanding of how presidents make foreign policy 
decisions. 
Framing.  Individuals tend to be risk-averse in the domain of gains and risk-
acceptant in the domain of losses.  This is called the framing effect.  “The same decision 
can be framed in several different ways; different frames can lead to different decisions” 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1982, 164).  The decision-makers frame depends on his 
appraisal of his situation.  “Framing effects arise when the same objective alternatives 
are evaluated in relation to different points of reference” (Kahneman and Tversky 1982, 
165).  The glass is half-empty or half-full depending on whether the decision-maker 
perceives himself above or below the reference point.  The strategic actor knows where 
he is and where he wants to be politically.   
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Reflection Effect.  Risk attitudes vary depending on the situational context of the 
decision-maker (McDermott and Kugler 2001; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Huth, 
Bennett, and Gelpi 1992; Huth and Russett 1993; Quattrone and Tversky 1988; Benartzi 
and Thaler 1995).  This is in contrast to a standard conception of risk orientation positing 
that individuals have characteristics that predispose them to take or avoid risks (see 
Kowert and Hermann 1997, George and George 1998).  Prospect theory suggests that 
decision-makers are “risk averse with respect to gains and risk acceptant with respect to 
losses” (Levy 1997), with a reflection effect around the reference point.  Rather than 
explaining presidential decisions solely on individual characteristics or personalities, the 
political context of the president provides an important explanatory variable that helps us 
understand foreign policy decisions. 
 
S-shaped Value Function 
Prospect theory suggests that gains diminish in value as they increase and losses 
hurt worse than gains satisfy (Quattrone and Tversky 1988, 721).  Rather than a linear 
expected utility value function, prospect theory value functions are concave in the 
domain of gains and convex, and steeper, in the domain of losses.  The s-shaped value 
function is an important departure from expected utility models.   
Loss Aversion.  The s-shaped value function is steeper (convex) for losses than 
gains.  This is indicative of the tendency for people to “overvalue losses relative to 
comparable gains” (Levy 1997, 89).  The pain of losing exceeds the pleasure of winning.  
When faced with a gamble that involves a 50% chance of winning or losing the same 
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amount of money, most are reluctant to take the risk.  Substantial research has 
documented this result (Tversky and Kahneman 1986, 1991; Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler 1991; Fischoff 1983). 
Endowment Affect.  The concave shape of the value function for gains produces 
a different result, a tendency to overvalue current possessions (Thaler 1980, 43-7).  
“People tend to value what they have more than comparable things they do not have, and 
the disutility of relinquishing a good is greater than the utility of acquiring it” (Levy 
1997, 89).  For example, the owner of an item will refuse to sell at a price that he would 
have never paid for it initially (see Knetsch 1989; Camerer 1995, 665-70; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991).  One implication of the endowment effect is the accommodation of 
gains.  Experimental evidence suggests that individuals will adjust to gains more quickly 
than losses (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991, 1342; Jervis 1992).  Gains are 
viewed as more permanent and efforts are made to hold on to them.  Losses are 
perceived as temporary and individuals are likely to engage in risk-acceptant behavior to 
regain what has been lost.   
Similar to expected utility theory, prospect theory is simply a theoretical 
approach to modeling decision behavior.26  The purpose of this dissertation is not to 
provide a defense of prospect theory, but to use the theory as an explanatory tool.27  
                                                          
26 McDermott and Kugler (2001) compare expected utility models with prospect theory in their analysis of 
Operation “Desert Storm” in January 1991.  They find that both models offer similar explanations of 
process, but different explanations of outcomes.   “The Expected Utility model points to the solution that 
could have been reached, but was not achieved because none of the central players fully realized that a 
Saudi Arabian peace initiative might work.  Prospect Theory focuses on how the actual outcome came 
about: why Bush made the choices he made about the crisis in the Gulf when he did” (2001, 78). 
27 Examples of Prospect Theory applications to international relations include:  Berejikian, Jeffrey. 1997. 
“The Gains Debate: Framing State Choice,” American Political Science Review and Levy, Jack. 1996. 
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Reference point dependence and an s-shaped value function provide useful insights into 
decision behavior that helps to bridge the gap between structural theories and individual 
actor theories of decision-making.   
This study addresses a common criticism highlighted by Farnham (2004, 442).  
“To explain the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy, we need to develop a 
theory of foreign policy decision-making that can give an account of the decision-
makers’ response to that context; we must understand how the political context’s 
characteristic features affect their thinking.”  Furthermore, prospect theory has been 
called a “reference-dependent theory without a theory of the reference point” (Levy 
1997, 100).  By introducing the notion of political capital, represented by presidential 
job approval as a reference point, testable hypotheses can be generated to further our 
understanding of foreign policy decision-making. 
 
Testing the Politically Rational Theory of Foreign Policy 
President Clinton’s behavior in the Balkans provides an interesting case study on 
presidential foreign policy decisions.  Faced with similar, though not identical, 
circumstances and enemies in Bosnia and Kosovo, Clinton’s behavior was consistent 
with prospect theory.  Clinton was more willing to take risks in Bosnia than Kosovo.  
Clinton’s assessment of his political environment changed dramatically between the two 
events.  Using Clinton’s job approval has a reference point, in Bosnia Clinton was in a 
domain of loss and in a domain of gain in Kosovo.  In Bosnia, the status quo was 
                                                                                                                                                                           
“Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International 
Conflict,” International Political Science Review. 
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unacceptable (loss aversion) because the state of his job approval threatened his 
reelection prospects.  At the time of the Kosovo crisis, Clinton’s popularity had 
rebounded and he was hesitant to risk losing what he had gained (endowment affect).   
 Obviously, one example does not prove a theory.  This dissertation is an analysis 
of how presidents make foreign policy decisions.  The role of political pressures and 
context faced by presidents is central to the analysis.  Presidents do not only react to 
stimulus from the domestic and international arenas, but factor in political considerations 
that affect policy choice.   
 
Hypotheses 
Prospect theory suggests that people recognize outcomes as gains or losses and 
not ending states of wealth, with gains and losses defined relative to a reference point 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 274).  In contrast, expected-utility models predict a linear 
utility function for job approval.  This means that a president would place equal 
importance on a change in approval that moves from 75% to 80% as a change from 47% 
to 52%.  I argue that there is a diminishing marginal utility for political resources such as 
job approval, and therefore, the utility function is not linear (Levy 1997, 88).   
The choice of a reference point may be the status quo, but the reference point 
may also involve goals and objectives of the decision-maker.  For the president there are 
two important considerations.  First, what is an acceptable level of job approval based on 
his expectations or goals?  One method of determining an acceptable level of job 
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approval is to look at historical numbers.  Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics for all 
Gallup polls asking the presidential job approval question from 1969 to 2000.   
 
TABLE 5.1     Presidential Job Approval from Gallup Polls (1969 to 2000) 
 Value Range of Values 
Mean 52.74 (sd. 10.9%) 50 to 56 
Median 54 53 to 57 
Mode 60 57 to 63 
Note:  With an average sample size of 1000, the margin of error is approximately +/-
3.1%.  n=673 
 
The mean and median presidential job approvals are very close, 53% and 54% 
respectively.  Additionally, presidents understand the importance of 50% approval for 
reelection purposes and status.  I would expect the president’s reference point to lie 
somewhere between 50% and 55%.  This range encompasses both historical averages 
and the minimum threshold of 50%.  According to Berejekian (1997, 792), “changes in 
current conditions are initially evaluated against prior circumstances, and there is good 
evidence to suggest that decision makers treat the past as a reference point or anchor 
against which an evaluation of current value is only partially adjusted” (see also Tversky 
and Kahneman 1974).  For our purposes, presidents will be more sensitive to gains and 
losses in approval from a particular reference point than the overall level of approval 
(see Levy 1997, 35; Kahneman and Tversky 1991, 1039).   
Second, what is the change that is occurring in relation to that reference point?  
Prospect theory hypothesizes that “individuals are risk-averse with respect to gains and 
risk-acceptant with respect to losses” and that “actors frame their decisions around a 
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reference point” (Levy 1992a, 171).  Instead of a linear value function, two related 
observations form an S-shaped function.  The function is concave in the domain of gains 
and convex in the domain of losses (see Figure 5.1).  There is a diminishing value from a 
continual increase in gains, and losses hurt worse than gains feel good (Berejekian 1997, 
790).   
Applying prospect theory to foreign policy decision-making leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
H1—When there is a significant decrease in a president’s job approval from his 
reference point, foreign policy behavior will become more risky as the president 
becomes more risk-acceptant in order to eliminate the loss in approval (reference point 
dependence). 
H2—When there is a significant increase in a president’s job approval from his 
reference point, foreign policy behavior will become less risky as the president becomes 
more risk-averse.   
H3—A president with a recent drop in job approval from above 50% to below 50% 
will exhibit more risky behavior in the short term (loss aversion). 
H4—A president with a recent increase in job approval from below 50% to above 
50% will become more risk averse in the short term in order to hold on to the gain 
(endowment affect). 
 
The theory offered above is that political resources, namely presidential job 
approval, form a critical component to understanding foreign policy decisions by the 
president.  Political resources of the president mediate the influences of domestic factors 
on foreign policy.  This is in contrast to much of the previous research on the 
diversionary theory that posits a direct relationship between poor economic conditions 
and an increase in conflictual foreign policies (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 
1991; Brace and Hinckley 1992; Russett 1990b; Morgan and Bickers 1992).  Rather than 
a direct link between the economy and foreign policy behavior, I propose that it is likely 
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that the economy indirectly influences foreign policy decisions due to its effects on job 
approval (DeRouen 1995).   
The economy, foreign policy events, and past job approval form the primary 
components of presidential job approval (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002, 59).  
As the economy declines, one would expect a corresponding decline in job approval, 
unless other issues are more salient to the public.  Edwards et al. (1995, 110) notes that 
in 1989 the public’s evaluation of President Bush was oriented towards non-economic 
issues.  Consequently, President Bush’s job approval remained very high even though 
the public rated his handling of many domestic issues very low.  Additionally, Edwards 
et al. (1995) find that the salience of economic issues varies over time in comparison to 
foreign policy issues. 
H5—The economy will have an indirect influence on foreign policy actions through 
its affect on job approval. 
 
The theory presented in this paper suggest that U.S. foreign policy actions are a 
function of the direct effects of the domestic political context and the international 
system and the indirect effect of each mediated by presidential resources.  Past research 
has found two common tendencies in relations with other nations:  consistency and 
reciprocity.  Consistency is characterized by a nation’s inclination to behave in the future 
as it has in the past (Anderson 1981).  Constancy in relations with other nations sends a 
signal to the public and other governments about what to expect in future foreign policy 
relations.  Edwards & Wood (1999) and Wood and Peake (1998) found strong inertia 
from past U.S. foreign policy actions indicating the US is likely to do in the future what 
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they have done in the past.  Reciprocity is the propensity to mirror the actions of other 
nations or the “change one nation’s actions induce in those of another nation” (Dixon 
1986).  This is closely related to Richardson’s (1960) work in arms races where he 
theorized that changes in a country’s behavior depend on the “country’s own past 
behavior, its response to the behavior of another country, and other motives not derived 
from either country’s behavior (Goldstein 1991).  Using three independent data sets 
(COPDAB, ASHLEY, WEIS), Goldstein (1991) found evidence of both inertia and 
reciprocity in superpower relations (see also Smith 1987; Dixon 1986; King 1989).  If 
foreign policy actions are strongly influenced by past actions and the actions of other 
nations, what would cause the president to act in an inconsistent manner? 
H6—Presidents will be more likely to break from the norms of consistency and 
reciprocity when their job approval is below their reference point. 
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
Foreign policy events are a result of linked actions and reactions occurring on 
both the domestic and international levels, therefore, there is a sequential element to 
foreign policy events that must be taken into account.  I propose a model of the foreign 
policy context that examines relevant explanatory variables in a time series format.  The 
series will run from 1969 to 1992 with all data aggregated into two-week time periods.  
Goldstein (1991) found that models that aggregated measures into larger periods (i.e., 
quarterly, yearly) yield less satisfying results than finer delineations such as weekly or 
monthly periods.  
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An important aspect of the proposed research is the consideration of domestic 
and international factors in the same model.  The dependent variable is U.S. foreign 
policy actions toward other nations.  In order to model the foreign policy decision 
context, both domestic international factors will be used as independent variables in the 
model.  Domestic factors include public opinion and economic indicators.  International 
actions will be captured by measuring the actions of other nations toward the United 
States.  Additional details on the data used in the analysis are found in Appendix A and 
Appendix B. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
TESTING THE POLITICALLY RATIONAL THEORY 
 
A politically rational theory of foreign policy is concerned with the political 
context of the decision-maker.  Context matters because the context provides the 
environment that produces the goals and incentives of the president.  “In other words, 
decision-making behavior cannot be understood without specifying the situation to 
which the decision-maker is responding—and for political decision-makers that includes 
not only substantive policy problems, but also the political context within which they 
must be addressed” (Farnham 2004, 443).  In foreign policy the president faces both 
domestic and international structural constraints.  Domestically, in addition to 
responsibility for the nation’s economic and political affairs, the president has outlined 
his foreign policy program and will be held accountable for his progress.  The 
international system further constrains the president, primarily through the necessity of 
responding to the actions of other nations.  Though influenced by both domestic and 
international factors, presidents are individual actors and therefore, there is a 
psychological aspect of decision-making that must be taken into account.  My politically 
rational theory of foreign policy decision-making recognizes the decision-making 
influence of the domestic arena, international system, and the individual-actor.  In 
carrying out his foreign policy duties, the president has numerous policy options and will 
make choices after assessing the entire political context.  This dissertation provides a 
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theoretical perspective on how the structural and the psychological aspects of decision-
making are linked.   
 This study is concerned with the interaction between risk and resources, and 
their ability to help explain foreign policy decisions.  Earlier, I suggest that foreign 
policy risk is largely imposed on the decision-maker by the international system.  The 
response to that risk is mediated by the level of the president’s political resources, 
defined by job approval.  The theory presented here is that presidents will take more 
risks when their political capital is below a reference point and take fewer risks when 
above the same reference point.     
 What follows is a test of this theory.  First, I will establish a reference point and 
determine whether the mean interaction scores are different, above and below the 
reference point.  A mean interaction score is computed by averaging the Goldstein 
weights (WEIS/KEDS data) applied to each interaction with a target nation.  Although 
testing for a difference between the mean interaction scores is an important first step, the 
test is not conclusive since there are factors other than job approval influencing foreign 
policy actions.  Second, I will create a more complete model of the foreign policy system 
that mimics the foreign policy process and controls for domestic, international, and 
individual-actor inputs.      
 
Job Approval As a Reference Point 
 
Job approval is not an end in itself.  Farnham has correctly observed that 
“decision-makers emphasize acceptability not primarily because they need social 
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approval but because they desire to accomplish various goals within that context” 
(Farnham 2004, 443).  Presidents desire the benefits from a high job approval because 
they have domestic and foreign policy, reelection, and legacy goals to accomplish.  
Although high job approval is not a sufficient condition for success, low job approval 
creates difficult conditions for the president that may preclude him from accomplishing 
his desires. 
 Job approval is only a snapshot of current feelings about the president and his 
performance.  By examining trends over a period of time, thus eliminating short-term 
variations, one can get a truer picture how the president is fairing with the public.  Figure 
6.1 graphs presidential job approval from Presidents Nixon to Clinton.  One can easily 
see that public approval typically rises and falls many times throughout an 
administration.  Sometimes dramatic shifts occur due to political events.  For example, 
Nixon’s job approval declined after Watergate and Bush’s job approval increased during 
the Gulf War.  Other than Clinton, whose job approval slowly trended down and then up 
throughout his presidency, most presidents faced several ups and downs.  Table 6.1 is a 
summary of job approval data for the same periods.  Two of the six presidents, Reagan 
and Bush, finished higher than they started.  Three of the six presidents had mean job 
approval numbers below 50%.  Without exception, each president experienced a great 
difference between their highest approval and their lowest approval.  The average spread 
between the high and low job approval number for the presidents is 39.88%.   
 
 
 
 121
FIGURE 6.1     Presidential Job Approval 1969-2000
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TABLE 6.1  Job Approval Summary by President, 1969 to 2000 
President 1st Last High Low 
High - 
Low Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Nixon 59 24 67 24 43 48.1 13.68 
Ford 71 53 71 37 34 46.5 7.14 
Carter 66 34 75 29 46 46.7 12.17 
Reagan 51 63 67 35 32 52.2 7.7 
Bush 51 56 80 32 48 61.5 12.5 
Clinton 58 56 73 37 36 55.5 7.55 
Average 59 48 72 32 39.83 51.75 10.12 
Source:  Gallup Polls between 1/1969 and 12/2000, n=670 
 
 
 An important question for this study is what level of job approval do presidents 
consider minimally acceptable and what level is desirable?  In other words, at what 
break points in approval would we expect behavior to change?  Table 6.2 shows a 
frequency distribution of Gallup polls from 1969 to 2000 and the distribution is graphed 
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in Figure 6.2.  Eighty-four percent (84%) are between 40 and 70 percent.  Thirty-four 
percent (34%) of job approval ratings fall between 50 and 59 percent.  Fifty percent 
(50%) is an important threshold for leaders and likely a minimally acceptable level.  
When a majority of respondents cannot say they approve of the job the president is 
doing, a president’s reelection prospects are in doubt and his status as a leader is in 
jeopardy.  During their presidencies, Truman and Carter’s approval dropped to the 20s 
and Johnson and Bush’s approval dropped to the 30s.  Truman and Johnson declined to 
seek reelection and Carter and Bush were defeated.   
Determining if a desirable level exists is more difficult.  Although presidents 
would like their job approval to be as high as possible, experience and historical data 
constrain expectations.  Two realistic levels for consideration are 55% and 60%.  The 
median approval rating from the data in Table 6.2 is 54%, placing the top half of all job 
approval ratings above this number.  Since national surveys average 1000 respondents, a 
margin of error is +/-3.1%, fifty-five percent (55%) is high enough to comfortably 
believe the actual result is above 50%.  Additionally, receiving the support of 55% of the 
public would be encouraging at the start of a national election cycle.   
Certainly, presidents would like their approval ratings to exceed 60%, which 
represents a solid majority of the American people.  Only 29% of job approval ratings 
are above the 60% level.  Seventy percent (70%) approval ratings are rare, especially 
with the partisan makeup of the American electorate.  In fact, only 4.2% of surveys give 
the president job approval ratings above 70%.  In this sample, a plurality of these data 
points relate to President Bush during the Gulf War.   
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TABLE 6.2     Job Approval Distribution in 10-point and 5-point Groups 
10-Point Groups Frequency Percent 
20-29 25 3.7 
30-39 49 7.3 
40-49 171 25.5 
50-59 231 34.5 
60-69 166 24.8 
70-79 24 3.6 
80-89 4 0.6 
Total 670 100.0 
5-Point Groups Frequency Percent 
21-25 6 0.9 
25-29 19 2.8 
30-34 21 3.1 
35-39 28 4.2 
40-44 75 11.2 
45-49 96 14.3 
50-54 111 16.6 
55-59 120 17.9 
60-64 111 16.6 
65-69 55 8.2 
70-74 18 2.7 
75-79 6 0.9 
80-84 4 0.6 
Total 670 100.0 
Gallup Polls between 1/1969 and 12/2000, n=670 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.2    Job Approval Distribution from 1969 to 2000
                       Percentage of individual Gallup surveys , n=670
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Risky Foreign Policy Relationships 
 
 In Chapter IV, I suggest a method of determining risk exposure in foreign policy.  
A president’s decision-making risk is determined by the level of his exposure to 
potential hazards, which increases the opportunity for foreign policy failure.  Two 
factors integrate to form a set of risky foreign policy relationships: strength of the target 
and the level of conflict with the target.  Therefore, risk increases as actions become 
more conflictual and the target nations more powerful.   
High risk relationships occur when over 50% of the interactions between the U.S. 
and the target nation are conflictual and the percentage of world power is above the 
median level for salient nations.  In a similar manner, medium risk relationships involve 
over 50% conflictual interactions and the % of world power is below the median level.  
Nations with less that 50% of conflictual interactions with the U.S. comprise low and 
medium/low risk relationships.   
Table 6.3 shows high and medium risk relationships resulting from applying this 
methodology for each presidential administration.28  The results provide few surprises, 
yet reduce the 135 nations in the data to 18 highly visible and conflictual relationships.  
The one confusing result is the USSR.  In the Nixon and Ford administrations, the USSR 
fell below the 50% conflictual interaction level.  The analysis below considers the 
US/USSR relationship separately due to the importance of the USSR during the 1969 to 
1992 period.  
 
                                                          
28 Originally created by Rodney Tomlinson of the US Naval Academy, The KEDS/WEIS data set covers 
the years from 1969 to 1992 and has not been updated in this form.  Although some updated data sets are 
available, they do not cover all potential dyads only regional relationships such as the Middle East or Asia.  
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TABLE 6.3     High and Medium Risk Relationships from Nixon to Bush 1 
High Risk Relationships       
President Country 
% 
Conflict 
(1) 
% of 
World 
Power 
(2) 
US 
Actions 
(3)  n 
Adversary 
(4) n 
Use of 
Force (5) 
Ford India 0.53 5.37% -0.02 27 -0.97 35  
Carter USSR 0.53 17.55% -1.08 530 -1.37 474  
Reagan E Germany 0.56 0.86% -0.98 15 -0.63 18  
Reagan USSR 0.59 16.78% -0.61 1791 -1.04 1574  
Reagan Poland 0.61 1.56% -0.47 139 -1.98 126  
Bush China 0.51 10.97% 0.01 84 -0.9 61  
Bush India 0.53 5.86% -0.44 14 0.06 5  
         
Medium Risk Relationships       
Nixon N Vietnam 0.87 0.68% -5.64 1361 -4.65 1108 1/69- 8/73 
Ford Cambodia 0.50 0.18% 0.25 32 -2.84 14  
Ford N Vietnam 0.59 0.80% -1.5 31 -1.5 51  
Ford N Korea 0.73 0.57% -2.83 21 -1.8 22  
Ford Cuba 0.77 0.22% -2.03 37 -1.61 24  
Carter S Africa 0.57 0.64% -1.28 54 -1.37 35  
Carter Zimbabwe 0.58 0.09% -0.79 51 -0.76 39  
Carter Iran 0.61 1.14% -1.28 291 -2.28 270  
Carter Cuba 0.67 0.24% -1.51 90 -1.05 57  
Reagan Syria 0.54 0.31% -0.64 221 -1.42 195 9/83-3/84 
Reagan S Africa 0.60 0.75% -0.33 257 -0.89 83  
Reagan Iran 0.67 0.82% -2.2 224 -2.76 179  
Reagan Nicaragua 0.70 0.04% -1.42 388 -1.65 433  
Reagan Libya 0.84 0.20% -2.3 162 -2.55 124  
Bush Nicaragua 0.51 0.07% 0.22 43 -0.42 34  
Bush Panama 0.69 0.03% -2.95 51 -3.72 23 12/89 
Bush Iraq 0.73 1.10% -3.03 161 -1.96 80 8/90-3/91 
 Average 0.63  Total 6075  5064  
(1) Percentage of conflictual US actions towards the target country during each president’s term in office. 
(2) Percentage of total world power (CINC score) during the president’s term in office. 
(3) Mean score of US actions towards the adversary during the president’s term in office. 
(4) Mean score of the adversary towards the US during the president’s term in office. 
(5) Period when the US used military force towards the adversary. 
Note: The mean scores are based on Goldstein weights applied to KEDS/WEIS data (Goldstein 1992). 
 
 
The table summarizes important information about each relationship and yields 
some useful information.  Due to my specification of risky relationships as a function of 
relative power and the conflictual nature of the relationship, all high and medium risk 
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relationships are highly conflictual.  An average of sixty-three percent (63%) of all 
interactions between the U.S. and these nations are conflictual.  The mean interaction 
score for US actions toward the target country and the mean adversary actions toward 
the US are highly correlated (74%), one indication of reciprocity in international 
relations.  There are no uses of force with high risk countries, only medium risk 
countries.  US actions toward these high and medium risk nations produced over 6000 
interactions, with over one-half of the interactions involving the Soviet Union or North 
Vietnam. 
The nations included in Table 6.3 form a unique dataset and undoubtedly raise 
questions of self-selection bias.  In order to test my theory that a president’s willingness 
to take foreign policy risk varies with job approval, my analysis requires a method of 
determining when risk-taking is likely to occur.  Using the concept of risk exposure, 
Chapter IV outlines a set of objective criteria to separate high risk foreign policy 
relationships from low risk relationships.  The nations included in the data result from 
my theory of foreign policy risk and are not chosen randomly.  The resulting dataset 
allows for the testing of hypotheses that concern presidential foreign policy decision-
making in the presence of risk.   
My methodology is important for several reasons.  First, a nation’s relationship 
with the U.S. changes over time.  Our nation’s relationship with the USSR exposed the 
president to more risk during the Reagan administration than during the Bush 
administration.  Choosing one set of nations for the entire time period masks the political 
realities that exist in each individual presidency.  Second, the methodology employed 
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allows this research to consider the entire international system, rather than limiting the 
analysis to dyadic relationships only.  Although understanding dyadic relationships are 
important, there is less opportunity to generalize the findings across the broad area of 
foreign policy decision-making.  Third, cooperative relationships result in less risk 
exposure and do not directly concern the research question in this dissertation.   
 
Preliminary Examination of the Data 
 This dissertation theorizes that presidents assess their political context and 
determine whether they are in a domain of gain or loss, depending on a reference point.  
When presidents are above or below their reference point, I expect there to be a 
difference in foreign policy actions pursued.  The primary factor in ascertaining their 
current state is the level of political capital or job approval.  If job approval is below the 
reference point, I expect conflictual behavior to increase evidenced by a smaller mean 
interaction score.29  In contrast, when a president’s job approval is above the reference 
point, I expect actions to become less conflictual and result in a greater mean interaction 
score.  An examination of mean interaction scores above and below job approval 
reference points provides a useful first step in testing the theory.  If the mean interaction 
scores do not differ, it is likely the theory is flawed.   
 Chapter IV divided salient nations into high, medium, medium/low, and low risk 
relationships for the U.S.  For comparison purposes, figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the results 
                                                          
29 Interaction scores in the data range from -10 to +10, with -10 the most conflictual action and +10 the 
most cooperative action.  Therefore, increasing conflict results in a lower number. 
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of graphing mean interaction score above and below job approval reference points for 
lower risk relationships and high/medium risk relationships.   
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FIGURE 6.3     Me an Inte raction by Job Approval-Low Risk Re lationships
 
 
 The mean interaction scores for low risk relationships show almost no variation 
at each job approval reference point.  This indicates that foreign policy actions toward 
nations considered a low risk relationship are not affected by different job approval 
reference points.  
The graph on figure 6.4 includes high and medium risk nations from Table 6.3 
during periods when there was no use of force.  As expected, both lines slope upward, 
indicating that mean scores above each breakpoint are less conflictual than below the 
breakpoint.  Based on a difference of means t-test, the mean interaction score above and 
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below each breakpoint below 67 are significantly different at the .05 level.  The smooth 
line is a result of the very small changes in the sample at each iteration.  An examination 
of the data shows a slight flattening of the mean in the 50-54% range.   
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FIGURE 6.4     Mean Interaction by Job Approval-High/Medium Risk  (No Force)
 
 
Mean interaction scores involving nations when the use of force is ongoing are 
dramatically different.  Figure 6.5 shows mean interaction scores above and below 
approval breakpoints with nations in which the U.S. is using military force (see Table 
6.3).  The mean interaction scores are smaller, more conflictual, due to the ongoing use 
of force.  The lines are both sloping upwards indicating that even when force is being 
used, the mean US foreign policy action is more cooperative as job approval increases.  
The means of the two lines are significantly different at the .05 level, except between the 
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45-49 range.  During periods when force is used, the magnitude of the conflicts score is 
much greater than periods when force is not applied regardless of the approval level.  
Unless noted, the analysis to follow considers interactions involving force separately 
from interactions not involving force.  This allows for the consideration of more routine 
foreign policy actions, rather than only actions involving the use of force. 
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FIGURE 6.5     Mean Interaction by Job Approval-High/Medium Risk  (Force)
 
 
 Figures 6.3 to 6.5 lend support to the theory that there is an observable difference 
in foreign policy actions as job approval changes.  Prospect theory suggests that the 
change occurs around a reference point.  In the previous discussion, a range of options 
were offered, 50% approval as a minimum level, and 55% or 60% as an acceptable level 
of approval.  If one point on the approval spectrum were to make a difference, it would 
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be 50%.  Although it is difficult to distinguish the importance of a job approval rating of 
52% vs. 53% or 57% vs. 58%, falling below 50% causes presidents concern.  Using 
50%, 55%, and 60% as possible reference points, figures 6.6 (no use of force) and 6.7 
(use of force) show the results of graphing the mean interaction scores by 10-point job 
approval ranges above and below the 50% to 59% range.  Similar to the previous figures, 
the line slopes upward indicating a more cooperative mean interaction score as job 
approval increases.  If the reference point lies between 50% and 59%, the mean 
interaction scores below and above this range should be measurably different.   
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Table 6.4 reports the results of equality of means test for Figures 6.6 and 6.7.  
Considering foreign policy actions when no force is used, the mean interaction score in 
the 40-49 job approval range is significantly different than the 50-59 range and the 60-69 
range (column 2).   The mean interaction score in the 50-59 ranges is not significantly 
different than the 60-69 range (column 3).  When force is applied, the mean interaction 
score in the 40-49 job approval range is significantly different the 60-69 range, but not 
different from the 50-59 range (Column 2).  Simple difference of means tests show that 
mean interaction scores appear to change in a manner that is not likely to be based on 
random chance.  An examination of the mean interaction scores above and below the 50-
59% job approval range provide evidence of a reflection effect, a change in risk 
orientation, around a reference point.   
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TABLE 6.4     Difference of Means Test (Reference Point 50-59) 
                         t-test for equality of means (significance 2-tailed test) 
No Use of Force 10 point Job Approval Range 
 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
30-39 n/a 0.158 0.003 0.000 
40-49 0.158 n/a 0.010 0.000 
50-59 0.003 0.010 n/a 0.232 
60-69 0.000 0.000 0.232 n/a 
Use of Force  
 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
30-39 n/a 0.037 0.027 0.000 
40-49 0.037 n/a 0.744 0.000 
50-59 0.027 0.744 n/a 0.000 
60-69 0.000 0.000 0.000 n/a 
 
 Loss Aversion and Gain Endowment.  In addition to a change in risk orientation 
around a reference point, prospect theory suggests that individuals will exhibit 
tendencies toward loss aversion and gain endowment.  Loss aversion is the inclination to 
perceive losses as temporary and engage in risky behavior to regain what is lost.  
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 287), a “person who has not made peace 
with his losses is likely to accept gambles that would be unacceptable to him otherwise.”  
They cite the example of gamblers who have a tendency to bet on more long shots at the 
end of the betting day.  Gain endowment is a propensity to hold on to what is gained as 
if it is permanent.  The concave value function in the domain of gain suggests that 
decision-makers will overvalue their current state.  There is a diminishing utility to 
further gains and the decision-maker becomes more cautious in order to hold on to those 
gains.  Table 6.5 examines a set of cases when job approval has decreased from above 
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55% to below 50% and from below 50% to above 55%.30  In the former, I would expect 
loss aversion and in the latter, gain endowment.  A drop in job approval from a relatively 
safe 55%+ to below 50% should increase conflictual behavior as the decision-maker 
tries to get back what he has lost.  An increase from an insecure job approval below 50% 
to above 55% should result in less risky, cooperative behavior as the decision-maker 
attempts to hold on to his gain. 
 
TABLE 6.5     Loss Aversion and Gain Endowment 
                        Mean Conflict Scores 4 & 8 weeks before/after Job Approval Shift crossing 50% 
  
Mean 4 
weeks 
before 
Mean 4 
weeks 
after 
Equality of 
Means 
(2-tailed test) 
Mean 8 
weeks 
before 
Mean 8 
weeks 
after 
Equality of 
Means 
(2-tailed test) 
Loss Aversion -0.7846 -1.0803 0.367 -0.9124 -1.2941 0.111 
        
Gain Endowment -2.0504 -1.1489 0.038 -1.5290 -1.3103 0.479 
 
 In the rows labeled loss aversion and gain endowment, the data moves as 
expected.  When job approval decreases below 50% (loss aversion), the mean interaction 
score becomes more conflictual after the drop in job approval in comparison to the 
weeks before the shift.  When job approval increases from below 50% to above 55% 
(gain endowment), the mean interaction score becomes less conflictual.  This result is 
the same for both four and eight week periods.  Although the means move in the 
expected direction, a test of the equality of the means reveals only a hint of loss aversion 
for the eight week period (sig. .111).  Evidence from the data does suggest support for 
gain endowment.  When approval moves from below 50% to above 55%, there is a 
                                                          
30 Table 6.8 is based on data collected before and after the following periods.  Decrease in approval: 
4/30/1973, 11/11/1974, 8/4/1975, 2/14/1978, 1/22/1979, 3/10/1980, 12/14/1981, 12/5/1986, 1/18/1992.  
Increase in approval: 6/2/1975, 10/13/1978, 12/3/1979, 11/21/1983, 4/5/1987. 
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significant difference in the mean conflict score 4-weeks before the gain and 4-weeks 
after the gain (sig. .038). Actions become less conflictual as the decision-maker attempts 
to secure his gains by taking fewer foreign policy risks. 
 The preceding analysis provides guarded support for a prospect theory 
explanation of risk-taking in foreign policy decision-making.  The value of these results 
is limited to what they actually explain.  Figures 6.3 to 6.7 calculate a mean interaction 
score based on foreign policy actions and the most recent job approval rating.  Although 
this is valuable information and an essential first step, the complexity of foreign policy 
decisions requires models that account for influences from both the domestic and 
international systems.   
 
Modeling the Foreign Policy System 
 Foreign policy decisions are actions and reactions in a dynamic environment.  
The president is constantly monitoring his political context and assessing inputs from the 
domestic and international systems.  The course of action he chooses takes into account 
the constraints and opportunities from the political context and is congruent with the 
decision-maker’s current risk orientation.  Each decision creates a new decision-making 
context as the actors react to a new set of circumstances.  Furthermore, the president is 
making foreign policy decisions simultaneously with his domestic policy efforts.  
Presidents are cognizant of their public standing because they desire to maintain their 
political capital to aid in the governing process.   
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 Although numerous scholars have applied prospect theory to international 
relations in order to explain foreign policy decisions (see McDermott 1998; McDermott 
and Kugler 2001; Berejikian 1997; Farnham 1994), each of these efforts relies heavily 
on detailed case studies of foreign policy events.  This study applies a prospect theory 
framework to foreign policy decision-making using a large-n, quantitative model.  The 
model replicates the dynamic process of foreign policy in the smallest increments 
possible given the constraints of the data.   
Data limitations result from available information lagging behind possible social 
science applications.  Monthly calculations of unemployment figures and irregular 
fielding of many survey questions hamper the development of time series data in 
increments smaller than monthly or quarterly.  Media data relating to foreign policy is 
available, but the media (Reuters) is the source for the KEDS interaction data used in 
this study.  The inclusion of a media variable result in a correlation problem between 
media mentions of foreign policy and the foreign policy event data.   
 Any model of the foreign policy decision-making process is at best a limited 
representation of reality due to the vast number of influences in the foreign policy 
system.  Similar problems confront the Federal Reserve’s efforts to model the economy. 
However, despite extensive efforts to capture and quantify what we perceive as 
the key macroeconomic relationships, our knowledge about many of the 
important linkages is far from complete and, in all likelihood, will always remain 
so.  Every model, no matter how detailed or how well designed, conceptually and 
empirically, is a vastly simplified representation of the world that we experience 
with all its intricacies on a day-to-day basis.31 
 
                                                          
31 Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan remarks to the American Economic Association, January 3, 
2004. 
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Although the challenges of modeling foreign policy decisions are numerous, valuable 
knowledge results from the effort.   
The model below seeks to gain some leverage in understanding foreign policy 
decisions by “explaining as much as possible with as little as possible” (King, Keohane, 
and Verba 1994, 29).  According to King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), “If we can 
accurately explain what at first appears to be a complicated effect with a single causal 
variable or a few variables, the leverage we have over a problem is very high.” 
 My model uses four primary variables: three structural and one actor specific.  
Appendix A provides an explanation of the variables used in the model.  The structural 
variables are international actions toward the U.S., the unemployment rate, and U.S. 
actions towards other nations.  These variables form the context within which the 
president must act.  The unemployment rate serves as a proxy for the domestic 
environment.  A large body of research has found economic conditions to influence 
elections and domestic politics (Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; Chappell and Keech 1985; 
Erikson 1989; Fair 1978; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992).  If employment is 
increasing, the domestic conditions are likely to be good for the president.  In contrast, 
declining employment creates dissatisfaction with the administration.  Certainly there are 
other options for assessing the domestic political environment, such as inflation, growth 
in the S&P 500, or GDP.  Some scholars have employed a “misery index” that combines 
several economic indicators (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991; Meernik 
1994).  Fordham (1998) shows that many economic variables, such as unemployment 
and inflation, have conflicting supply and demand effects and including these variables 
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in the same model may be problematic.  Unemployment is a highly personal and public 
issue that is reported widely each month.   
 Job approval is the actor specific variable.  Chapter III shows that of the possible 
factors that considered political capital, job approval is the most useful and important.  
Job approval is also personal.  Presidents believe that a part of their future political 
fortunes rests with their public approval.  For the purposes of this model, I convert actual 
job approval numbers to their natural log.  The logged approval numbers below the 
reference point are multiplied by minus one.  This change allows the model to comment 
directly on the theory of reference dependence.  These variables are highly correlated 
with job approval (50% job approval reference point, .82; 55% job approval reference 
point, .80; 60% job approval reference point, .76). 
 
Vector Autoregression 
 VAR techniques allow the modeler to incorporate fewer explanatory variables 
and not specify causal relationships, allowing the data to determine the causation.  “VAR 
focuses on the causal relationships implied by the estimated reduced form of what is 
essentially an unknown structural model and on certain of that model’s dynamic 
properties” (Freeman et. al. 1989).  The multiple lags allowed in the model helps to 
control for history and reduce specification errors (Edwards and Wood 1999).  Because 
past theories of foreign policy decision-making are not a certain guide, vector auto 
regression (VAR) is an appropriate empirical method to build a theory upon.  This 
technique imposes less rigid restrictions on the parameters and does not force the 
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practitioner to specify causal direction (Edwards and Wood 1999, 334, Freeman, 
Williams, and Lin 1989, 843).  Each of the variables is regressed on the past lags of 
itself and all other variables in the model.  The numbers of lags in the models below 
were determined by using Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). 
There is some controversy in the literature whether conventional OLS-VAR 
requires stationary variables.  Sims (1980), Harvey (1990), and Doan (1996) reason 
against differencing even if the variables contain a unit root.  “They argue that the goal 
of VAR analysis is to determine the interrelationships among the variables, not the 
parameter estimates.  The main argument against differencing is that it ‘throws away’ 
information concerning the comovements in the data” (Enders 1995, 301).  Others 
suggest that unit roots can bias causal inferences from VAR results (Phillips 1992; 
Freeman et al. 1998).  Each of the variables in the model were tested for a unit root using 
the KPSS test, Phillips Perron test, and the Dickey Fuller test.  The dependent variable 
series, U.S. foreign policy actions, is stationary.  The domestic politics variable, 
unemployment, contains a unit root.  The question is whether or not to difference the 
unemployment series.  Differencing the unemployment variable gives the change in 
unemployment from one period to the next.  A change in unemployment does not 
account for the level of unemployment.  Unemployment is theoretically important to the 
model.  It is well-known that unemployment influences job approval and it is likely that 
the magnitude of unemployment is more influential than the change in unemployment.  
The results below report p-values without differencing unemployment.  A comparison of 
models with and without differenced unemployment is provided in Appendix C at the 
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end of this chapter.  The models test for residual autocorrelation using the Ljung-Box 
Test and the Lagrange Multiplier Test.   
 
Model Results—High and Medium Risk Relationships 
The models report results involving two relationships:  U.S. with all other high 
and medium risk nations and U.S./USSR.  The importance of relations with the USSR 
during the 1969 to 1992 period requires a separate examination of this relationship.  
From 1969 to 1992, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were the lone superpowers and 14% 
of all U.S. interactions were with the USSR. 
The theory presented in this paper suggests that foreign policy actions are a 
function of the direct effects of the domestic political context and the international 
system and the indirect effect of each mediated by presidential resources.  Table 6.6 
shows the influence of the variables on U.S. actions toward all other high and medium 
risk nations using three different reference points, and controlling for international 
actions and unemployment.32  The results of the model lend support to the theory.  The 
results demonstrate that US foreign policy actions toward other nations are strongly 
driven by past US actions.  This result is similar to Edwards & Wood (1999) and Wood 
and Peake (1998), who found strong inertia from past actions, indicating the US is likely 
to do in the future what it has done in the past.  Additional research has found evidence 
                                                          
32 My theory suggests that foreign policy actions are a function of both the direct effects of the domestic 
political context and the international system and the indirect effect of each mediated by presidential 
resources.  To measure the indirect effects, I attempted to use interaction terms for domestic influences 
(unemployment) and political resources (job approval) and international system (actions toward U.S.) and 
(job approval), but the interactions terms were too highly correlated with other variables.  Also, too many 
variables in a VAR model dramatically increase the degrees of freedom.   
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of reciprocity in international relations (Goldstein 1991; Goldstein and Freeman 1989, 
1990, 1991).  The fact that U.S. actions influence the actions of other nations and other 
nations influence U.S. actions is not surprising.   
 
TABLE 6.6     Granger Test for Influence on US Foreign Policy Actions 
                        All High and Medium Risk Relationships 
  
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
Block 
 
Reference 
Point 
50% 
 
Reference 
Point 
55% 
 
Reference 
Point 
60% 
USA Foreign 
Policy Actions 
 
 USA Actions 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
 International Actions 0.044 0.023 0.010 
    
 Unemployment 0.002 0.014 0.060 
    
 Job Approval Reference Point 0.001 0.023 0.368 
    
 Number of observations 624 624 624 
 AIC 18.97 20.21 20.37 
    
Note:  The numbers in the tables are p values calculated from Granger causality Wald Test (Chi-squared 
statistics).  The data is in two-week increments with one lag used in the analysis.  Two lags were tested 
and it was determined that 1 lag yielded a lower BIC than two lags.  Dummy variables are included for 
Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan presidencies.  There were 625 observations running from 1/5/69 to 
12/31/92. 
Note: High and medium risk relationships are listed in Table 6.3 
 
The primary variable of interest is the job approval reference point.  In two of the 
three models (50% and 55%), the reference point is significant.  This means when 
presidential job approval moves from above the reference point to below the reference 
point, actions become more conflictual (i.e., actions move down the -10 to +10 scale).  
Using the AIC to compare the three models, the reference point at 50% performs slightly 
better than the other two.   
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How do we know that 50% is better than 49% or 51%?  To answer this question, 
I ran repeated models changing the reference point each time.  Table 6.7 shows that the 
model with a significant reference point and the lowest AIC, indicating the model with 
the best fit, is exactly 50%.  As explored earlier in this chapter, this figure makes 
theoretical sense.   
 
TABLE 6.7    Analysis of Job Approval Reference Point  
                       Significance levels at 95% confidence intervals 
 
Reference Point Break 
Significance of 
 Reference Point 
 
AIC 
47+ .007 20.17 
48+ .008 20.07 
49+ .006 20.13 
50+ .003 20.02 
51+ .001 20.11 
52+ .001 20.30 
53+ .001 20.23 
54+ .016 20.21 
55+ .020 20.22 
56+ .123 20.58 
57+ .578 20.58 
58+ .365 20.68 
59+ .608 20.64 
60+ .368 20.37 
 
Since a VAR model provides information concerning all possible causal 
relationships, I can report the influences on the job approval reference point and 
comment on indirect influences on U.S. foreign policy actions.  Table 6.8 shows that the 
influences on the job approval reference point are the previous value of the reference 
point, U.S. foreign policy actions, and unemployment.  It is not surprising that both U.S. 
actions and unemployment (economy) influence job approval, since each of these 
variables forms a component of job approval ratings.   
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TABLE 6.8     Influence on the Reference Point (High and Medium Risk) 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
Block 
 
Reference 
Point 
50% 
 
Reference 
Point 
55% 
 
Reference 
Point 
60% 
Reference Point  
 USA Actions  0.003 0.975 0.849 
     
 International Actions  0.391 0.082 0.303 
    
 Unemployment  0.000 0.002 0.013 
    
 Job Approval Reference Point  0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
 Number of observations 624 624 624 
 AIC 18.97 20.21 20.38 
    
Note:  The numbers in the tables are p values calculated from Granger causality Wald Test (Chi-squared 
statistics).  The data is in two-week increments with one lag used in the analysis.  Dummy variables are 
included for Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan presidencies.   
Note: High and medium risk relationships are listed in Table 6.3 
 
 
The significance of unemployment’s influence on U.S. foreign policy is puzzling.  
Proponents of the diversionary theory have suggested that the president will use force 
when confronted with a poor economy to divert attention from the economy.  I believe 
that there are reasons that this model cannot be used to support that theory.  First, when 
the model is run without the job approval reference point variable, unemployment is not 
significant at the .05 level.  This would lead me to believe that unemployment has an 
indirect effect on U.S. foreign policy actions through job approval.  A second and less 
likely explanation is that foreign nations know when the U.S. domestic economy is poor 
and become more conflictual, which forces presidents to respond in-kind.  Figure 6.8 
graphically summarizes the results of the three models with the job approval reference 
points at 50%, 55%, and 60%.  When the job approval reference point is set at 60%, job 
approval does not influence U.S. foreign policy actions.  
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FIGURE 6.8    Foreign Policy Decision-Making Model-High/Medium Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  Solid lines are significant at the .05 level. 
           Dotted lines represent hypothesized relationships that are not significant.  
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US/USSR Relationship 
 During the period from 1969 to 1992, relations with the Soviet Union required a 
disproportionate amount of attention from U.S. presidents, and therefore were highly 
salient to the American public.  Figure 6.9 shows a model identical to the previous 
analysis but limited to U.S./USSR interactions from 1969 to 1992 (results compiled from 
Tables 6.9 and 6.10).  The results tell an interesting story concerning U.S. and Soviet 
relations.  During the period from 1969 to 1992, no U.S. and Soviet interactions 
involved the use of force.  Therefore, the data represents day-to-day interactions between 
the countries.  In the models where the job approval reference point is 50% and 55%, 
U.S. actions toward the Soviet Union are influenced by past U.S. actions and the 
president’s job approval, and not by Soviet actions.  In contrast, when the reference point 
is 60%, U.S. actions are not influenced by job approval.  As job approval increases, 
USSR actions are more influential on U.S. actions.  At a 60% job approval reference 
point, USSR actions influence U.S. actions at the .06 level.  This would indicate that as 
job approval decreases, the behavior of U.S. foreign policy is more influenced by job 
approval than Soviet actions.  As with the previous set of models, unemployment is not 
significant when the reference point is removed from the model.  In the models where 
the job approval reference point is set at 50% and 55%, the reference point variable is 
significant.  As job approval declines below the reference point, actions toward the 
USSR become more conflictual.  In the 50% and 55%% models, U.S. actions are not 
influenced by Soviet actions.   
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TABLE 6.9    Influence on US Foreign Policy Actions Toward USSR 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
Block 
 
Reference 
Point 
50% 
 
Reference 
Point 
55% 
 
Reference 
Point 
60% 
USA Foreign 
Policy Actions 
 
 USA Actions 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
 International Actions  0.130 0.110 0.064 
    
 Unemployment 0.020 0.023 0.131 
    
 Job Approval Reference Point  0.031 0.021 0.902 
    
 Number of observations 624 624 624 
 AIC 16.50 17.73 17.90 
    
Note:  The numbers in the tables are p values calculated from Granger causality Wald Test (Chi-squared 
statistics).  The data is in two-week increments with one lag used in the analysis.  Two lags were tested 
and it was determined that 1 lag yielded a lower BIC than two lags.  Dummy variables are included for 
Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan presidencies.  There were 625 observations running from 1/5/69 to 
12/31/92. 
 
 
 
TABLE 6.10    Influence on the Reference Point (USA/USSR) 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
Block 
 
Reference 
Point 
50% 
 
Reference 
Point 
55% 
 
Reference 
Point 
60% 
Reference Point  
 USA Actions 0.034 0.577 0.851 
     
 International Actions 0.451 0.365 0.703 
    
 Unemployment 0.005 0.005 0.018 
    
 Job Approval Reference Point 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
 Number of observations 624 624 624 
 AIC 16.50 17.73 17.90 
    
Note:  The numbers in the tables are p values calculated from Granger causality Wald Test (Chi-squared 
statistics).   
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FIGURE 6.9     Foreign Policy Decision-Making Model-U.S./Soviet Union 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  Solid lines are significant at the .05 level. 
           Dotted lines represent hypothesized relationships that are not significant. 
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Results Dependent on the USSR 
Fourteen percent (14%) of all U.S. interactions from 1969 to 1992 involved the 
USSR.  In order to insure that the reported results are not dependent on the inclusion of 
interactions with the USSR in the model, Table 6.11 shows the models resulting from all 
high and medium risk relationships excluding the USSR.  The influence of the job 
approval references point at 50% and 55% is consistent with the models presented 
above.   
 
TABLE 6.11     Influence on US Foreign Policy Actions (No USSR) 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
Block 
 
Reference 
Point 
50% 
 
Reference 
Point 
55% 
 
Reference 
Point 
60% 
USA Foreign 
Policy Actions 
 
 USA Actions 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
 International Actions  0.010 0.010 0.009 
    
 Unemployment 0.073 0.179 0.258 
    
 Job Approval Reference Point  0.004 0.315 0.585 
    
 Number of observations 624 624 624 
 AIC 18.40 19.60 19.80 
    
Note:  The numbers in the tables are p values calculated from Granger causality Wald Test (Chi-squared 
statistics).  The data is in two-week increments with one lag used in the analysis.  Two lags were tested 
and it was determined that 1 lag yielded a lower BIC than two lags.  Dummy variables are included for 
Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan presidencies.  There were 625 observations running from 1/5/69 to 
12/31/92. 
 
Tables 6.6 to 6.10 report Granger causal test numbers.  Regression coefficients in 
VAR models are difficult to interpret because of high colinearity resulting from the lags 
in the model; consequently, analysts typically do not interpret coefficients but track the 
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system dynamics.  Appendix D at the end of the chapter includes graphs of impulse and 
response functions.  The graphs show the result when introducing an impulse or shock to 
the reference point variable, foreign policy actions become more conflictual for 3-4 
periods (6-8 weeks) in high/medium risk relationships and 1-2 periods (2-4 weeks) in 
relations with the USSR.   
 
Discussion 
 The difference of means test and the full VAR models support the theory that the 
foreign policy behavior of presidents is influenced by their propensity to take risks and 
the level of acceptable risk is a function of political capital.  The VAR models control 
for the influence of international actions toward the U.S., domestic political conditions, 
and the political capital of the president.  As hypothesized, when a president’s job 
approval decreases below a reference point, the president becomes more risk-acceptant 
(H1).  Similarly, when a president’s job approval increases above a reference point, 
foreign policy actions become more cooperative (H2).  These results hold for job 
approval reference points at 50% and 55%.  Foreign policy actions are not influenced by 
the job approval reference point at 60%.  Additionally, there is strong evidence for an 
endowment effect, and less evidence for loss aversion (H3&H4).  When a president’s job 
approval increases from below 50% to above 55%, president’s become more cooperative 
(risk-averse) in the short term in order to hold on to the gain.  President’s with a drop in 
approval from above 55% to below 50% become more conflictual (risk-acceptant), but 
the mean differences are not significant at the .05 level.  According to the models, the 
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domestic economy (unemployment) influences both job approval and foreign policy 
actions.  It is more likely that unemployment indirectly influences foreign policy actions 
through job approval (H5).  When job approval is removed from the model, 
unemployment does not influence foreign policy actions.   
 The important elements in my theory are presidential political capital (job 
approval) and risk-propensity.  The politically rational president becomes more 
conflictual in his foreign policy actions as his popularity declines and more cooperative 
as his popularity increases.  When a president is unpopular, the status quo is 
unacceptable and efforts are made to confront the problem.  When a president is popular 
the status quo is acceptable and efforts are made to maintain the current state.  The shift 
between the two positions occurs around a reference point.  According to this analysis, 
the most likely reference point is 50% job approval.  Although determining whether this 
reaction is due to a belief that conflictual actions will increase his standing in the public 
or a natural human tendency toward risk-acceptant behavior is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, I believe prospect theory offers a more reasonable explanation for the data.  
The diversionary theory suggests that presidents will resort to using force to divert the 
attention of the public from poor domestic conditions, yet major military operations are 
no more likely to occur when the president is popular than when the president is 
unpopular (Table 6.12).   
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TABLE 6.12  High Profile Conflicts Involving the United States from Nixon to Bush 1** 
  Job approval prior to use of force 
Military Operation Beginning Date 90 days 60 days 30 days Domain 
U.S. Intervention in Lebanon 08/01/82 45 45 42 Loss 
U.S. Invasion of Grenada 10/23/83 42 43 47 Loss 
U.S. Invasion of Panama 12/20/89 68 60 69 Gain 
U.S. Invasion of Kuwait (Iraq) 08/20/90 65 69 60 Gain 
U.S. Intervention in Somalia 08/14/92 41 38 32 Loss 
U.S. Occupation of Haiti 09/19/94 45 42 45 Loss 
NATO Intervention in Bosnia  11/08/95 45 44 46 Loss 
Kosovo War 04/07/99 65 68 68 Gain 
Afghanistan War 10/07/01 50 55 *54 Mixed 
U.S. Invasion of Iraq 03/19/03 61 58 58 Gain 
      
Single Incidents      
The Mayaguez Rescue Operation  05/12/75 39 38 44 Loss 
Iranian Hostage Rescue  04/24/80 58 55 39 Loss 
Down Libyan planes (Gulf of Sidra) 04/19/81 51 55 60 Gain 
Bombing of Libya 04/15/86 63 64 63 Gain 
Down Libyan planes (Gulf of Sidra) 01/04/89 54 51 57 Mixed 
Bombing in Sudan, Afghanistan 09/20/98 60 63 60 Gain 
Bombing in Iraq/UNSCOM 12/16/98 63 65 66 Gain 
      
Note:  Unless noted, all job approval numbers are Gallup polls.    
*Democracy Corps poll 9/6/01.  Gallup did not conduct a poll until after the 9/11/01 terrorists attack 
(9/22/01) and Bush's approval had jumped to 90%. 
**Vietnam excluded because the war had begun before Nixon took office in January 1969. 
 
If presidents can count on the use of force to raise their approval ratings, why not 
use force more often?  I believe presidents view the use of force as a risky foreign policy 
tool to be used with discretion and not for personal gain.  This dissertation examines all 
foreign policy interactions, not just the use of force, and finds support for a prospect 
theory explanation of presidential foreign policy decision-making.  Also, the data 
suggest a diminishing value for approval as approval increases.   
The preceding analysis reveals some interesting tendencies in foreign policy 
decision-making.  In relations with high and medium risk nations, U.S. foreign policy is 
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influenced by past U.S. actions and the actions of other nations (reciprocity).  This is not 
a surprising finding in light of previous work in this area.  Reciprocity helps to explain 
why a president will use force even when he is popular.  As the president’s job approval 
drops below 55%, job approval begins to influence foreign policy actions, and future 
actions become more conflictual.   
 In U.S. and USSR interactions, the results are slightly different.  U.S. policy 
towards the USSR is influenced by past U.S. actions and job approval when approval is 
below 55%.  As job approval increases to 60%, U.S. actions are not influenced by 
approval, but by past actions and actions by the USSR.  In other words, a popular 
president is more reactive toward the USSR and an unpopular president more proactive.   
The idea that presidential behavior varies according to the context has important 
implications for continued study of foreign policy decision-making.  In the final chapter, 
I will summarize the findings of this dissertation and suggest some possible extensions 
of the analysis. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The introduction to this dissertation suggests that how a president makes foreign 
policy decisions remains an unanswered question.  This study is only a first step and 
represents one approach to further our understanding of presidential foreign policy 
actions.  In this final chapter, I revisit my approach to studying foreign policy decision-
making, comment on contributions this dissertation makes to the study of the presidency 
and foreign policy, and propose promising directions for future study. 
 
Approach to the Study 
 The theoretical approach and the models created in this study attempt to mimic 
three important realities of the foreign policy arena, the systemic, the dynamic, and the 
political.  Determining causal influences on the president is challenging because of the 
large number of possible variables and time sensitive nature of foreign policy.  I 
designed the models to reflect these fundamental realities and capture key causal 
relationships.   
The foreign policy arena is a complete system.  Foreign policies result from the 
interaction of the international system, domestic politics, and individual actors.  A 
consideration of each of these factors improves our ability to understand foreign policy.  
By combining international, domestic, and actor-specific variables in one model, I am 
able to replicate closely actual system related processes. 
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The nature of the foreign policy system is dynamic rather than static.  It is a 
constantly moving target.  Because each action by a member of the system results in a 
reaction, foreign policy actions by one member of the system result in a new decision-
making environment.  Using Vector Autoregression (VAR) statistical techniques, I 
model the foreign policy system in bi-weekly periods rather than monthly or quarterly 
periods and test for causal relationships among key independent variables.   
The political nature of foreign policy makes isolation from the influence of 
domestic politics impossible.  Presidents recognize that there are domestic and 
international consequences that result from foreign policy decisions.  Depending on the 
perceived success or failure of his foreign policy-decisions, reaction from the public, 
media, and Congress can increase or decrease the president’s ability to govern 
domestically in the future.  
The systemic, dynamic, and political nature of the foreign policy system creates a 
decision-making environment that the scholar must endeavor to comprehend fully.  The 
president is not a causal mechanism that responds to stimulus A with response B.  As 
presidents assess their political context, they make foreign policy choices that they deem 
appropriate, represent good policy, and match their risk propensity.  In making foreign 
policy decisions, presidents have a range of conflictual and cooperative policy choices.  
The findings of this dissertation lend support to the theory that presidents will respond in 
a more conflictual manner when their job approval is below a job approval reference 
point and more cooperatively when above the same job approval reference point.   
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The Politically Rational Decision-Maker 
 The politics of decision-making plays a prominent role in my analysis of how 
presidents make foreign policy decisions.  Although all presidents desire to make good 
public policy, other objectives such as reelection, maintaining influence, and legacy 
goals influence presidential decisions.  I argue that when faced with a decision, politics 
plays an important role in choosing among alternative policy choices.  The contribution 
of this dissertation is the development of a theoretical approach that provides a link 
between structural and individual theories of foreign policy decision-making, improving 
our ability to explain how presidents make foreign policy decisions.   
 Presidential decision-making occurs in an environment with numerous incentives 
and constraints that influence the president.  The models presented in Chapter VI show 
that both domestic politics and the international system influence presidential foreign 
policy decisions, and presidential political capital.  The primary explanatory factors in 
the study of U.S. foreign policy actions are risk propensity and political capital, 
measured by job approval.  The analysis shows that the propensity to take foreign policy 
risk increases as job approval drops below 50% and decreases as job approval moves 
upward.  Numerous experiments have documented the tendency of individuals in a 
domain of loss to take extraordinary risk; these results indicate a similar response in a 
large-n study.   
 It is relatively straightforward to recognize the importance of a job approval 
number above 50% for the president.  Although job approval is no panacea for leaders, 
presidents need to operate from a position of strength in order to have the greatest 
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opportunity for success.  The desire to regain lost approval and maintain high approval 
alters the probability that the president will take risks in foreign policy actions. 
 I argue that the greatest risk in foreign policy for a U.S. president is failure.  The 
United States is the strongest nation in the world both militarily and economically, and 
the public expects foreign policy success.  Although both cooperation and conflict 
involve some level of risk, the prospect of failure and consequences of failure increase 
when actions involve conflict.  The politically rational decision maker is less willing to 
jeopardize political capital unless he is in a domain of loss.   
 It is possible to explain a large portion of day-to-day U.S. foreign policy actions 
by the concepts of consistency and reciprocity.  Past U.S. actions (consistency) and the 
actions of other nations toward the U.S. (reciprocity), shape U.S. foreign policy actions 
toward other nations.  The uniqueness of this study is to show that foreign policy 
behavior changes, violates consistency and reciprocity, near a job approval reference 
point of 50%.  The political context matters to the president.  
 In Chapter II, I suggest that a comprehensive theory of foreign policy should help 
to explain anomalies in this field of study.  These questions include: 
• Why are presidential foreign policy actions sometimes congruent with public 
opinion and other times contradictory to public opinion?   
• Why are presidential foreign policy actions sometimes cooperative and 
sometimes conflictual, even under similar circumstances?   
• Why do some presidents take more foreign policy risk than others do? 
 
By focusing on the risk propensity and political capital of the president in a prospect 
theory framework, the answers to each of these questions become clearer.  
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Future Study 
 There are many approaches to studying foreign policy decision-making and the 
large-n study of this dissertation represents one method.  A focus on two important 
questions provides an opportunity to extend this analysis into the future.  First, how does 
the increasing interdependence of the world’s economy affect presidential foreign policy 
decisions and relationships with domestic institutions?  Globalism has changed 
economic relationships between the U.S. and many key nations such as China and India.  
U.S. companies increasingly commit huge resources to operations in other countries.  
Jacobs and Page (2005, 120) find that “internationally oriented business leaders exercise 
strong, consistent, and perhaps lopsided influence on the makers of U.S. foreign policy.”  
The influence of economic interdependence on international relations and domestic 
business interests on presidential decision-making are important considerations in the 
future study of foreign policy.  Second, how and when do domestic elites in the media, 
business community, think tanks, and other interest groups influence presidential 
decision-making?  Considerable qualitative research has documented the influence of 
these groups, yet it is very difficult to quantify their influence.  We know very little 
about the relative influence of the mass public versus elite groups on presidential 
decisions.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Public Opinion 
The primary public opinion variable of interest is presidential job approval.  
Since 1945, Gallup has been using a standard approval question:  “Do you approve or 
disapprove of the way that [president’s name] is handling his job as president?”  The 
Gallup data provides the most complete time series of presidential approval information 
available.  The Gallup time series is not entirely complete.  Additional presidential job 
approval survey data from CBS/New York Times polls from 1976 to 1992 were added to 
the series and bi-weekly data computed using Stimson’s algorithm for combining survey 
data (Erikson, Mackuen, Stimson 2002, 32). 
 
Foreign Policy Actions 
The dependent variable in question is U.S. foreign policy actions.  For the 
purposes of this study, a data set is produced that includes all interactions between the 
U.S. and high and medium risk nations.  A bi-weekly time series of foreign policy 
actions from 1969 to 1992 is created using the PANDA24 data set.  Using machine-
readable text, the Kansas Events Data System (KEDS) parses the text into source and 
target countries and events/actions (see Schrodt and Gerner 1994 for validity tests of 
machine coded events).  The events/actions are tied to a World Event Interaction Survey 
(WEIS) code in order to categorize the action (McClelland and Hoggard 1969).  The 61 
WEIS events were weighted by Goldstein (1992) producing a conflict/cooperation scale 
ranging from –10 (military attack) to +8.3 (military assistance).  The series is divided 
into bi-weekly periods to better model real-world decision making.  Goldstein (1991) 
found that models that aggregated measures into larger periods (i.e., quarterly, yearly) 
yield less satisfying results than finer delineations such as weekly or monthly periods. 
The events are aggregated into bi-weekly data for use in time series analysis.  
Foreign policy actions will be separated into events with the USA as the source and 
events with USA as the target.  This allows the model to account for possible stimuli 
from the international political system.  This database has been used in numerous studies 
(see Wood & Peake 1998; Goldstein & Pevehouse 1997; Edwards & Wood 1999; and 
Pevehouse & Goldstein 1999) 
 
Economic Data 
 The influence of the economy on foreign policy and presidential approval is 
examined by looking at both objective and cognitive factors.  Objective indicators of the 
economy, including unemployment and inflation statistics, are obtained from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics at the U.S. Department of Labor.  Additionally, consumer 
expectations concerning the economy is measured by using data from the Index of 
Consumer Sentiment (University of Michigan Survey Research Center).   
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APPENDIX B 
 
KEDS PROJECT MODIFIED WEIS EVENT CODES WITH GOLDSTEIN SCALE VALUES 
 
 
Code Meaning  Goldstein Weight 
223 MILITARY ENGAGEMENT -10 
211 SEIZE POSSESSION  -9.2 
212 ARREST PERSON  -9 
220 FORCE   -9 
225 ASSASSINATE TORTURE -9 
222 NONMILITARY DESTR -8.7 
221 NONINJURY DESTR -8.3 
226 COUP ATTEMPTED  -8 
182 MILITARY DEMO  -7.6 
173 SPECIF THREAT  -7 
195 BREAK DIPL RELAT -7 
224 RIOT  VIOLENT CLASH -7 
174 ULTIMATUM  -6.9 
170 THREATEN  -6 
180 DEMONSTRATE  -6 
196 STRIKE   -6 
172 NONMIL THREAT  -5.8 
193 CUT AID   -5.6 
181 NONMIL DEMO  -5.2 
113 DEFY LAW  -5 
152 CLAIM RIGHTS  -5 
197 CENSOR   -5 
200 EXPEL   -5 
201 EXPEL PERSONNEL -5 
203 BAN ORGANIZATION -5 
204 EXPEL FROM GOVT -5 
210 SEIZE FINE  -5 
214 SPY   -5 
150 DEMAND   -4.9 
202 EXPEL GROUP  -4.9 
171 UNSPECIFIED THREAT -4.4 
192 CUT ROUTINE ACT  -4.1 
110 REJECT   -4 
111 TURN DOWN  -4 
112 REFUSE   -4 
151 ISSUE COMMAND  -4 
190 REDUCE RELATIONS -4 
198 WITHDRAW FROM  -4 
194 HALT NEGOTIATION -3.8 
122 DENIGRATE DENOUNCE -3.4 
160 WARN   -3 
161 WARN POLICIES  -3 
162 WARN OF PROBLEM -3 
213 KIDNAP SENTENCE JAIL -2.5 
132 FORMAL PROTEST  -2.4 
121 CRITICIZE  -2.2 
191 CANCEL EVENT  -2.2 
114 ALTER RULES  -2 
120 ACCUSE   -2 
130 PROTEST   -1.9 
131 MAKE COMPLAINT -1.9 
63 GRANT ASYLUM  -1.1 
123 INVESTIGATE  -1 
133 SYMBOLIC ACT  -1 
140 DENY   -1 
Code Meaning  Goldstein Weight 
141 DENY ACCUSATION -0.9 
22 PESSIMIST COMMENT -0.4 
96 REQUEST POLICY CHANGE -0.3 
97 REQUEST RIGHTS  -0.3 
23 NEUTRAL COMMENT -0.2 
21 DECLINE COMMENT -0.1 
94 CALL FOR  -0.1 
102 URGE   -0.1 
20 COMMENT  0 
25 EXPLAIN POSITION 0 
91 ASK INFORMATION 0.1 
24 OPTIMIST COMMENT 0.4 
100 PROPOSE   0.5 
11 SURRENDER  0.6 
2 RETREAT  0.6 
10 YIELD   1 
30 CONSULT  1 
31 MEET   1 
34 VOTE ELECT  1 
95 PLEAD   1.2 
101 OFFER PROPOSAL  1.5 
61 APOLOGIZE  1.8 
32 VISIT   1.9 
66 RELEASE   1.9 
13 RETRACT  2 
60 GRANT   2 
62 STATE INVITATION 2.5 
33 RECEIVE   2.8 
54 ASSURE   2.8 
65 TRUCE   2.9 
14 ACCOMODATE CEASEFIRE 3 
82 AGREE FUTURE ACT 3 
90 REQUEST  3 
41 PRAISE   3.4 
92 ASK POLICY AID  3.4 
93 ASK MATERIAL AID 3.4 
40 APPROVE  3.5 
67 APPOINT   3.5 
42 ENDORSE  3.6 
43 RALLY   3.8 
50 PROMISE   4 
51 PROMISE POLICY SUPPORT 4.5 
53 PROMISE OTHER SUPPORT 4.5 
55 PROMISE RIGHTS  4.5 
15 CEDE POWER  5 
52 PROMISE MAT'L SUPPORT 5.2 
64 GRANT PRIVILEGE  5.4 
80 AGREE   6 
83 ALLY   6 
73 GIVE OTHER ASSIST 6.5 
81 MAKE AGREEMENT 6.5 
70 REWARD   7 
71 EXTEND ECON AID 7.4 
72 EXTEND MIL AID  8.3 
84 MERGE INTEGRATE 10 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
Comparison of Results of Differenced versus Not Differenced Unemployment 
Granger Tests for Influence on US Foreign Policy Actions 
 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
Block 
 
Reference Point 50% 
 
 Not Differenced Differenced 
All High and Medium Risk Relationships  
USA Foreign 
Policy Actions 
 
 USA Actions 0.000 0.004  
 International Actions 0.044 0.008  
 Unemployment 0.002 0.474  
 Job Approval Reference Point 0.001 0.035  
    
 Number of observations 624 624  
 AIC 18.97 19.04  
    
US and USSR Relationship    
    
USA Foreign 
Policy Actions 
  
 USA Actions 0.000 0.000  
 International Actions 0.130 0.028  
 Unemployment 0.020 0.474  
 Job Approval Reference Point 0.031 0.191  
    
 Number of observations 624 624  
 AIC 16.49 16.57  
    
High/Medium Risk Relationships (No USSR    
    
USA Foreign 
Policy Actions 
  
 USA Actions 0.000 0.000  
 International Actions 0.010 0.008  
 Unemployment 0.073 0.485  
 Job Approval Reference Point 0.004 0.017  
    
 Number of observations 624 624  
 AIC 18.40 18.43  
Note:  The numbers in the tables are Chi-squared statistics; p values in parentheses.   
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APPENDIX D 
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